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Abstract 
This thesis explores the nature of creativity in the poetic vision of Percy Bysshe Shelley. 
"Poetic vision" is chosen for its complex connotations, which include creative imaginings, 
dreams and intimations of futurity. I examine questions that Shelley raises concerning 
perception, existence and the fabric of reality. To develop a conceptual framework that has an 
ontological basis, I draw on the theories of two twentieth-century non-dualist thinkers: David 
Bohm, who combines science, philosophy and art, and the existential thought of Martin 
Heidegger. I also investigate ways in which literary expression and life become interwoven and 
suggest that this reciprocity is explicable through a dynamically creative vision of existence. 
In Chapter One Shelley's reflections on the creative capacity of poetic visions to influence 
states of being, and his holistic apprehension of existence in On Life, provide the thesis with a 
conceptual paradigm which is in contradistinction to the Cartesian schism between mind and 
matter. A Defence of Poetry is contrasted with Peacock's The Four Ages of Poetry to show that 
the contention between the two writers' visions springs from questions relating to being. 
Shelley's declaration that the poetic impulse is central to life is examined in the light of 
Heidegger's notion of the poetic as disclosing being and Bohm's quantum concepts of creativity. 
In Chapter Two Alastor is interpreted as a poem which raises questions about existence and 
I provide a counter-approach to critical positions of scepticism. Heidegger's concepts of "Being-
in-the-world" and "Being-towards-death" provide the basis for an existential analysis of the 
Poet's impassioned quest. A comparison between the Poet's dream of his feminine counterpart 
and Shelley's own vision of his ideal beloved reveals connections between artistic vision and 
human experience. 
In Chapter Three on Laon and Cythna. poetic vision is shown to operate from a metaphysical 
basis of thought, passion, and the human wil l to enact a radical transformation in consciousness. 
The poem's investigation of freedom is linked to Heidegger's concept of being absorbed in the 
"they." Chapter Four continues my extended reading of Laon and Cythna. Shelley's notion of 
creativity collapses the demarcations between imaginative vision and the physical world. Here 
his view of reality is contrasted with the psychological investigations of Jean Piaget. The poem's 
vision of human empowerment is compared with Peacock's fatalism in Ahrimanes. 
Chapter Five investigates challenges to Shelley's optimism. Julian and Maddalo is the major 
poem interpreted in a chapter where the keynote is the contention between theories about the 
nature of reality and their validity to human life. Shelley's anxiety about communicating visions 
of despair is analyzed with regard to the Maniac's tragic predicament. 
Chapter Six interprets Prometheus Unbound as a dramatic engagement with the spiritual, 
imaginative, emotional and sensuous planes of being. Existence is seen to be poised on a mobile 
nexus of thought and emotions. Asia has a dynamic role and, through consideration of her 
journey with Panthea to Demogorgon, I examine Shelley's complex negotiation between free will 
and determinism. Spinoza's monism is discussed in relation to "Love's Philosophy." 
In Chapter Seven on Hellas. "Thought", "Passion", "Wil l" , "Reason" and the "Imagination" 
are shown to have creative powers which determine futurity. Questions about the structure of 
reality are explored in the drama's dynamic interchange between the magician-like Ahasuerus 
and the Turkish tyrant Mahmud. Dreams are given significance as avenues of perception to 
realms beyond conscious experience and in relation to unfolding the future. 
Finally, in Chapter Eight Shelley's ideas about poetic creativity are explored through his 
poems to Jane Williams. Whilst composing these lyrics Shelley used the figure of Rousseau, in 
the Triumph of Life, to suggest a reciprocity between art and life. I examine the similarities 
between Rousseau's fictional creation of Julie in La Nouvelle Heloise and his subsequent love 
for Sophie d'Houdetot. Shelley's lyrics to Jane Williams communicate desire at different levels 
of conscious awareness, from trance-like mesmerism to overt invitation. 
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Preface 
This thesis explores the nature of creativity in the poetic vision of Percy Bysshe Shelley. 
"Poetic vision" is chosen to connote a dynamic multiplicity of meanings: creative imaginings, 
dreams, and intimations of futurity. Questions concerning perception, existence and the 
structure of reality have a significant role in this thesis. Shelley's reflections on the nature of 
poetic creativity and its power to affect human existence in A Defence of Poetry have, I shall 
argue, a daring originality it is important not to underestimate. Crucially Shelley affirms that 
poetry "creates for us a being within our being" (PP. 505). I investigate the far-reaching 
implications of this statement by focusing on the nature of "being", that is, questions of 
ontological significance. Central to Shelley's apprehension of existence is the premise that 
"The view of life presented by the most refined deductions of the intellectual philosophy, is that 
of unity" (PP. 477). This interconnected "view of life" provides the thesis with a key 
conceptual paradigm of existence. Here my interpretation is in contradistinction to the 
Cartesian schism between mind and matter, and the sense of alienation from the world that this 
dualism generates. Discussions about the philosophical foundations of dualism and holism are 
offered in Chapters One and Two. 
For Shelley, imaginative visions are the very basis of existence. In Prometheus Unbound 
the Earth speaks of a post-mortal realm in which exist "Dreams and the light imaginings of 
men / And all that faith creates, or love desires," (I- 200-1). These "imaginings" generate forms 
that are 'Terrible, strange, sublime and beauteous" ( I . 202). 1 pursue Shelley's emphasis on 
the way imaginative visions are energised through human emotion by considering theories on 
the frontiers between quantum physics, philosophy and psychology; theories which are yielding 
a deeper understanding of human creativity. Given the wealth of holistic theories now 
emerging about the nature of existence,1 the late twentieth century is a time "when our 
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conscious development has reached a higher level from which the poet can tell us something 
new" (SMA. 77). 
The critic of Shelley approaches his work through a dominant inheritance of scepticism,2 
which derives its assumptions from an epistemological basis. Of canonical status is Earl 
Wasserman's Shelley: A Critical Reading which stresses the "skeptical quality" in the poems.3 
Scepticism focuses on the uncertainty of knowing, and this emphasis detracts from 
investigating the questions that Shelley raises about the nature of existence, "the wonder of 
our being" (PP. 505). Consequently some of the poetry's most challenging insights into being 
are evaded when interpreted from a sceptical perspective. For instance, Ahasuerus' declaration 
in Hellas. "Nought is but that which feels itself to be" (785), demands, but has rarely received, 
analysis of its daring ontological assertion. Drawing on the theories of two twentieth-century 
non-dualist thinkers, David Bohm and Martin Heidegger, my conceptual framework is based 
on ontological enquiry. Shelley's engagement with the nature of being and his imaginative 
speculations on life are shown, in a detailed analysis in Chapter One, to anticipate some of the 
implications now arising from Bohm's quantum theories. 
It is rewarding to re-evaluate Shelley's ideas about thought, imagination and passion in 
the light of a creative thinker such as David Bohm who combines science, philosophy and art 
in his apprehensions of existence. For Bohm, human consciousness is involved in a 
fundamental participation with the universe. The affinities between Bohm's conceptions and 
Shelley's speculations are striking. For instance, in Bohm's understanding "thought is real".4 
an implicit part of reality with manifold consequences.5 Similarly for Shelley thoughts have an 
ontological status as seen in Laon and Cvthna. "Thoughts have gone forth whose powers can 
6leep no more!" (CP, 2260). Using Bohm's "implicate" and "explicate" models of reality, 
outlined in Chapter One, I analyse Shelley's fascination with "the human mind's imaginings"6 
in relation to the creation of futurity. Here Bohm's hypotheses give cogency to Shelley's 
deepest intuitions of regeneration through a radical transformation in consciousness. To 
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achieve this regeneration, poems such as Prometheus Unbound depict conflicting tensions: 
good and evil; love and hate; optimism and despair. 
Shelley's poetic vision concentrates on restructuring the latent thoughts and emotions 
which underlie the manifestation of form and events. By focusing on love as the most potent 
power of transformation, rather than envisioning the destruction of the existing order, Shelley 
expresses his hope of attaining freedom without violence. Tn works like Prometheus Unbound. 
creation through love is presented as the only tenable choice, however abject the circumstances. 
Perhaps what is most compelling in Shelley's vision is his analysis of human nature when 
besieged by circumstances which confront the bounds of human endurance. In the preface to 
The Cenci Shelley explains that 
the fit return to make to the most enormous injuries is kindness and forbearance, 
and a resolution to convert the injurer from his dark passions by peace and love. 
Revenge, retaliation, atonement, are pernicious mistakes. (PP, 240) 
Yet in the drama the ideals of "peace and love" falter under the intensity of Beatrice's 
degradation by Count Cenci. The Shelleyan reader is left to reflect on an irresolvable chasm 
between an "eminently fearful and monstrous" (PP. 239) story and the human limits of 
"kindness and forbearance." Shelley is able, however, in his greatest work '*to hope, til l Hope 
creates / From its own wreck the thing it contemplates" (Prometheus Unbound. TV. 573-4). 
This thesis does not provide an interpretation of The Cenci. as it has been my aim to limit 
Shelley's darker vision of being to a single chapter in which Julian and Maddalo was chosen 
in preference to this drama. Other omissions of Shelley's major works, largely occasioned by 
the constraints of space, include Adonais and the Triumph of Life. However some of Shelley's 
ideas about death in the former composition, and creativity in the latter work, are examined in 
the final chapter. 
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Reading Shelley's prose and poetry in the light of recent insights from quantum physics 
presents an academically adventurous challenge since physics and literature are mainly viewed 
as intellectual disciplines which are diametrically opposed.7 But such a fragmentary approach 
to thought did not exist in the early nineteenth century; Shelley's contemporaries freely pursued 
eclectic ideas. The work of Humphry Davy, for instance, "straddled any boundaries between 
physical science, physiology and psychology, and literature."* In a similar spirit Shelley's 
interest in contemporary scientific discoveries infiltrated his consciousness and imaginatively 
shaped his poetic vision.9 An interdisciplinary approach is germane when all branches of 
knowledge are pursued for a common aim: a deeper understanding of the nature of existence. 
A division between physics and philosophy has not always existed in western thought; the 
early Greek philosophers, who questioned the nature of the universe, "were regarded primarily 
as 'physicists.'"10 And this interdependence is evident in the thought of David Bohm who "was 
never able to see any inherent separation between science and philosophy" (SOC. 3). 
Philosophical speculation, which is central to Shelley's ideas about creativity, is the 
common ground which unites different disciplines. In this thesis Shelley's pursuit into 
questions about the nature of existence is also read in the context of Martin Heidegger's 
existential philosophy. Why choose the ideas of an existentialist philosopher to elucidate 
Shelley's poetic vision of being? A full discussion of the significance of Heidegger's ideas 
must be deferred until the main body of the thesis, but it is germane at this point to mention 
two of his inimitable phrases. Like Shelley, Heidegger focused on the entirety of existence, 
designated by his terms "Being-in-the-world" (BT, 78) and "Being-a-whole" (BT, 425). 
Moreover his concern with an existential quest into the nature of freedom is of specific 
relevance to Shelley's ideas. Heideggerian thought has been influential in critical discourse, 
notably with Derrida's theory of deconstruction. But my analysis of Heidegger's ideas is not 
concerned with their appropriation by critical theorists, but seeks to ascertain what insights 
they might yield into Shelley's speculations concerning the nature of existence. 
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In relation to creativity I investigate ways in which literary expression and life become 
interwoven and mutually enriching. My MA dissertation on Epipsychidion posited that 
"Structuring and self-consciously exploring personal experience through a succession of 
literary discourses, confuses the aesthetic distance between art and life; personal consciousness 
and literary consciousness become interlaced."11 The present thesis traces these 
interconnections and suggests that the degrees of reciprocity become explicable through an 
holistic and creative vision of existence. The relationship between text and subsequent 
experiences was cogently outlined by Shelley following Peacock's marriage: 
It is altogether extremely like the denouement of one of your own novels, and as 
such serves to a theory I once imagined, that in everything any man ever wrote, 
spoke, acted, or imagined, is contained, as it were, an allegorical idea of his own 
future life, as the acorn contains the oak. (LS I I , 192) 
These "allegorical" ideas represent unstructured potentiality, and the conditions necessary for 
these acorns to mature into oak trees, that is become part of life's actual experiences, is 
investigated in this study. Significantly, Shelley not only outlines a parity between Peacock's 
fiction and his life, he also implies that the creative act is not confined to the artist but 
applies to "any man."12 In this way all aspects of life, writing, speaking, acting and imagining, 
have a generative possibility, that i f sufficiently empowered, could determine one's experience 
of reality.13 In this study I examine Shelley's belief that his imaginative visions are a potent 
force on the spirit of futurity, "The trumpet of a prophecy!"14 Shelley's concept of "prophecy" 
is defined towards the end of A Defence of Poetry: "Poets are the hierophants of an 
unapprehended inspiration, the mirrors of the gigantic shadows which futurity casts upon the 
present" (PP. 508). Shelley's poems realistically acknowledge the opposition between the 
contemporary socio-political milieu and his egalitarian ideals of freedom; the tension between 
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these polarities is skilfully manipulated so that his visionary aims are given greater clarity. 
With the emphasis on the dynamic nature of vision as the source of continual creativity, my 
interpretation offers a counter proposition to accounts of Shelley's poetics as ineffectual 
utopianism.15 I explore how Shelley synthesizes the metaphysical elements of imagination, 
thought, passion and the human will into a vision that provides a paradigm for transforming 
the world. 
Chapter One formulates the theoretical foundations of the thesis and presents an holistic, 
interconnected vision of existence. Shelley's conception of unity in On Life is compared with 
Bohm's perceptual orders of reality which originate from an interrelated totality. A close 
textual reading of A Defence of Poetry, incorporating drafts from the Bodleian Shelley 
Manuscripts, suggests contrasts with Peacock's The Four Apes of Poetry. Here I argue that the 
major contention between their visions is not one of knowing, Peacock's Enlightenment 
emphasis on reason versus Shelley's exaltation of the imagination; more fundamentally, it 
springs from their differences over the nature of being. To confirm Shelley's declaration that 
the poetic impulse is central to human life, I examine Heidegger's notion of the poetic as 
disclosing being and Bohm's quantum metaphorical concepts of creativity, both of which 
claim that poetry renders the deepest insights into existence. In this chapter, and throughout 
the thesis, I examine Shelley's affirmation that poetry restructures our existing apprehensions 
of reality into a new perceptual order: "It creates anew the universe after it has been annihilated 
in our minds by the recurrence of impressions blunted by reiteration" (PP, 505-6). Accordingly, 
Shelley's poetic vision is seen as conveying insights for the regeneration of humanity since "A 
Poet... is the author to others of the highest wisdom, pleasure, virtue and glory" (PP. 506). 
Having established a "Poetics of Being," in Chapter Two I investigate Alastor's 
philosophical "questionings" as a primordial concern with the parameters of being, "Nature's 
vast frame, the web of human things, / Birth and the grave" (719-20). By focusing on questions 
of existence, my interpretation offers a counter-approach to the view of Alastor as a poem 
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implicated in scepticism. In my reading Alastor's ontological priorities are interpreted in 
relation to Heideggerian concepts such as "Being-in4he-world" and "Being4owards-death." 
Intense passion fuels the Poet's quest and is central to Shelley's creative vision. William 
Drummond's Academical Questions, which Shelley acclaims highly in On Life (PP, 476), 
explores how powerful emotions influence the state of being. Finally, a comparative 
analysis of the Poet's dream of his feminine counterpart and Shelley's vision of his ideal 
beloved and sequential meeting with Mary Shelley is shown to yield fascinating 
interconnections between artistic vision and lived experiences. 
In Chapters Three and Four I provide an extensive reading of a much neglected work, 
Laon and Cythna. In this poem Shelley's epic portrayal of freedom is interpreted as a notable 
precursor to Prometheus Unbound. Poetic vision operates from a metaphysical basis and 
works with thoughts, passion, and the indefatigable human will to enact a radical 
transformation in consciousness. Internal mental and emotional changes are shown to 
precipitate external transformations. In Chapter Three Laon and Cythna's investigation of 
freedom is linked to Heidegger's existential concepts of "authenticity" and being inauthentically 
absorbed in the '^ they." Women champion Shelley's ideals: the anonymous Woman of Canto 1 
and Cythna both impart the poem's wisdom which is conceived and relayed with love. In 
Chapter Four the very fabric of reality is questioned as Shelley collapses demarcations between 
imaginative vision and the physical world. This philosophical position of unity is explored 
through the poem's presentation of childlike modes of apprehension. Shelley's view of 
oneness, as the primary mode of existence, is contrasted with the psychological approach in 
Jean Piaget's The Child's Conception of the World. Finally Shelley's vision of self-
determination and human empowerment is compared with Peacock's fatalism in Ahrimanes. 
Chapter Five investigates the challenges to Shelley's optimism and its vision borders on 
despair. A reading of "Stanzas written in Dejection", with its theme of death as the poet's 
desired destination, opens the chapter. The keynote in this chapter is the contention between 
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theories about the nature of reality and their validity to human life. Here Julian and Maddalo is 
the major poem interpreted, and Shelley's drafting of his essay "On Love" elucidates some of 
the conflicts between freedom and possessiveness in his vision of love. The question of inter-
involvement and individuality in relationships is metaphorically addressed through the 
conceptual paradigm of the wave-particle duality in modem physics. Shelley's anxiety about 
communicating visions of despair and the consequences of this negativity on the field of 
consciousness receives a detailed analysis in relation to the Maniac's abject predicament. 
Chapter Six interprets Prometheus Unbound as a dramatic engagement with the spiritual, 
imaginative, emotional and sensuous planes of being. Existence is seen by the work as poised 
on a mobile nexus of thought and emotions. Shelley uproots Aeschylus' myth in the reader's 
consciousness by re-imagining Prometheus' suffering and redemption with an intensity that 
awakens deeper insights. Under the duress of Jupiter's torture, Prometheus experiences an 
internal transformation at the core of his being. Emotions have ontological repercussions and 
Prometheus' compassion is the necessary prerequisite for his subsequent physical release by 
Hercules. Archetypally, Prometheus symbolizes creative fire, but it is his feminine counterpart, 
Asia, who has the drama's most dynamic role. Prior to Prometheus' release, Asia and 
Panthea's journey to Demogorgon demonstrates Shelley's complex negotiation between free 
will and determinism. Asia's compliance with both her inner nature and external forces 
suggests a vision of co-creation; free choice is trustingly submitted to the cosmic power which 
brings its desires to fruition. The influence of Spinoza's monism on Shelley's poetic vision is 
examined, and his appropriation of pantheism is discussed with reference to "Love's 
Philosophy." Love permeates existence in the rejuvenated Promethean world; the ecstatic 
paradisal vision of Act IV is animated "by the love that moves the sun and the other stars."16 
In Chapter Seven, on Hellas, the freedom of Greece is at stake and for its defence Shelley 
formulates his most persuasive discussion of the power of "Thought," "Will," "Passion," 
"Reason," and the "Imagination" to decide futurity. I cite textual evidence from The "Hellas" 
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Notebook to show the numerous revisions that Shelley made to perfect this vision. 
Fundamental questions about the structure of reality are explored in the drama's dynamic 
interchange between the metaphysician Ahasuerus and the Turkish tyrant Mahmud. With 
regard to the creation of futurity, the drama presents a psychological battle where Mahmud's 
understanding of existence is effectively overthrown, thus ensuring Turkish defeat. Shelley's 
portrayal of the spectral Ahasuerus is interdependent with the natural world, and this creative 
interchange yields magician-like powers for his protagonist. Dreams are given significance as 
avenues of perception to realms beyond conscious experience, and in relaying prescience of 
futurity. Hellas reveals Shelley's understanding of the creative power of thought when animated 
by intense passion. 
Finally in Chapter Eight Shelley's ideas about poetic creativity are explored through his 
love lyrics to Jane Williams. Whilst composing these lyrics Shelley used the figure of 
Rousseau, in his draft of the Triumph of Life, to suggest an interrelationship between writing 
and life's experiences. In relation to the nature of creativity, I examine how Rousseau's 
imaginative visions dominate his perception of reality and are fervently channelled into literary 
expression. La Nouvelle Heloise and the Confessions are interpreted to reveal fascinating 
similarities between Rousseau's fictional creation of Julie and his subsequent love for Sophie 
d'Houdetot. A menage a trois is a significant trait in Rousseau's romantic leanings and equally 
implicit in Shelley's emotional psychology. Shelley's desire for Jane Williams generates some 
of his finest lyrics. I interpret the poems in the context of their accompanying missives and as 
gifts showing deep affection for Jane. Most intriguingly, the lyrics communicate desire at 
different levels of consciousness, from the trance-like mesmerism of "The Magnetic Lady to 
Her Patient" to the overt enticement in 'To Jane. The Invitation." 
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Chapter 1 
Shelley's "Poetry of Life": Encountering a Poetics of Being 
I seem as in a trance sublime and strange 
To muse on my own separate phantasy, 
My own, my human mind, which passively 
Now renders and receives fast influencings, 
Holding an unremitting interchange 
With the clear universe of things around. 
("MontBlanc", 35-40) 
I 
My opening chapter explores Shelley's holistic conception of being in On Life and the 
dynamic interchange of self and world that arises from this vision. Of central importance is A 
Defence of Poetry in which Shelley declares that poetry has a creative influence on the 
nature of being: '*the poetical faculty . . . creates new materials of knowledge, and power and 
pleasure" (PP, 503). Working with concepts from David Bohm's quantum theories and 
Martin Heidegger's existential philosophy, I take an anti-epistemological stance in order to 
construct a poetics that has the question of being at its core.1 In this theory the fundamental 
principle is one of holism in which the mental, emotional and physical planes of existence are 
understood to be intimately inter-involved. My analysis of Shelley's idea of unity is shaped by 
Bohm's understanding of reality where he envisages '*the unbroken wholeness of the totality 
of existence as an undivided flowing movement without borders" (WIO. 172). This notion of 
interrelatedness is in contradistinction to Descartes' dualistic philosophy.2 There are conceptual 
inadequacies in the Cartesian position, namely that "The link between the mechanistic events 
in the body and the spiritual events in the soul was something Descartes was never able to 
explain satisfactorily."3 Bohm and Hiley present a view of existence which addresses this 
Cartesian dilemma; they surmise that in the underlying level of reality from which all manifest 
existence emanates 'Hhere is no real division between mind and matter, psyche and soma."4 The 
fundamental concept which resonates through Bohm's work is that of wholeness: "both 
observer and observed are merging and interpenetrating aspects of one whole reality, which is 
indivisible and unanalysable" (WIO, 9). 
David Bohm's scientific speculations are not the only viewpoint from which I interpret 
Shelley's "poetry of life" (PP. 502). Philosophical insight into his assertion that the imagination 
is "the principle of synthesis, and has for its objects those forms which are common to 
universal nature and existence itself . . ." (PP. 480) is explored through Martin Heidegger's 
existential quest to "raise anew the question of the meaning of Being" (BT. 1). Like Bohm and 
Hiley's holistic conception of an "undivided universe", Heidegger's ontology is also founded 
on the premise of oneness. However Heidegger's understanding of wholeness is construed with 
the notion of disclosure or unconcealment. Such a notion differs from Bohm's fundamental 
emphasis on continual creativity. Heidegger encapsulates a sense of interconnection in his 
hyphenated designation of "Being-in-the-world" which "stands for a unitary phenomenon. 
This primary datum must be seen as a whole" (BT. 78). Both Bohm and Heidegger share a 
common aim to dislodge the influence of Cartesianism on the western spirit of humanity. In 
the twentieth century science has radically challenged its assumptions about the structure of 
reality. Bohm writes l<that both in relativity and in quantum theory the Cartesian order is 
leading to serious contradictions and confusion" (WIO. xv). Heidegger had earlier stated that 
"The relativity theory of physics arises from the tendency to exhibit the interconnectedness of 
Nature as it is 'in itself" (BT. 30). Foregrounding the nature of being as an interrelated field 
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demands a transformation in thinking in which a divisive Cartesian world-view becomes 
unsustainable.3 Bohm's scientific speculations and Heidegger's philosophical theories give 
credence to Shelley's holistic understanding of existence in On Life: "The view of life 
presented by the most refined deductions of the intellectual philosophy, is that of unity" (PP. 
477). To engage in an interplay with the thoughts of a poet, a scientist and a philosopher, 
concerning the structure of reality, is to be aware that a constant negotiation is needed between 
similarity and diversity in all approaches. Nevertheless the argument of this thesis focuses on 
the underlying common ground from which these theories originate: the primacy of being 
involved in a participatory engagement within the world. 
Bohm's work opens up new frontiers for research; he suggests ways in which inferences 
from quantum theory can elucidate a deeper understanding of human creativity.6 Like Shelley 
pondering '*the dark abyss of-— how little we know" (PP, 478), Bohm also stresses the 
provisional nature of his speculations; his insights do not specify a definitive explanation, but 
the nearest approximation that can be attained "in our present phase of unfoldment of 
consciousness" (WIO. 212). At times Bohm's work takes imaginative leaps beyond what is 
scientifically proven; but these leaps are necessary to further our understanding of the 
dynamics of life: a vision of existence which is depicted by Shelley as being "so miraculous" 
yet "so certain and so unfathomable" (PP. 475). William Blake envisaged that imaginative 
cognition is essential for the advancement of knowledge: There is No Natural Religion [First 
Series] concludes with the declaration that, 
If it were not for the Poetic or Prophetic character the Philosophic & Experimental 
would soon be at the ratio of all things, & stand still, unable to do other than 
repeat the same dull round over again.7 
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That Bohm's quantum suppositions should be metaphorically applied to Shelley's work is 
appropriate given Shelley's continued fascination with science.8 The relationship between 
poetry and science is outlined in A Defence of Poetry and poetry is accorded the pre-eminent 
position: "Poetry is indeed something divine. It is at once the centre and circumference of 
knowledge; it is that which comprehends all science, and that to which all science must be 
referred" (PP, 503). Shelley's conception of "science" is probably employed here in the 
broader context of knowledge, particularly in relation to the originality of new thoughts, 
rather than the constraint of a single discipline. To support this suggestion an earlier cancelled 
draft shows Shelley reconsidering his ideas on knowledge: 
loftiest power: that is they 
teaeh ?number unfold the secretest things 
Of moral & intellectual science knowledge; 
The philosophy of 
The two former Dante, & still more perhaps 
MilteB. . . . (BSM IV, f. 71r rev, 708-13) 
The finalised version, which appears in A Defence of Poetry, accentuates philosophy: 
"Shakespeare, Dante and Milton . . . are philosophers of the very loftiest power" (PP. 485). 
Nevertheless it is evident from the composition of this statement that Shelley's estimation of 
their ability to "unfold the secretest things" comprehensively includes different branches of 
knowledge. A further relevant illustration of Shelley's understanding of science appears in the 
drafting of the following sentence: "All the authors of revolutions in opinion are not only 
necessarily poets as they are inventors" (PP. 485). Originally Shelley wrote "science" (BSM 
IV, f. 71 v rev, 670) and later changed the word to "opinion." When searching for a term that 
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encompasses the originality of new ideas, poetry, philosophy, and science sometimes occupy a 
similar lexical space in Shelley's consciousness. 
Before interpreting Shelley's understanding of poetic creativity further, it is helpful to 
outline Bohm's conceptual models of reality which lend credence to Shelley's ideas about unity. 
In his perceptions of existence, Bohm differentiates between two orders of reality. The 
"implicate order" is "one unbroken whole, including the entire universe with all its 'fields' and 
'particles'" (WIO. 189). Significantly in this order time and space have a more intimate 
relationship than the human mind is able to conceive of in a conscious waking state. The 
apparent linear progression of past, present and future, perceived in a conscious waking state, 
betrays the underlying simultaneity which exists: the "implicate order" is "a multidimensional 
reality that cannot be comprehended fully in terms of any time order, or set of such orders" 
(WIO. 211). The second category, the "explicate order", can be defined succinctly as the 
manifest world, and this order "dominates ordinary 'common sense' experience" (UU. 382). An 
indivisible relationship between the "implicate" and "explicate" levels of existence is a basic 
premise: "in consciousness, as in quantum theory, the explicate order emerges from the 
implicate order as a relatively stable and self-determined domain and ultimately flows back 
into the implicate order" (UU. 383). Contrary to the prevalent Cartesian paradigm of dualism, 
Bohm's theories confer a validity on Shelley's vision of existence in which all-encompassing 
unity is the primary actuality. 
The metaphorical analogies of Bohm's "implicate" model of reality render more explicit 
Shelley's quasi-mystical apprehension of poetic experience in A Defence of Poetry. For 
Shelley, a poet 
not only beholds intensely the present as it is, and discovers those laws according 
to which present things ought to be ordered, but he beholds the future in the 
present, and his thoughts are the germs of the flower and the fruit of latest time. 
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Not that I assert poets to be prophets in the gross sense of the word, or that they 
can foretell the form as surely as they foreknow the spirit of events: . . . A Poet 
participates in the eternal, the infinite, and the one; as far as relates to his 
conceptions, time and place and number are not. (PP. 482-3) 
Here "participates" is in accord with Bohm's quantum idea of a creative involvement with the 
world. "The eternal, the infinite, and the one", commonly interpreted as Plato's ideal reality, 
can also be seen to represent the intrinsic totality from which all manifest existence arises. 
Significantly Bohm deduces that "not just the content of thought", but also '^ the actual 
structure, function and activity of thought is in the implicate order" (WIO. 204). But within 
this "implicate order" thought does not permeate the innermost level. Bohm suggests that there 
is "a deeper level of enfolded activity — very subtle — which is intelligent, and has energy 
and passion" (UM. 48). Poetic conception participates in this deepest generative order of 
reality because it goes beyond existent thought-forms, and consequentially poetry is vitally 
creative. 
Shelley's attraction to Plato's world of ideas takes on a new dimension when juxtaposed 
with Bohm's "implicate order." In Plato's paradigm the primary level of reality is similarly 
not that which is manifestly existent, but "a reality without colour or shape, intangible but 
utterly real, apprehensible only by the intellect which is the pilot of the soul."9 However, a 
fundamental difference occurs in their understanding of the primary actuality: for Plato "the 
abode of the reality with which true knowledge is concerned" is apprehended solely through the 
"intellect";10 Bohm conceives that the deepest level of reality "is intelligent, and has energy and 
passion." Here Bohm's insights are more in accord with Shelley's vision in which passion 
conveys a creative potential.11 In A Defence of Poetry to "foreknow the spirit of events" 
implies that the poet has prescience of the underlying energy patterns which precede the 
manifestation of form. But prescience is not a passive viewing of futurity. The dynamic impact 
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of thought on the material world is evident since the poet's "thoughts are the germs of the 
flower and" generate "the fruit of latest time." Poets are not "prophets in the gross sense of the 
word, or . . . can foretell the form" because the future emerges from varying possibilities; this 
is analogous to the idea that precognition could not be absolute, or perhaps even possible, given 
the quantum concept of mdeterminism.12 Bohm surmises that "a great deal of the future may 
be enfolded in the present as a potentiality, or a likely possibility, but still be changeable" CUM, 
132). 
In A Defence of Poetry Shelley states that poetry "acts in a divine and unapprehended 
manner, beyond and above consciousness" (PP, 486). This suggests some collective source of 
consciousness, exceeding individuality. As Shelley later explains, poets are "compelled to 
serve, the Power which is seated upon the throne of their own soul" (PP, 508). In their 
compositions poets "measure the circumference and sound the depths of human nature with a 
comprehensive and all-penetrating spirit . . . it is less their spirit than the spirit of the age" (PP. 
508). This notion of interrelationship had earlier been established with Shelley's reference to 
the "mind of the creator, which is itself the image of all other minds" (PP. 485). In relation to 
this interconnection of consciousness, Bohm's theories gesture towards an unknowable 
infinity; he surmises that our "participation" in the universe "goes on to a greater collective 
mind, and perhaps ultimately to some yet more comprehensive mind in principle capable of 
going indefinitely beyond the human species as a whole" (UU. 386). 
The implications arising from a participatory nature of existence are immense and 
fundamental to Shelley's exposition of the "one mind" in On Life. Here Shelley rejects the 
separatism inherent in the notion of finite autonomous individuals and embraces a more 
inclusive definition of existence: 
the existence of distinct individual minds similar to that which is employed in now 
questioning its own nature, is likewise found to be a delusion . . . The words L and 
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you and they are grammatical devices invented simply for arrangement and totally 
devoid of the intense and exclusive sense usually attached to them. It is difficult 
to find terms adequately to express so subtle a conception as that to which the 
intellectual philosophy has conducted us. (PP, 478) 
Wasserman deduces that "This 'one mind' is neither an artificial abstraction nor a deity, but 
is Existence itself" (SCR. 146). Here Shelley's expression of "so subtle a conception" has 
remarkable similarities with Bohm's supposition that it is 
ultimately misleading and indeed wrong to suppose . . . that each human being is 
an independent actuality who interacts with other human beings and with nature. 
Rather, all these are projections of a single totality. (WIO. 210) 
Open communion and communication are possible when we transcend the finite notion of 
a spectatorial self and perceive the nature of being as an interpenetrating field. A creative 
dialogue with others, in Bohmian terms "participating in a dance of the mind" (UM, vii), 
educes a deeper understanding of life. Perceived from within the "implicate order" of reality, 
Bohm views human interaction as a "social meditation" in which mutual reciprocity develops 
because "what I am is enfolded in you, and what you are is enfolded in me" (UM. 111). For 
Sheiley the notion of a communion between minds, to elicit insights into existence, also has a 
retrospective orientation in a solitary, but equally creative, engagement with the immortal 
literary and philosophical conceptions that are imprinted upon the world. Shelley, as a 
visionary poet, participates in "the episodes of the cyclic poem written by Time upon the 
memories of men. The Past, like an inspired rhapsodist, fills the theatre of everlasting 
generations with their harmony" (PP. 494-5). 
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On Life addresses major philosophical questions about the nature of existence; the 
contentions it raises in relation to being, mind and perception deserve serious consideration. 
However, the essay is limited in scope as it is bounded by the constraints of logical disquisition 
and does not fully realize Shelley's deepest intuitions. Shelley presents a reasoned acceptance 
and rejection of various philosophies: he assimilates Berkeley's subjective idealism where 
"Nothing exists but as it is perceived" (PP. 477) and rejects "materialism" as "a seducing 
system to young and superficial minds" (PP. 476). There is a tone of reservation which 
confines Shelley's speculations on mind to the known boundaries of human experience: "Mind, 
as far as we have any experience of its properties, and beyond that experience how vain is 
argument, cannot create, it can only perceive" (PP, 478). Although Shelley denies the 
possibility of achieving certitude about the nature of existence, some of his speculations are 
worth investigating in relation to Bohm's ideas. 
Shelley proposes that "It is infinitely improbable that the cause of mind, that is, of 
existence, is similar to mind" (PP. 478). This suggestion coincides with Bohm's assumption 
"that the more comprehensive, deeper, and more inward actuality is neither mind nor body but 
rather a yet higher-dimensional actuality, which is their common ground and which is of a 
nature beyond both" (WIO. 209). Kenneth Cameron rightly perceives that "Shelley's empirical 
and scientific attitude" (SGY. 154) is inherent in his investigation of mind and particularly 
evident in On Life. To employ "refined abstractions of logic" (PP. 476) to penetrate into the 
mystery of being was later recognized by Shelley as partially self-defeating. Consequently A 
Defence of Poetry is "devoid of the formality of a polemical reply" (PP, 507). In this essay 
Shelley cogently expresses the limitations of reason and accentuates the vital nature of 
imaginative perception: 
Reason is the enumeration of quantities already known; imagination is the 
perception of the value of those quantities, both separately and as a whole. 
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Reason respects the differences, and imagination the simuJtitudes of things. 
Reason is to Imagination as the instrument to the agent, as the body to the spirit, 
as the shadow to the substance. (PP. 480) 
Although prose is not the most appropriate medium for eliciting visionary aspirations, 
Shelley's A Defence of Poetry is clearly an exception; it is "possibly the finest, certainly the 
most radiant, prose written by any poet in the language."13 Peacock's provocative "Essay 
against the cultivation of poetry" (LS I I , 244) is undoubtedly a decisive factor in stimulating 
Shelley to write his lengthy retort as "an antidote" (LS D, 275) to the Four Ages of Poetry. 
Shelley's impassioned vindication of "the insulted Muses" is fuelled by his "sacred rage" (LS 
II , 261) at Peacock's censure of poetry. 
Although theoretically presented, On Life is also an ardent investigation which revels in 
'*the wonder of our being" (PP. 475). Shelley's philosophical pursuit into the nature of 
existence is presented in thought-provoking rhetoric. The exclamatory style and repetitive 
syntactical patterning emphasize Shelley's sense of wonder at "Life, the great miracle": 
what is the birth and the extinction of religions and of political systems to life? 
What are the revolutions of the globe which we inhabit, and the operations of the 
elements of which it is composed, compared with life? What is the universe of 
stars and suns [of] which this inhabited earth is one and their motions and their 
destiny compared with life? (PP. 475) 
The above citation can misleadingly suggest that Shelley's view of existence is one of division 
in which life is somehow distinct from the universe. But the triad of sentences where "life" is 
the final utterance is shrewdly constructed; "life" is always followed by the question mark and 
enhances Shelley's sense of mystery. Moreover emphasis is placed on "life" as signifying the 
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entirety from which all distinct existence emerges. Shelley's impassioned questioning receives 
greater clarification a few paragraphs later; here he offers a compelling statement on the 
indivisibility of human existence and the material world. The interrelationship of consciousness 
and matter is perceived as an holistic state of participation which is experienced naturally in 
childhood14 and can still be intuitively felt by transcending received ideas of conscious 
awareness: 
We less habitually distinguished all that we saw and felt from ourselves. They 
seemed as it were to constitute one mass. There are some persons who in this 
respect are always children. Those who are subject to the state called reverie feel 
as i f their nature were dissolved into the surrounding universe, or as i f the 
surrounding universe were absorbed into their being. They are conscious of no 
distinction. (PP, 477) 
To be "conscious of no distinction" between self and world is a state of innocent perception; the 
world is experienced without any superimposed structures determining what we expect to see. 
"One mass" connotes a holism that is diametrically opposed to the Cartesian division of mind 
and matter and can be supported by Bohm's supposition "that the mental and the material are 
two sides of one reality" (UM. 20). This radical way of perceiving reality penetrates "The mist 
of familiarity [which] obscures from us the wonder of our being" (PP. 474-5). Bohm's theories 
deduce that children experience life more dynamically in accord with the wholeness implicit in 
the implicate order of reality; it is only through habit that "an illusion may arise in which the 
manifest static and fragmented content of consciousness is experienced as the very basis of 
reality" (WIO. 206).15 Shelley likewise asserts that "in living we lose the apprehension of life" 
(PP. 475) as we are inculcated by repetition into a restrictive vision of existence: "As men grow 
up, this power commonly decays, and they become mechanical and habitual agents" (PP, 477). 
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Originality is lost because humanity merely follow existing perceptions and do not participate 
in the deepest "implicate order" of creativity. Human life becomes a quasi-automated state of 
existence as "Their feelings and their reasonings are the combined result of a multitude of 
entangled thoughts, of a series of what are called impressions, planted by reiteration" (PP. 
477). 
On Life opens with an immaterialist apprehension of the nature of life, prosaically 
depicting existence as subjective experience: "Life, and the world, or whatever we call that 
which we are and feel, is an astonishing thing" (PP. 474). Here, the remarkable assertion that 
being and feeling are the totality of existence is impaired by the syntactical arrangement: 
greater prominence is given to "Life and the world" which dominate the sentence as expansive 
subjects and connote multiple associations within the reader's mind. Linguistically the world 
is separated from life and Shelley does not achieve the integration between intuition and 
expression inherent in his poetic evocations. A sense of fragmentation is especially apparent 
when the above citation is juxtaposed with Ahasuerus' insight in Hellas: "Nought is but that 
which feels itself to be" (785). Here the simplicity of the almost monosyllabic diction belies the 
integration of meaning which entices the reader to pause thoughtfully over the significance. In a 
single line Shelley brilliantly unifies being with feeling: syntactically "feels" appears between 
the present tense and the infinitive of the verb '*to be," conveying an intimacy between form 
and meaning. "Nought" effectively eradicates any notion of existence beyond this sphere. 
Shelley's poetic apprehensions of life are melded through his divine afflatus which 
"bring [s] light and fire from those eternal regions where the owl-winged faculty of calculation 
dare not ever soar" (PP. 503). Bohm's attempts to convey movement and overcome the 
discreteness inherent in language, which suggests a detached subject who is only contingently 
related to the world, are discussed in his chapter The rhemode — an experiment with 
language and thought (WIO. 27-47).16 In his speculations, Bohm outlines the necessity for a 
different grammatical "structure in which the verb has a primary function" (WIO. 30). This 
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innovation would more accurately represent his conception of existence as "Undivided 
Wholeness in Flowing Movement" (WIO. 11). Two inter-related precepts link Shelley's and 
Bohm's ideas in relation to language: the world is experienced without any sense of division in 
childhood; the acquisition of language creates a perceptual barrier by originating a sense of 
fragmentation between self and world. Shelley succinctly encapsulates his ideas thus: 
We are born, and our birth is unremembered and our infancy remembered but in 
fragments. We live on, and in living we lose the apprehension of life. How vain is 
it to think that words can penetrate the mystery of our being. (PP. 475) 
On Life is a text of varying achievement in which Shelley does not always successfully 
realize his contentions. Confusion sometimes arises as to his precise meaning: for instance, 
the negative and speculative way in which some opinions are formulated undermines Shelley's 
conviction in his assumptions. This is evident in the following admission: " I confess that 1 am 
one of those who am unable to refuse my assent to the conclusions of those philosophers, who 
assert that nothing exists but as it is perceived" (PP. 476). This convoluted expression partly 
reveals Shelley grappling to ascertain philosophical insight, but also suggests a tone of 
constraint in expressing a view which he finds "startling to the apprehension" (PP. 476). The 
philosophical ideas in On Life are enhanced and further substantiated by the essay's 
intertextuality. Shelley?s conclusion that "nothing exists but as it is perceived" (PP. 476) gains 
greater significance by the Shakespearian contextualization: "the solid universe of external 
things is 'such stuff as dreams are made o f" (PP. 476). But although Shelley appropriates 
poetic allusions to elucidate his assertions, his vision has not the sustained penetration into 
being that is evident in poems such as Prometheus Unbound, discussed in Chapter Six. The 
contrasting achievements of On Life and A Defence of Poetry are evident in the differing 
contextualizations of the Tasso's aphorism: "'Non merita nome di creatore, sennon Iddio ed il 
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Poeta'" (PP. 475). In On Life the citation appears towards the end of a speculative paragraph 
imbued with reservation that opens, " I f any artist (I do not say had executed) but had merely 
conceived in his mind the system of the sun and stars and planets " (PP. 475). Conversely in A 
Defence of Poetry the quotation is the affirmative culmination of an inspired passage, which 
convincingly asserts divine claims for the creative power of poetry: 
It creates anew the universe after it has been annihilated in our minds by the 
recurrence of impressions blunted by reiteration. It justifies that bold and true 
word of Tasso— Non merita nome di creatore. se non Iddio ed il Poeta. (PP. 505-
6 and n. 7) 
Perhaps the later composition of A Defence of Poetry accounts for a more authoritative tone 
in Shelley's maturing vision. But of greater interest is the emphasis on "creates" which 
suggests a comprehensive reconception of our existing apprehensions of reality. The "nome di 
creatore", or appellation of creator, is given full significance, denoting a divine act of 
origination. 
A Defence of Poetry was initially conceived as a counter-force to Peacock's assault on 
the supremacy of poetry: "poets have been challenged to resign the civic crown to reasoners 
and mechanists" (PP. 500). Ironically Shelley may have fuelled Peacock's denunciation of 
poetry. In his letter of 24 January 1819 Shelley wrote 
— I consider Poetry very subordinate to moral & political science, & if I were 
well, certainly I should aspire to the latter; for I can conceive a great work, 
embodying the discoveries of all ages, & harmonizing the contending creeds by 
which mankind have been ruled. (LS II , 71) 
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In his introduction, Brett-Smith has cogently remarked that Peacock's "essay has at any 
rate one great merit, it stimulates thought" (FAP. viii). And certainly when juxtaposed with 
Shelley's response in A Defence of Poetry. '*the two essays by Peacock and Shelley make a 
philosophic dialogue."17 Within this "dialogue" the philosophical difference first appears to be 
an argument between opposing views about the nature of knowledge: Peacock, in the 
Enlightenment tradition, declares the superiority of "Pure reason and dispassionate truth" 
(FAP. 9); Shelley elevates imaginative perception, "The great instrument of moral good is the 
imagination" (PP. 488), and claims that "A man, to be greatly good, must imagine intensely 
and comprehensively" (PP. 487-8). However the division between reason and imagination is 
more fundamental than an epistemological investigation can reveal. For Shelley there are 
deeper questions at issue than ways of knowing; his "Defence" is driven by an ontological 
imperative that delves into the vital impact of poetry on human existence. Accordingly, I read 
Shelley's poetic treatise, written with the intent of being "favourable to the cause of truth" (PP. 
507), as a philosophical inquiry into the interrelationship between poetic expression and the 
essential nature of our being. Shelley declares that poetry shapes our very existence: it 
"creates for us a being within our being" (PP. 505). Poetry elicits an interactive engagement 
by rekindling hidden feelings: 
a word, a trait in the representation of a scene or a passion, will touch the 
enchanted chord, and reanimate, in those who have ever experienced these 
emotions, the sleeping, the cold, the buried image of the past. (PP. 505) 
Shelley expresses how poetry yields an ontological significance: "A poem is the very image 
of life expressed in its eternal truth" (PP. 485). "The very image of life" suggests limitless 
human potentiality because poetry "is universal, and contains within itself the germ of a 
relation to whatever motives or actions have place in the possible varieties of human nature" 
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(PP. 485). The effect of the poetic impulse on the state of being is an expansive experience that 
negates subjectivity: poetry engenders "the interpenetration of a diviner nature through our 
own" (PP. 504). Accordingly this encounter calls forth the most exalted human emotions, "The 
enthusiasm of virtue, love, patriotism, and friendship" (PP. 505). Here Shelley delineates a 
heightened awareness similar "to the state called reverie" (PP, 477) in On Life. Under this 
expansive apprehension there is a sense of oneness in which the "self appears as what it is, an 
atom to a Universe" (PP, 505). 
n 
The integral relationship of poetry to being is found in Heideggerian thought, but whereas 
Shelley accentuates the creative force, Heidegger foregrounds the notion of revelation: "The 
art work opens up in its own way the Being of beings" (PLT. 39). How does Heidegger 
understand "Being?" This question is difficult to answer, given Heidegger's outpouring of 
ideas about Being; it could easily generate a thesis in itself. Perhaps one of Heidegger's 
simplest definitions of Being appears in his "Letter on Humanism" when he declares, "Yet 
Being—what is Being? It is It itself. The thinking that is to come must learn to experience that 
and to say it" (BW. 234). But as so often in Heidegger, his qualifying statements result in 
clarity receding into a perplexing enigma, as the following citation shows: 
'Being'—that is not God and not a cosmic ground. Being is farther than all beings 
and is yet nearer to man than every being, be it a rock, a beast, a work of art, a 
machine, be it an angel or God. Being is the nearest. Yet the near remains farthest 
from man. (BW. 234) 
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Heidegger's play upon "nearest" and "farthest" defies logical explication, somewhat 
resembling a Zen paradox. But quasi-mystical insights into the nature of being are essential to 
present a radically new way of perceiving existence. For Shelley innovative perception is 
necessary to appreciate our gift of existence: "Life, the great miracle, we admire not, because it 
is so miraculous" (PP. 475). In his study of Heidegger's "ontology, of his poetics of thought" 
George Steiner points out that Heidegger's ideas "cannot, finally, be reconciled to the manner 
of ratiocination and linear argument which has governed Western official consciousness after 
Plato." Accordingly he suggests that 'To 'understand' Heidegger is to accept entry into an 
alternative order or space of meaning and of being."18 
Heidegger's thoughts about the interrelationship between poetry and being are found in 
his discussion of the original meaning of the Greek word "physis." He defines "physis" as 
embracing both being and becoming; it is "self-blossoming emergence" which the Greeks 
apprehended "through a fundamental poetic and intellectual experience of being."19 This 
comprehensive understanding of being has a direct relevance to Shelley's ideas about Greek 
drama; audiences are able to experience an identification that is in accord with their inner 
nature and also the qualities to which they aspire: 
The tragedies of the Athenian poets are as mirrors in which the spectator beholds 
himself, under a thin disguise of circumstance, stript of all but that ideal 
perfection and energy which every one feels to be the internal type of all that he 
loves, admires, and would become. (PP. 490) 
An aspiration towards "perfection" is a recurrent ideal in A Defence of Poetry: "Poetry 
thus makes immortal all that is best and most beautiful in the world" (PP. 505). Shelley's most 
extravagant expression deems that "Poetry turns all things to loveliness; it exalts the beauty of 
that which is most beautiful, and it adds beauty to that which is most deformed" (PP. 505). 
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Encapsulating exalted universal qualities is the ultimate poetic achievement. In direct contrast, 
Shelley unequivocally condemns poets who inscribe their personal code of ethics into their 
compositions: "A Poet therefore would do ill to embody his own conceptions of right and 
wrong, which are usually those of his place and time, in his poetical creations, which 
participate in neither" (PP. 488). Notwithstanding this censure of moral principles, Shelley's 
own value-judgments are evident in his reproach of the depiction of theological tyranny: "The 
distorted notions of invisible things which Dante and his rival Milton have idealized" (PP, 498). 
An acute problem for Shelley was their endorsement of the Christian doctrines of hell and 
damnation. As Shelley remarks, "Dante and Milton were both deeply penetrated with the 
antient religion of the civilized world" (PP. 499). Shelley attributes the imperfections in 
Dante's and Milton's visions as necessary for their contemporary milieu, such distortions 
being "merely the mask and the mantle in which these great poets walk through eternity 
enveloped and disguised" (PP. 498). He painstakingly attempts to differentiate between the 
sublime conceptions of the poets and popular beliefs: "It is a difficult question to determine 
how far they were conscious of the distinction which must have subsisted in their minds 
between their own creeds and that of the people" (PP, 498). But Shelley's shrewd reasoning in 
A Defence of Poetry belies his sense of immense disquiet. An undercurrent can be detected in 
drafting his argument: 
those monstrous conceptions which Dante 
& Milton have, [defiled]; [idealized]; [& havo] 
discussion 
but Let us refrain from an inquiry into 
opinions 
the origin of those een monstrous oonocption3 
which Dante & Milton have idealized, 
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which 
& which involvfing]es no less than an inquiry 
into the origin of evil. — It is enough 
to know that a Poet inasmuch as 
he is a poet, can in no manner 
express what is evil (BSM IV, f. 50v rev, 1938-50) 
Twice Shelley chooses the phrase "monstrous conceptions" and although he asserts that a poet 
"can in no manner express what is evil", suggesting that the act of composition mediates evil, 
doubt inevitably arises in the reader's mind. However an evaluation of good and evil is not 
what is at issue in this thesis. My central concern is with the creative impetus of poetic 
articulation and its effects on the nature of being. Given Shelley's creative dictum, according 
to which impassioned thoughts have a generative impact on futurity, one must ask what might 
be the consequences of portraying negative experiences. In his analysis of Athenian drama 
Shelley explains that 
The imagination is enlarged by a sympathy with pains and passions so mighty, 
that they distend in their conception the capacity of that by which they are 
conceived; the good affections are strengthened by pity, indignation, terror and 
sorrow; and an exalted calm is prolonged from the satiety of this high exercise of 
them into the tumult of familiar life; even crime is disarmed of half its horror and 
all its contagion by being represented as the fatal consequence of the unfathomable 
agencies of nature; error is thus divested of its wilfulness; men can no longer 
cherish it as the creation of their choice. In a drama of the highest order there is 
little food for censure or hatred; it teaches rather self-knowledge and self-respect. 
(PP, 490) 
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Shelley's point is that "pity, indignation, terror and sorrow" not only produce the cathartic 
effect of emotional release, but also, by the law of contrast, intensify the desire for exalted 
emotions like love. Perhaps Shelley's most cogent insight is that the Greek portrayal was in a 
universal, rather than an individual, context and hence appeared mysteriously "as the fatal 
consequence of the unfathomable agencies of nature." Consequently there is a sense of 
personal detachment as humanity's capacity to create, or their culpability in inflicting grief is 
not an issue and "error is thus divested of its wilfulness." Although Shelley's argument is 
skillfully constructed and has a degree of veracity, in view of his belief that all thoughts and 
intense emotions influence the state of being, the portrayal of abhorrent experiences would 
still have some repercussions. The extent of these reverberations is explored in Chapter Six 
with Jupiter's oppression affecting the whole interconnected field of being. 
Shelley traces the source of the poetic impulse to the creation of humanity: "poetry is 
connate with the origin of man" (PP. 480). In a witty but mocking statement Peacock had 
earlier conceded that poetry kindled intelligence: "Poetry was the mental rattle that awakened 
the attention of the intellect in the infancy of civil society" (FAP. 18). However, Peacock 
places historical limitations on poetry which is soon surpassed by other branches of knowledge: 
"Poetry cannot travel out of the regions of its birth, the uncultivated lands of semi-civilized 
men" (FAP. 15). Consequently he considers that poetic achievement declined with the 
irretrievable loss of the golden Homeric age. Shelley's antithetical position claims that poetry 
has a universal significance. In a draft letter to Charles Oilier, he denounces Peacock's assault 
on the imagination because this assault annihilates the principle of life and threatens the fabric 
of human existence: 
It is an 
impious daring attempt to extinguish [tho] Imagination 
which is the Sun of life, Impious, attempt 
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parricidal & self murdering attempt 
(BSM IV ? f. 80v rev, 6-9) 
In a second, less emotive, re-working of these ideas Shelley further develops his cosmic 
paradigm of "the Sun of life" to differentiate the various qualities of imagination and reason: 
He would extinguish Imagination which 
is the Sun of life, & grope his way by 
& borrowed 
the cold & uncertain A light of that 
which he calls 
what is called th [at]e moon A Reason, — 
over ? foils 
stumbling through the interlunar night 
chasms 
without of life time where She deserts us. 
(BSM IV. f. 80vrev, 13-22) 
Although this passage lacks the clarity of a final composition, Shelley's metaphorical analogy 
between the "Imagination" as the "Sun of life" and "Reason" as being "without of life" 
shows his perception working at the primary level of being. Clarification of Shelley's thoughts 
about existence arise in his finished composition. His concern is with the "unchangeable forms 
of human nature" (PP. 485). The imagination is perceived to possess a unifying quality that 
penetrates to the source of life: the imagination is "the principle of synthesis, and has for its 
objects those forms which are common to universal nature and existence itself' (emphasis 
added, PP, 480). Moreover the embodiment of imaginative apprehension is poetic: "Poetry, in 
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a general sense, may be defined to be 'the expression of the Imagination'" (PP. 480). What 
Shelley intends by the "general sense" of poetry becomes clearer as the essay progresses when 
he states that "the popular division into prose and verse is inadmissible in accurate philosophy" 
(PP. 484). Moreover "The distinction between poets and prose writers is a vulgar error" (PP. 
484). Clearly for Shelley the poetic is often implicit in language, irrespective of being 
arranged in metrical form: 
The parts of a composition may be poetical, without the composition as a whole 
being a poem. A single sentence may be considered as a whole though it be found 
in a series of unassimilated portions; a single word even may be a spark of 
inextinguishable thought. (PP. 485-6) 
Shelley is defending poetry as having a ubiquitous and creative presence in human life. To 
elucidate the fundamental significance of poetry on the nature of being, from a different 
perspective, Heidegger's later thinking is appropriate. 
In Heideggerian thought, after Being and Time, "it is art rather than more utilitarian 
pursuits which plays the crucial role in disclosing" being (H, 70). Heidegger's essay "The 
Origin of the Work of Art" ascribes a primal significance to poetry in uncovering the world: 
"Poetry is the saying of the unconcealedness of what is" (PLT. 74). Shelley's own position with 
regard to the degrees of concealment and disclosure of existence, arising from poetic 
expression, is more ambiguous: "whether it [poetry] spreads its own figured curtain or 
withdraws life's dark veil before the scene of things" (PP, 505). In an endlessly seductive 
account of revelation Shelley states that "Veil after veil may be undrawn, and the inmost naked 
beauty of the meaning never exposed" (PP. 500). Yet, equally, ultimate disclosure seems an 
achievable ideal as poetry "strips the veil of familiarity from the world, and lays bare the 
naked and sleeping beauty which is the spirit of its forms" (PP. 505). Quantum resonances of 
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unstructured potentiality are latent in Shelley's assertion that: "All high poetry is infinite; it is 
the first acorn, which contained all oaks potentially" (PP. 500).20 
Heidegger explores the nature of poetic being in "'. . . Poetically Man Dwells . . ."', an 
essay inspired by Holderlin in which Heidegger proposes "that our unpoetic dwelling . . . 
derives from a curious excess of frantic measuring and calculating" (PUT. 228). Heidegger's 
stated intent is to eschew moral deliberation. For Shelley, the ethical consequences of 
unrestricted reasoning are at issue; he states that social inequality "must ever flow from an 
unmitigated exercise of the calculating faculty" (PP. 501). In Heidegger's view "Poetry is 
what really lets us dwell" and he criticizes its devaluation:21 
Poetry is either rejected as a frivolous mooning and vaporizing into the unknown, 
and a flight into dreamland, or is counted as a part of literature. And the validity 
of literature is assessed by the latest prevailing standard. (PUT, 213) 
Heidegger's critique of the marginalization of poetry has not only a retrospective relevance 
in undermining Peacock's position, but also serves to counteract some of the late twentieth-
century trends where literary criticism overshadows the poetry it purports to illuminate. Being 
in thrall to "the latest prevailing standard" is an issue which Paul Fry addresses in his A 
Defense of Poetry; an interpretation underpinned by the valid assumption that poetry "is both 
perennial and pancuhural" and clearly is "a need not a commodity."22 Paralleling Shelley's 
rejection of Peacock's attack on poetry, Fry mounts a similar challenge in a work that is 
critically alert to the strategic vulnerability of adopting a defensive position.23 With a stated 
intellectual "orientation toward historicism and formalism."24 Fry contends that it is possible 
to have a "meaning-free" (this does not signify "meaningless"), preconceptual encounter with 
the world: "Ostension . . . is that indicative gesture toward reality which precedes and underlies 
the construction of meaning."23 A "meaning-free" reality, or even "a temporary release from 
24 
significance"26 is implausible in Heideggerian thought since understanding is a fundamental 
existential principle of human existence. But understanding is not necessarily an intellectual 
conceptualizing enterprise, but more a primordial sense of "encounters" or "dealings" in the 
world. Heidegger explains that "The kind of dealing which is closest to us is . . . not a bare 
perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to 
use . . . " (BT. 95). Although this early Heideggerian view states that "dealing" is pragmatic, 
his emphasis on a concerned engagement of being, rather than abstract perceptual knowledge, 
is germane to Shelley's poetics of being. 
In further contradistinction to Fry's proposal "that existence can be meaning-free",27 
Bohm's teleological quantum view posits that life is inherently purposeful. With Bohm's 
conception of "Meaning as being", an understanding of life that is elicited in a dialogue with 
Renee Weber, he affirms that meaning is not ascribed to a pre-existing reality, but implicit in 
all creation:28 
Meaning infuses and informs energy, giving it shape and form. Now a certain 
form is matter, which is energy which has stabilized into a regular form, . . . with 
some independence. But there must be a meaning that is behind it. 2 9 
For Bohm meaning has hierarchical gradations of significance; nevertheless it is implicit in all 
existence. Weber appropriately comments on Bohm's understanding that meaning "is not 
reserved for what is self-reflective and self-conscious in a human sense" (QI, 439). With a 
conceptual basis where "meaning is the essence of reality" (QI, 441), existence is perceived as 
unfolding towards a significant goal. Bohm makes several speculations concerning this 
destination in which he suggests, yet also undercuts, the notion of finality: the goal might be 
"love", "order", "harmony", or even "the process itself (QI, 447). How can Bohm's insights 
elucidate Shelley's ideas about creativity? Significantly both Bohm and Shelley give pre-
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eminence to the implicit thoughts and emotions which precede the manifestation of form. 
Moreover they both consider that human consciousness is in a fundamental creative 
participation with the world.30 One of Bohm's suggestions, that creation may unfold towards 
"love", has an affinity with Shelley's ideas in On Love in which love implicitly permeates 
existence: "the bond and the sanction which connects not only man with man, but with every 
thing which exists" (PP. 473). Certainly Bohm's ideas on creation affirm that "Creativity is 
not possible out of fear"; indeed, '^ true creativity . . . would only be possible with love" (UM. 
115, 117). 
In A Defence of Poetry love is the ultimate ideal: "The great secret of morals is Love; or a 
going out of our own nature, and an identification of ourselves with the beautiful which exists 
in thought, action, or person, not our own" (PP. 487). As in other exalted Shelleyan states, 
such as "reverie" in On Life (PP. 477), the notion of self is subsumed in a comprehensive 
experience of interrelationship. Shelley celebrates the epoch when "The freedom of women 
produced the poetry of sexual love. Love became a religion" (PP. 496-7). "Religion" 
epitomizes a sacred wholeness and cleverly subverts the Christian paradigm founded on the 
Platonic duality of body and soul. Consequently the poetic expression of love engenders a 
paradisal state of harmony: 
The familiar appearance and proceedings of life became wonderful and heavenly; 
and a paradise was created as-out of the wrecks of Eden. And as this creation 
itself is poetry, so its creators were poets; and language was the instrument of 
their art. (PP, 497) 
Here '*the wrecks of Eden" symbolizes the collapse of dualism and "paradise" connotes a sense 
of oneness with a unifying presence that is melded through the poetic vision. For Shelley "this 
creation itself is poetry", a view which calls into question Fry's notion that '*the world,. . . will 
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rarely i f ever find solutions in poetry and might as well not befuddle itself with false 
consciousness in pursuit of them there."31 Contrary to Fry's contention, I suggest that Shelley, 
Bohm and Heidegger consider that poetry is the most appropriate medium to yield a greater 
insight into the fabric of reality. First, an inquiry into a deeper understanding of human 
existence was the lifelong poetical quest that Shelley died whilst still pursuing; poignantly in 
The Triumph of Life he leaves the irresolvable question, "Then, what is Life?"' (544). 
Secondly, Heidegger's mature thought was based on a highly poetic explication of being, 
whereby he affirmed that "The poetic is the basic capacity for human dwelling" (PUT. 228). 
Thirdly, it is Bohm's belief that "an art form, like poetry" (WIO, 55) communicates the most 
comprehensive insights about the nature of reality. 
m 
From a philosophical perspective "Peacock puts the genuine utilitarian case — though it is in a 
deliberately provocative and extreme form. . . ,"3 2 Particularly derogatory in Peacock's 
argument is his dismissal of contemporary poetry as unrefined and unintellectual: 
A poet in our times is a semi-barbarian in a civilized community. He lives in the 
days that are past. His ideas, thoughts, feelings, associations, are all with 
barbarous manners, obsolete customs, and exploded superstitions. (FAP. 16) 
Peacock values abstract knowledge of an independent reality, grasped through analytical 
reasoning. His perception of reality consists of solid evidence, objective truth: "with the 
progress of reason and civilization, facts become more interesting than fiction" (FAP. 8). With 
a mind dominated by reason, Peacock views the earliest poets as "historians and chroniclers of 
their time" and their poetic insights are depicted as being acquired by a cerebral detachment 
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from the world, through "observing and thinking" (TAP. 5). As society progresses, "Men also 
live more in the light of truth and within the interchange of observation" (FAP. 6). History, 
with its factual basis, is an intellectual pursuit singled out by Peacock to supersede poetry: "the 
maturity of poetry may be considered the infancy of history" (FAP. 8). In drafting his 
"Defence" Shelley considered that history had a vitiating effect on the portrayal of life: 
Poetry is 
as ?new 
a mirror which makes beautiful that 
which is distorted: history is as a 
mirror which distorts that which ?should 
be beautiful. - History & Poetry, are howovor 
inwoven 
so [entangled] as not to be separated without destroying 
the texture of tho in which thoy exist. 
(BSM IV. f. 69vrev,771-9) 
Significantly the cancelled lines acknowledge an inseparable bond between history and poetry, 
highlighted by "inwoven" and "entangled." Heidegger's expression of the way in which history 
and poetry are indivisible is of relevance: "Art is historical, and as historical it is the creative 
preserving of truth in the work. Art happens as poetry . . . Art is history in the essential sense 
that it grounds history" (PLT. 77). In revision Shelley refined his idea of the representation that 
deforms perfection; he substituted the term "history" with the phrase "The story of particular 
facts" (PP. 485). Clearly Shelley's intention was not to reject history per se, but more to 
replace a fragmentary approach to reality with a poetic vision of harmony. Evidence of 
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Shelley's concern with unity, and the way in which it is disrupted by historical representation, 
is found on the following page of the Bodleian Shelley Manuscript: 
For History or the 
transitory 
catalogue of isolated facts differs from 
Poetry or the exhibition of eternal 
thoughts: the former has no ?bond of ?common. 
(BSM IV. f. 69r rev, 814-8) 
Although the lack of clarity in Shelley's writing leads Murray to question "bond" and 
"common", from the facsimile it appears that he has made the most likely choice: an 
assumption which is supported by the finalized essay: "a story is a catalogue of detached 
facts, which have no other bond of connexion than time, place, circumstance, cause and effect" 
(PP. 485). This version of reality is restrictive as it "is partial, and applies only to a definite 
period of time, and a certain combination of events which can never again recur" (PP. 485). 
But in "Poetry" the progression of time presents ceaseless interconnections "and for ever 
developes new and wonderful applications of the eternal truth which it contains" (PP. 485). 
Throughout The Four Ages of Poetry Peacock equates truth with historical or 
philosophical advancement. He dissociates the emotional responses of "being charmed, 
moved, excited, affected, and exalted" from "the desire of valuable knowledge" (PAP, 18). His 
indictment of a passionate poetic impulse is contemptuously expressed: 
The highest inspirations of poetry are resolvable into three ingredients: the rant 
of unregulated passion, the whining of exaggerated feeling, and the cant of 
factitious sentiment: and can therefore only serve to ripen a splendid lunatic like 
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Alexander, a puling driveller like Werter, or a morbid dreamer like Wordsworth. 
(FAP. 17). 
Conversely, for Shelley "the highest inspirations of poetry" emanate from a deep emotional 
involvement. Passion is the power that can instigate regeneration. In a revolutionary era 
poetry foreshadows "a beneficial change in opinion or institution" through "an accumulation of 
the power of communicating and receiving intense impassioned conceptions respecting man and 
nature" (PP. 508). Shelley praises the Athenians for their "representation of the highest 
idealisms of passion and of power" (PP, 489). Peacock censures emotive feelings as a self-
centred mental chaos that sabotages intellectual aims: "passion,... is the commotion of a weak 
and selfish mind" (FAP. 18). Passion for Shelley arises from the depths of our inner being and 
is the generative force that empowers imaginative visions.33 But passion must be mediated 
through the imagination. In his critique of "the classical and domestic drama" Shelley 
condemns unimaginative emotionalism: "sentiment and passion: which, divested of imagination, 
are other names for caprice and appetite" (PP. 491). Within Shelley's vision knowing has an 
integral relationship with being; it emanates from and re-defines the poet's sense of being. 
Great poetry synthesizes the internal and external into an all-embracing harmony: "An equal 
sensibility to the influence of the senses and the affections" is sought "in the presence of those 
thoughts which belong to the inner faculties of our nature, not in the absence of those which are 
connected with the external; their incomparable perfection consists in an harmony of the union 
of all" (PP, 492). 
Determined to ridicule the mythical elements in life, Peacock's pragmatic literalness 
denies the validity of the supernatural: "We know too that there are no Dryads in Hyde-park 
nor Naiads in the Regent's-canal. But barbaric manners and supernatural interventions are 
essential to poetry" (FAP. 15). Peacock's understanding of intellectual activity accentuates a 
methodology based on observation: 
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Hie philosophic mental tranquillity which looks round with an equal eye on all 
external things, collects a store of ideas, discriminates their relative value, assigns 
to all their proper place, and from the materials of useful knowledge thus 
collected, appreciated, and arranged, forms new combinations that impress the 
stamp of their power and utility on the real business of life, is diametrically the 
reverse of that frame of mind which poetry inspires, or from which poetry can 
emanate. (TAP. 16-17) 
Clearly Peacock's assumptions about the nature of reality are influenced by the Cartesian 
legacy of dualism; his ideal thinker is a detached spectator contemplating an objective world of 
"external things." His stress on knowledge being "collected" conveys a fragmentary approach 
to reality; such a divisive view can be discredited by Heidegger's censure of the mistaken 
preoccupation with epistemology: '*the perceiving of what is known is not a process of 
returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped 
i t . . ." (BT. 89). The classic Romantic opposition to the Cartesian tradition is epitomized in 
Wordsworth's "spiritual autobiography", The Prelude (1805):34 
But who shall parcel out 
His intellect by geometric rules, 
Split like a province into round and square? 
Who knows the individual hour in which 
His habits were first sown even as a seed, 
Who that shall point as with a wand, and say 
'This portion of the river of my mind 
Came from yon fountain'? Thou, my friend, art one 
More deeply read in thy own thoughts; to thee 
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Science appears but what in truth she is, 
Not as our glory and our absolute boast, 
But as a succedaneum, and a prop 
To our infirmity. Thou art no slave 
Of that false secondary power by which 
In weakness we create distinctions, then 
Deem that our puny boundaries are things 
Which we perceive, and not which we have made. 
To thee, unblinded by these outward shows, 
The unity of all has been revealed.35 
These lines render a compelling statement about "The unity of all." Although poetic in 
composition, Wordsworth advocates that his insights are not portrayed "in a mystical and idle 
sense", but cogently presented "in the words of reason deeply weighed."36 Outward 
fragmentary appearances are self-created and not the primary reality because "we create 
distinctions, then / Deem that our puny boundaries are things / Which we perceive, and not 
which we have made." The dichotomy between a semblance of discreteness and yet a tacit 
interconnectedness is outlined by Heidegger when he proposes that "No matter how 
fragmented our everyday existence may appear to be, however, it always deals with beings in a 
unity of the 'whole,' i f only in a shadowy way" (BW. 99). With the Heideggerian concept of 
"Being-in-the-world" as context and intimate involvement, and Bohm's quantum theories of 
holism, there are no disengaged observers, only participators in reality. As Arkady Plotnitsky 
points out "Quantum physics was to deconstruct causality37 and, by implication, subjectivity 
even more radically."38 
With a dispiriting logic, based on utilitarianism, Peacock consigns contemporary poetry to 
aesthetics: "But though not useful, it may be said it is highly ornamental, and deserves to be 
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cultivated for the pleasure it yields."39 Most reprehensibly, Peacock relegates poetry from the 
mainstream of intellectual pursuit: 
the progress of useful art and science, and of moral and political knowledge, will 
continue more and more to withdraw attention from frivolous and unconducive, to 
solid and conducive studies: that therefore the poetical audience will not only 
continually diminish in the proportion of its number to that of the rest of the 
reading public, but will also sink lower and lower in the comparison of intellectual 
acquirement. (FAP, 19) 
In his devaluation of poetry Peacock instigates a divisive, hierarchical approach to 
knowledge. For Heidegger the poetic is fundamental to existence and he criticizes aesthetics 
because "aesthetics is in thrall to the metaphysical tendency to consider everything as an object 
producing experiences in us subjects" (H, 68). Peacock's reasoning concerning "useful art and 
science" is specious because he takes knowing, rather than being, as his point of departure. 
Consequently his apprehensions are of a secondary nature in that they do not reach the source 
of human creativity. The way in which knowing is subordinate when divorced from being 
becomes apparent with Shelley's ideas on creativity: to be of significance, knowledge must not 
be apprehended purely intellectually, but continually rewoven through the poet's being: 
We want the creative faculty to imagine that which we know; we want the 
generous impulse to act that which we imagine; we want the poetry of life: our 
calculations have outrun conception; we have eaten more than we can digest. (PP. 
502) 
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With "the poetry of life" cognition is re-rooted through experience to achieve a sense of 
reintegration and more intense awareness of being. For example "The Provencal Trouveurs" 
elicit an emotional cognition that has a quasi-mesmeric effect: their "verses are as spells, which 
unseal the inmost enchanted fountains of the delight which is in the grief of Love. It is 
impossible to feel them without becoming a portion of that beauty which we contemplate" (PP. 
497). Here the individuality of one's being merges into a self-abandoned surrender to this 
influence. Such a state of oneness is ennobling: "the gentleness and the elevation of mind 
connected with these sacred emotions can render men more amiable, more generous, and wise, 
and lif t them out of the dull vapours of the little world of self (PP. 497). An intimate 
involvement where "Being and knowing are inseparable" (QI. 443) is central to Bohm's 
quantum understanding of existence. Also following this same contention, in Heideggerian 
thought there is a rejection of "the pale and empty dichotomy of 'being and thinking.'" 4 0 
Heidegger maintains the notion of interconnectedness with his articulation of a cognitive 
engagment in which "man's being is determined by the essential belonging^ogether of being 
and apprehension."41 
In drafting his conception of '"the creative faculty" as '*the basis of all knowledge" (PP. 
503), Shelley twice attempted to incorporate the word "realize": 
For, since 
the { ) powers of man, We want the 
genorous spirit which [will] should realize 
what wo have imagined; & whteh-we want 
the will [? strength] faculty to build [of] a Paradise 
creative spirit to imagine that which 
we know: we want the generous spirit 
act 
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to realise that which we imagine 
we want the poetry of life. . . . 
(BSMIV, f. 44v rev, 2304-13) 
"Realize" in this context designates the act of bringing into being. Although in revision Shelley 
discarded the "powcre of man" this statement combined with the frequent reiteration of "we" 
highlights how it is humanity's capacity to create that is implicit in A Defence of Poetry. As 
Wasserman points out "the mind that 'feeds this verse' is the human mind" (SCR, 205). In a 
penetrating assessment of Shelley's creative theories, Wasserman states how metaphysical 
elements predominate: "awareness, not matter, is the stuff of which existences are formed, and 
their radical base is self-consciousness" (SCR. 139). Shelley's final decision of the "generous 
impulse" (PP. 502) originated as "the generous spirit" and when interpreted with "realize" it 
indicates that Shelley conceives of the imagination as a generative force. The above cited 
lines regarding the "creative faculty" are later re-worked into a more ardent declaration: poetry 
"compels us to feel that which we perceive, and to imagine that which we know" (PP. 505). 
Contrary to Peacock's devaluation of poetic knowledge, Shelley deems that poetry has a 
primal, all-embracing significance to life: poetry is "the root and blossom of all other systems 
of thought: it is that from which all spring, and that which adorns all" (PP. 503). Such a 
universal claim is not simply over-zealous enthusiasm, but a cognizance that poetry is the only 
form of expression able to convey a deep understanding of life. In Bohm's understanding 
thought with totality as its content has to be considered as an art form, like poetry, 
whose function is primarily to give rise to a new perception, and to action that is 
implicit in this perception, rather than to communicate reflective knowledge of 
'how everything is'. This implies that there can no more be an ultimate form of 
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such thought than there could be an ultimate poem (that would make all further 
poems unnecessary). (WIO. 63) 
In Bohm's paradigm poetry does not mimetically represent a static external reality "of 'how 
everything is'", but creates a new perceptual order. With ceaseless movement as the sine qua 
non of Bohmian thought there can be no notion of finality. Poetic vision, in Shelleyan terms, 
deconstructs our fabricated representations of reality: poetry "defeats the curse which binds us 
to be subjected to the accident of surrounding impressions" and "makes us the inhabitants of a 
world to which the familiar world is a chaos" (PP, 505). Interpreted from a quantum 
viewpoint, an ordered and fragmented Newtonian universe is dismantled so that the chaotic 
realm of infinite potentiality can be restructured and given new form through human 
consciousness. This intense apprehension of "the wonder of our being" (PP, 505) is consonant 
with Shelley's earlier declaration in On Life. Hence the "poetical faculty creates new 
materials of knowledge, and power, and pleasure" (PP, 503). Conceptually there is a direct 
analogy between Bohm's paradigm of manifest existence unfolding from the underlying 
"implicate order" and Shelley's idea that the "elements and principles" of poetry have "a 
common source with all other forms of order and of beauty according to which the materials of 
human life are susceptible of being arranged, and which is poetry in a universal sense" (PP, 
507). In opposition to Peacock's denunciation of poetry, Shelley's A Defence of Poetry. 
Bohm's scientific theories, and Heidegger's philosophical reflections all bestow preeminence 
on poetic articulation as revealing a more cogent portrayal of existence. For Heidegger poetry 
discloses the truth of Being: he declares that "The nature of art is poetry. The nature of poetry, 
in turn, is the founding of truth" (PUT, 75). Determining what constitutes the truth of human 
existence is a goal that inevitably yields only provisional results. However, a poetics of being 
suggests that the most profound insights into the nature of reality are generated through poetic 
discourse. 
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In conclusion, then, this chapter has explored how poetic vision yields a more inclusive 
picture of reality. Following Whitehead's idea that "nature is a structure of evolving processes. 
The reality is the process",4' Bohm's view of existence suggests that knowledge is elicited from 
an interpenetrating field of creativity: "any describable event, object, entity, etc., is an 
abstraction from an unknown and undefinable totality of flowing movement" (WIO, 49). 
Consequently, contrary to Peacock's assertion, "the empire of thought is" not "withdrawn 
from poetry, as the empire of facts had been before" (FAP, 9); indeed the conveyance of 
original thought-forms is dependent on poetic encapsulation. For Heidegger poetry unveils a 
primordial encounter with Being. In "The Thinker as Poet " he advocates a constitutive role 
for poetry: "poetry that thinks is in truth / the topology of Being" (PUT, 12) An organic 
reciprocity between human thought and expression is accentuated as "Singing and thinking are 
the stems / neighbor to poetry. / They grow out of Being and reach into / its truth" (PLT, 13). 
Finally, in Shelley's words, poetry "is ever still the light of life" (PP, 493). 
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1 Craig Robinson employs certain Heideggerian concepts to elucidate his understanding of 
Ted Hughes' poems. His following statement encapsulates my own sense of Heidegger's 
appropriateness to Shelley's ideas: "Because Being is the ultimate foundation, the deepest layer 
of reality, it encompasses and underpins even all deviations from itself and can never be 
defeated by rational-technological thinking", Ted Hughes as Shepherd of Being (New York: St 
Martin's, 1989), 8. 
2 In his "Sixth Meditation", which is subtitled "The existence of material things, and the real 
distinction between mind and body", Descartes outlines how the mind and body are 
fundamentally distinct substances and are only contingently connected. Rene Descartes, 
Meditations on First Philosophy: with Selections from the Objections and Replies, rev., trans, 
and ed. John Cottingham (1986; Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), 50-62; hereafter referred 
to as Descartes. 
3 Anthony Kenny, Descartes: A Study of his Philosophy (New York: Random, 1968), 222. 
4 UU. 386. Bohm and Hiley also suggest that "the deeper reality is something beyond either 
mind or matter, both of which are only aspects that serve as terms for analysis", UU. 387. 
5 David Cooper encapsulates the disquieting divisiveness in Descartes' philosophy: "What is 
really disturbing in Descartes' 'methodological doubt'. . . . is not the worry that perhaps there 
really is no world, but the sense that I am a self-enclosed realm, 'cut o f f in logical isolation 
from the world", Existentialism: A Reconstruction (1990: Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 23; 
hereafter referred to as Cooper, Existentialism. 
6 Bohm's collaboration with Hiley in The Undivided Universe transcends established 
intellectual boundaries and presents a holistic approach to knowledge by combining theoretical 
physics with "intuitive and imaginative" speculations, UU. 4. 
7 William Blake, Complete Writings, ed. Geoffrey Keynes (1957; Oxford: Oxford UP, 1989), 
97; hereafter referred to as Blake. 
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See my analysis of Shelley and contemporary science in Chapter Six, Prometheus Unbound. 
n. 28 and n. 55. 
9 Plato, Phaedrus and Letters VI I and V l l l . trans. Walter Hamilton (1973; Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1988), 52; hereafter referred to as Plato, Phaedrus. 
1 0 Plato, Phaedrus. 52. 
1 1 For a detailed account of the creative potential of passion in Shelley's vision, see in 
particular my discussion of Hellas in Chapter Seven. 
1 2 Here it is necessary to point out a major difference between quantum theorists. The 
generally held scientific view, which arises from the "Copenhagen" version, is that "physical 
processes at the most fundamental level are seen as being irreducibly and ineliminably 
^deterministic" (2). This view is still the dominant position, even though David Bohm 
proposed "a detenninistic theory, accounting for all the phenomena of nonrelativistic quantum 
mechanics", (1), James T. Cushing, Arthur Fine and Sheldon Goldstein, eds., Bohmian 
Mechanics and Quantum Theory: An Appraisal (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996). In his analysis of 
causality and chance in classical and quantum physics, Bohm makes a persuasive argument 
that negotiates the concepts of determinism and indeterminism. Bohm concludes that in 
quantum theory "we are not led to the point of view of complete relativity. For such a point of 
view implies that there is no objective content to our knowledge at all . . . there still exists an 
absolute, unique, and objective reality", Causality and Chance in Modern Physics, fbreward 
Louis De Boglie (1957; London: Routledge, 1997), 170. 
1 3 Michael O'Neill, ed., The Bodleian Shellev Manuscripts Vol. XX. MSS. Shelley e.6 and 
adds, d.8 (New York: Garland, 1994), 3. 
1 4 For a discussion of childlike modes of perception in Shelley's poetic vision, see my 
discussion of Jean Piaget's psychological research in Chapter Four, Laon and Cvthna. 113-17. 
1 3 Bohm defines the "creative state of mind" as "one whose interest in what is being done is 
wholehearted and total, like that of a young child. With this spirit, it is always open to learning 
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what is new, to perceiving new differences and new similarities, leading to new orders and 
structures, rather than always tending to impose familiar orders and structures in the field of 
what is seen", OC, 17. 
1 6 Bohm often defines the origins of words as they have a relevance to his conceptions. He 
states that "('rheo' is from the Greek verb, meaning 'to flow') ", WIO. 31. 
1 7 Marilyn Butler, Peacock Displayed: A Satirist in his Context (London: Routledge, 1979), 
293; hereafter referred to as Butler. 
1 8 George Steiner, Heidegger (Glasgow: Fontana, 1978), 18. 
1 9 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: 
Yale UP, 1959), 14; hereafter referred to as Heidegger, Metaphysics. 
2 0 The concept of potentiality in Shelley's vision has been discussed by D. J. Hughes in his 
essay on "Potentiality in Prometheus Unbound". PP. 603-20, see Chapter Six, n. 40; hereafter 
referred to as Hughes, PP. 
2 1 Heidegger points out that "When Holderlin speaks of dwelling, he has before his eyes the 
basic character of human existence", PLT. 215. 
2 2 Paul H. Fry, A Defense of Poetry: Reflections on the Occasion of Writing (Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 1995), 2; hereafter referred to as Fry. 
2 3 See in particular Fry's introduction, 1-8. 
2 4 Fry, 5. 
2 3 Fry, 13. 
2 6 Fry, 204. 
2 7 Fry, 13. 
2 8 The question of meaning invites philosophical speculation and some clarification of David 
Bohm's understanding is helpful. In his analysis of thought Bohm cites three definitions of 
"meaning": "One of them is 'significance'; it's like a 'sign' that points to something. Another 
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is 'value.' And there is 'purpose' or 'intention.' These are connected", Thought as a System 
(London: Routledge, 1997), 194; hereafter referred to as Bohm, Thought as a System. 
2 9 "Meaning as Being in the Implicate Order Philosophy of David Bohm: a Conversation", QI, 
445; hereafter cited in the text QI. 
3 0 For Shelley's ideas on the power of human consciousness to enact a transformation, see in 
particular Chapters Three and Four, Laon and Cythna and Chapter Seven, Hellas. 
3 1 Fry, 4. 
3 2 Butler, 290. 
3 3 See in particular Chapter Seven, Hellas. 
3 4 William Wordsworth, The Prelude. 1799. 1805. 1850. ed. Jonathan Wordsworth, M. H. 
Abrams and Stephen Gill (New York: Norton, 1979), ix; hereafter referred to as Wordsworth, 
Prelude (1805). 
3 5 Wordsworth, Prelude (1805), Book Second, 208-26. 
3 6 Wordsworth, Prelude (1805), Book Second, 234, 235. 
3 7 For Bohm's position on quantum theory and causality see n. 12. 
3 8 Plotnitsky interprets Shelley's The Triumph of Life in the light of Niels Bohr's theory of 
complementarity in quantum mechanics, Arkady Plotnitsky, " A l l Shapes of Light: The 
Quantum Mechanical Shelley", Shelley: Poet and Legistator of the World, ed. Betty T. Bennett 
and Stuart Curran (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996), 267. In my analysis I examine 
David Bohm's quantum ideas as metaphors of human potentiality for understanding the nature 
of existence. I explore the deep affinities between Bohm's idea that thought is an implicit part 
of reality and Shelley's view that human consciousness plays a central role in transforming the 
world. Bohm states that both himself and Einstein "felt that the key question was: 'What is the 
nature of reality?"' In Bohm's opinion this ontological fascination yields more penetrating 
insights into the fabric of existence than Niels Bohr's epistemological suppositions. Bohm 
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states that "Bohr's view is based on epistemology, on saying that all we can discuss is our 
knowledge of reality". P C . 103. 
3 9 Peacock subsequently undercuts even this faint praise with his pejorative comment that 
"Even if this be granted, it does not follow that a writer of poetry in the present state of society 
is not a waster of his own time, and a robber of that of others", FAP. 17. 
4 0 Heidegger, Metaphysics. 141. 
4 1 Heidegger, Metaphysics. 140. 
4 2 A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (London: Cambridge UP, 1933), 90. 
Bohm cautions that "to identify certain views concerning the totality as belonging to 
Whitehead, or to someone else, is to interfere with treating knowledge consistently as an 
integral part of an overall process. Indeed, whoever takes up Whitehead's views is actually 
taking these as a point of departure, in a further process of the becoming of knowledge". WTO, 
63. 
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Chapter 2 
Alastor: Philosophical "Questionings" and Self-Consuming Passion 
She had the same lone thoughts and wanderings, 
The quest of hidden knowledge, and a mind 
To comprehend the universe. . . . 1 
(Byron) 
Into her dream he melted, as the rose 
Blendeth its odour with the violet,— 
Solution sweet. 
(Keats) 
I 
In the Inferno3 the Pilgrim questions the damned Francesca da Rimini to ascertain "the very 
root of such a love"4 which engulfed her and Paolo, "how, and by what signs, did love allow 
you / to recognize your dubious desires?'" 5 In relation to Alastor the theme of concealed 
passion is particularly germane to the Poet: "Life, and the lustre that consumed it, shone / As 
in a furnace burning secretly / From his dark eyes alone" (252-4). Compassion for the afflicted 
lovers is the tone that resonates from Dante's poem with "painful tears of pity."6 In a similar 
vein Alastor can be construed as a moving requiem to "The unheeded tribute of a broken 
heart" (624). A significant resemblance between the source of passion in Dante and the 
creative inspiration for Alastor is that the "dubious desires" are instigated by literary or 
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intellectual pursuit. When Dante's lovers read of Lancelot's love for the Queen, 'Time and 
again our eyes were brought together / by the book we read; our faces flushed and paled."7 
Likewise Shelley's poet is incited to passion when '*the solemn mood / Of her pure mind 
kindled through all her frame / A permeating fire" (161-3). 
My interpretation of Alastor emanates from and is indivisibly re-linked to an 
understanding that Shelley's turbulent emotional life fuelled his creative impetus.8 Shelley 
emotively resituated his experiences in a poetic context rendering Alastor a "dynamic, and 
unstable, mental topography"9 of his psychological state. Shelley privately appropriated 
literary allusions to communicate his deepest feelings, as evidenced in his disintegrating 
marriage to Harriet. Perceiving his situation through Dante's discourse of damnation, Shelley 
cites the epitaph over the gate of Hell as personally relevant: "Lasciate ogni speranza voi 
ch'entrate!", ' "Al l hope abandon, ye who enter here'" (LS 1, 402 and n. 3). An 
autobiographical approach to Shelley's work has incited critical censure and requires 
sensitive mediation.10 My counter-argument to this opposition elucidates a major tenet which 
informs this thesis. I contend that in Shelley's writing there is evidence to show that the 
creative process exacts a reciprocal re-definition between art and life; not only is experience 
transmuted into art, but once artistic imaginings have been passionately woven into Shelley's 
consciousness they were entangled with his perceptions and radically affected his life. In my 
analysis 1 agree with Stuart Sperry's suggestion that "Alastor takes its origins from some of 
the most deeply felt and intimate experiences of Shelley's life"," but 1 go further into 
investigating how this is a dual process, in which art and life become mutually interwoven. It 
is implausible to offer a causal explanation between poetic composition and sequential life 
experiences; the interweaving processes hermeneutically form a creative dialogue which has no 
distinct point of origination or closure. Richard Holmes contends that "Shelley wrote the poem 
precisely in order to distance himself from his own lived experience" (SP, 305). Certainly the 
idea of distancing oneself is a credible motive, but the creative process is more involved than 
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one of simple release. Moreover Alastor concludes with little solace and turns against 
creativity; there is no faith expressed in the redeeming power of art: 
In the frail pauses of this simple strain, 
Let not high verse, mourning the memory 
Of that which is no more, or painting's woe 
Or sculpture, speak in feeble imagery 
Their own cold powers. Art and eloquence, 
And all the shews o' the world are frail and vain 
To weep a loss that turns their lights to shade. (706-12) 
Much disputation emanates from the interpretation of the relationship between the 
narrator, the Poet and Shelley.12 Earl Wasserman proposes '*the likelihood that Narrator and 
Visionary represent Shelley's polarized impulses" (SCR, 11). Since Wasserman's reading 
many subtly complex variations have emerged. Frederick Kirchhoff alerts the reader to the 
textual distortion arising "Once the intellectual contradictions in Alastor have been reified into 
dramatis personae."13 For William Reach the Poet may function as '*the projection of a 
submerged impulse in the narrator's own mind . . . the narrator's deeper self projected as 
spectral other . . ." (SS. 87). Tilottama Rajan rightly discerns a congruity between their roles: 
'*the~Poet is not the narrator's opposite, but his epipsyche", hence they are "essentially similar 
beings."14 Certainly the narrator's privileged access to the Poet's interiority, the impulses that 
drive him, precludes the possibility that he is a detached, or mere witnessing consciousness. 
My reading of their relationship concurs most with Michael O'Neill's suggestion of a 
reflexive, quasi-indivisible trinity: "ultimately both figures are barely separable from Shelley's 
self-examining imagination" (HM1. 16). 
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Shelley's prefatory explanation that '"ALASTOR,' may be considered as allegorical of 
one of the most interesting situations of the .human mind", directs attention to the epistemic15 
dilemma arising from "The Poet's self-centred seclusion" (PP. 69). His insatiable quest for 
wisdom, where "He drinks deep of the fountains of knowledge" (PP. 69), instigates a sense 
of mental dissociation and his subsequent departure: "he left / His cold fireside and alienated 
home / To seek strange truths in undiscovered lands" (75-7). A brief summary of 
contemporary theoretical approaches illustrates how interpretations of Alastor's exploration of 
"The fountains of divine philosophy" (71) give unquestioned pre-eminence to epistemological 
considerations. Pulos's "The Role of Scepticism in Shelley's Thought" examines Shelley's 
complex appropriation of philosophical ideas and concludes that he is "a consistent Platonist 
in the sceptical tradition.",6 For Pulos there is consistency in Shelley's system of thought, even 
though he points out a major contention "between his empiricism and his Platonism."17 Deeply 
influenced by Pulos, Wasserman similarly presupposes the importance of an epistemological 
foundation; he sees Alastor as illustrating "The Poetry of Skepticism" and defines Shelley's 
position in the Alastor volume as "a skeptical empiricism that will evolve ultimately into the 
idealism that he was to call the 'intellectual philosophy'" (SCR. 7). Rajan's theoretically 
sophisticated interpretation, based on German Romantic theories of the imagination, aims to 
validate a "'deconstruction' of the official Romantic metaphysic of the imagination",18 although 
she disagrees with the most radical deconstructive claims "that Romanticism is, from its 
inception, a movement of self-demystifieation."19 Her critical perspective is one of alternating 
idealism and skepticism; Rajan surmises that Shelley's "desire to hypostatize vision by 
transferring it to the external world relies on a confusion rather than a cooperation of 
epistemological theories."20 
This brief overview shows that an analysis of Shelley's scepticism is an entrenched 
feature of critical practice; however this position is not unassailable. A counter-possibility 
arises if one regards the dominant theme in Alastor as a more primordial concern with the 
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nature of existence, and views the poem as one in which Shelley explores core issues relating 
to the utmost limits of being: "Nature's vast frame, the web of human things, / Birth and the 
grave" (719-20). 
To comprehend Alastor's insistent engagement with the nature of being, in the poem's 
"contemplation of the universe" (EE, 69), requires a cogent ontological basis. An explication 
of the primary significance of being occurs in the writings of Martin Heidegger which 
determine that "Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity and every possible 
character which an entity may possess. Being is the transcendens pure and simple" (BT, 62). 
Reading an early nineteenth-century text in the light of Heidegger's existential views is not 
only a challenging enterprise, but may seem inapt given the wealth of philosophical theories 
that Shelley himself appropriated. But perhaps the reason why Shelley was so resourceful is 
because the influence of the all-pervasive nature of knowing, as a way of understanding life, 
inevitably created a perceptual barrier to his ideas on existence. On Life crystallizes 
Shelley's fascination with '*the wonder of our being" (PP. 475) which he conceived as an 
holistic field. In relation to philosophical inquiry, Heidegger censures the scandalous 
"unquestioned centrality and sovereignty of epistemology" as these investigations obscure the 
primary question of being.21 Pivotal to Heidegger's formulation of an ontological argument is a 
collapse of the dualistic Cartesian legacy with its inherent notion of a contemplative subject 
divorced from the world. Descartes' conceptual scheme, which distinguishes mind and matter, 
is clarified in his "Sixth Meditation": "my essence consists solely in the fact that I am a 
thinking thing."22 This supposition allows Descartes to deduce that "it is certain that I am 
really distinct from my body, and can exist without it ." 2 3 In Heidegger's view it is vacuous to 
present knowing from the perspective of a detached subject and object; his vision of unity is 
encapsulated in the idea that "the self is characterized as a 'movement' or a 'happening' in a 
'life-context.'"24 This nondualist conception is signified in Being and Time by Heidegger's 
"compound expression 'Being-in-the-world'", which "stands for a unitary phenomenon" (BT. 
47 
78). Heidegger's term "Dasein"23 denotes a sense of intimate involvement, an "understanding 
of the self as inextricably woven into the wider context of a community and a cosmos."26 The 
importance of Heidegger's conception of holism is affirmed in the view that: "Dasein, as Being-
in-the-world, is always ' contextualized. " , 2 7 By drawing on a number of Heideggerian tenets in 
Being and Time and other works, particularly the presumption that "Being-in-the-world is a 
basic state of Dasein" (BT, 86), my interpretation examines the ontological implications 
inherent in the Poet's quest. This focus on the nature of being is in accord with the poem's 
"obstinate questionings" (26) which delve into the "deep mysteries" (23) "of this 
unfathomable world!" (18). These "questionings" are more fundamental than the possibility 
and extent of knowing; they are primarily involved with being, in an attempt "to render up 
the tale / Of what we are" (28-9) and search for "the true law / Of this so lovely world!" (685-
6). Shelley's endeavour to conceive a "true law" is, at this stage of his intellectual development, 
somewhat nebulous. Nevertheless certain analogies with Heidegger's existential ideas yield 
insights into how an examination of the nature of being is crucial to the progress of Shelleyan 
thought. 
In Alastor human creativity is central to a consideration of being; poetic expression 
emanates from and becomes entwined with the very fabric of cosmic creation: 
I wait thy breath, Great Parent, that my strain 
May modulate with murmurs of the air, 
And motions of the forests and the sea, 
And voice of living beings, and woven hymns 
Of night and day, and the deep heart of man. (45-9) 
These "woven hymns" mark the culmination of a frenzied search to elicit the principles of 
creativity; the narrator recites his ardent quest for esoteric knowledge: "Like an inspired and 
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desperate alchymist / Staking his very life on some dark hope" (31-2). Immediately these lines 
confront the perilous nature of this venture, by insinuating a willingness to wager personal 
sacrifice. Timothy Clark's account of "Destructive Creativity" in Alastor senses, in the 
invocation, "overtones of rape and violence in accordance with the violent workings of the 
mysterious active Power in the rest of the poem."28 Delving into the essential nature of life is 
presented as an act of necromancy, rather than philosophy, "by forcing some lone ghost" (27) 
and passionately conjuring "Such magic as compels the charmed night / To render up thy 
charge" (36-7). Depictions of sorcerous exploits frame the narration of the Poet's life, 
occurring in both the prologue and epilogue to his experiences. However the rejuvenating 
power of "Medea's wondrous alchemy" (672), although desperately sought, remains elusively 
beyond human scope, residing in the mythical realms: 
O, that the dream 
Of dark magician in his visioned cave, 
Raking the cinders of a crucible 
For life and power, even when his feeble hand 
Shakes in its last decay, were the true law 
Of this so lovely world! . . . (681-6) 
The allure of sorcery, as a means for intervening with and attaining knowledge of "life and 
power", has a ubiquitous presence in Shelley's poetry. But even though Shelley invokes 
supernatural powers and alchemy, he develops a persuasive philosophical vision to underpin 
these magical allusions. The magus-like Ahasuerus, condemned to the "blighting curse" (679) 
of immortality with a fate "Lone as incarnate death!" (681), is a figure that haunted Shelley's 
consciousness. After Ahasuerus' appearance in Queen Mab, Shelley made significant revisions 
to this character in line with the evolving sophistication of his philosophical thought. 
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Ahasuerus' most dynamic portrayal occurs in Hellas; he overthrows Turkish tyranny by 
manipulating Mahmud's apprehension of reality through dreams and the metaphysical 
elements of "Thought", "Will", "Passion", "Reason" and "Imagination."29 Here Shelley 
deploys Ahasuerus as a catalyst to effect a dramatic change in Mahmud's consciousness and 
thereby expedite Greek liberation. Even more diaphanous and cunning than the spectral 
Ahasureus is his female counterpart, "the wizard lady" (385) of The Witch of Atlas; she is 
mischievously intent on interfering with humanity by exerting the power of "her own 
thoughts" (210) 'To work whatever purposes might come / Into her mind" (213-4). These 
ethereal figures enact Shelley's philosophical creed where emotive thoughts generate physical 
transformations. 
In Alastor the Poet interacts meaningfully with the phenomenal world: "The magnificence 
and beauty of the external world sinks profoundly into the frame of his conceptions, and 
affords to their modifications a variety not to be exhausted" (PP. 69). For Kirchhoff this unity 
is problematical; he perceives that the Poet's progression is hindered by "the fear of passing 
from an archaic psychic state in which the world is undifferentiated from the self to a mature 
state in which the self is able to recognize and cope with the alien nature of its field of self-
objects. . . ." 3 0 KirchhofFs anthropocentric paradigm has an inherent objectifying tendency, 
which underestimates the presentation of oneness in Alastor. With a cosmic energy pulsating 
through the core of his being, it seems counterintuitive to suggest that the Poet is merely 
contingently related to nature: '^ the Poet's blood" (651) is said to "ever beat in mystic 
sympathy / With nature's ebb and flow" (652-3). Undoubtedly the Poet is intrinsically 
connected to the cosmos.31 This inter-involvement can be elucidated by the Heideggerian 
notion "that 'being-in' is not a spatial relationship . . . It is a matter of engagement, not 
location" (H, 23). Shelley's "minute analysis of Nature conducted with vividly human 
metaphor"32 renders the Poet's state of being as unequivocally engaged with the natural world, 
where "Every sight / And sound from the vast earth and ambient air, / Sent to his heart its 
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choicest impulses" (68-70). Furthermore he intuitively experiences an innate sense of 
belonging: "he would linger long / In lonesome vales, making the wild his home" (98-9). Being 
guided by nature's "choicest impulses" suggests a precedence from the poem's Rousseauian 
heritage: "nature is likened to a voice within. Conscience, our inner guide, 'speaks to us in the 
language of nature.'"33 The Reveries d'un promeneur solitaire (1776-8), which appears in 
Shelley's reading list for 1815 (LS II , 483), relates Rousseau's unshakable belief in '*the 
close relation I perceive between my immortal nature and the constitution of the world, the 
physical order I see all around me" (RSW. 56). Shelley's conception of this interrelationship 
appears in On Love when human solitude induces a search for reciprocity in nature: 
we love the flowers, the grass and the waters and the sky. In the motion of the very 
leaves of spring in the blue air there is then found a secret correspondence with 
our heart. There is eloquence in the tongueless wind and a melody in the flowing 
of brooks and the rustling of the reeds beside them which by their inconceivable 
relation to something within the soul, awaken the spirits to a dance of breathless 
rapture. (PP. 474) 
How the Poet's developing relationship with the phenomenal world is interpreted is of 
philosophical significance. The following polarizations define extreme positions: Keach's 
explanation of the Poet / narrator as being narcissistically estranged from the world, "a 
disillusioned pantheist whose alienation from natural life becomes increasingly solipsistic, and 
finally self-annihilating" (SS. 87); or an interpretation that views the Poet's gradual 
emaciation into a "frail and wasted human form" (350) as a disembodiment which 
metaphorically prefigures his final absorption into nature, wherein "He sought in Nature's 
dearest haunt, some bank, / Her cradle, and his sepulchre" (429-30). Textual evidence strongly 
supports the latter claim of an integration with nature; the Poet sinks into an 
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untimely tomb 
No human hands with pious reverence reared, 
But the charmed eddies of autumnal winds 
Built o'er his mouldering bones a pyramid 
Of mouldering leaves in the waste wilderness:—. (50-4) 
But the Poet's natural grave, devoutly moulded by '*the charmed eddies of autumnal winds", 
connotes a tone of disquiet with "untimely" and "waste." Nevertheless the Poet knowingly 
surrenders his being to cosmic forces. His death, although poignantly evoked, precludes 
sentimentality as his expiration is depicted as a final, albeit feeble, cosmic interaction: 
He did place 
His pale lean hand upon the rugged trunk 
Of the old pine. Upon an ivied stone 
Reclined his languid head, his limbs did rest 
Diffused and motionless, on the smooth brink 
Of that obscurest chasm; —and thus he lay, 
Surrendering to their final impulses 
The hovering powers of life. . . . (632-9) 
It has been suggested that in Alastor "Shelley's pantheism is more gesture than 
substance" (HM1. 14), but this underplays the philosophical foundation of the Poet's search 
into "Nature's most secret steps" (81) which "He like her shadow has pursued" (82). The 
narrator's own dealings with nature are conveyed in a tone of loving reverence evocative of a 
mystical consanguinity: " I f no bright bird, insect, or gentle beast / I consciously have injured, 
but still loved / And cherished these my kindred" (13-15). This principle of honouring, rather 
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than violating, natural laws allows him to enjoy a "wonted favour" (17), even though he is 
denied innermost knowledge "Of thy deep mysteries" (23). Likewise the Poet's vegetarianism, 
echoing that of his creator, in which "the doves and squirrels would partake / From his 
innocuous hand his bloodless food" (100-1), emanates from a considered eco-spiritual view.34 
Implicit throughout Alastor is "the Romantic notion of a purpose or life coursing through 
nature."33 Earlier, in Queen Mab. Shelley had delineated the permeating presence of "Nature's 
soul" (TV. 89) which is inherent in every atom of creation: "And filled the meanest worm that 
crawls in dust / With spirit, thought, and love" (TV, 96-7). 
Utilizing the fluidity of water as a metaphor for consciousness, the Poet searches the depths 
of his being for an intimation of his unknown destination: 
"O Stream! 
Whose source is inaccessibly profound, 
Whither do thy mysterious waters tend? 
Thou imagest my life. Thy darksome stillness, 
Thy dazzling waves, thy loud and hollow gulphs, 
Thy searchless fountain, and invisible course 
Have each their type in me. . . . ( 502-8) 
More consequentially the Poet's impassioned invocation recognizes a degree of simultaneity 
between his essential composition and that of the "mysterious waters." The rhetorical 
questioning and emotive articulation of his own "invisible course" are reverently addressed to 
an elemental creative force; most appropriate considering that the Poet's skeletal appearance 
had earlier been likened to '*the Spirit of wind" (259) and a divine cosmic power: "As i f that 
frail and wasted human form, / Had been an elemental god" (350-1). The degree of inter-
involvement between the Poet and natural forces is strongly conveyed in the repeated 
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alliteration: "his scattered hair / Sered by the autumn of strange suffering / Sung dirges in the 
wind" (248-50). Timothy Clark is rightly persuaded by the claim that "the voyage represents 
the poet's state of mind after the dream" but alerts the reader to "not overlook the 
extraordinary viciousness and destructiveness being described."36 It is precisely this violent, 
erotic imagery which affirms a complete interpenetration; nature is literally impregnated by 
the Poet's unconsummated passion. Throughout the Poet's obsessive compulsion to be 
reunited with "the light / Of those beloved eyes" (331-2) he is impelled by an instinctual 
impetus: "A strong impulse urged / His steps to the sea-shore" (274-5) and "A restless impulse 
urged him to embark" (304) on his sea voyage. Whether the Poet's "dark obliterating course" 
(329) is a creation of "his own deep mind" (298), or arises from an external agency, guided 
by ministering "genii" (330), remains inconclusive. Certainly the most persuasive implication 
is an idea of a creative interchange, possibly below the threshold of conscious awareness: 
I f we think of nature as a force, an elan running through the world, which emerges 
in our own inner impulses, i f these impulses are an indispensable part of our 
access to this force, then we can only know what it is by articulating what these 
impulses impel us to. 3 7 
Remarkably the Poet conveys a quiescent acceptance of his fate, even during the most 
tempestuous storm: "Calm and rejoicing in the fearful war 7 Of-wave running on wave, and 
blast on blast / Descending, and black flood on whirlpool driven" (326-8). Surrounded by this 
turbulence he still retains a sense of control "the Poet sate / Holding the steady helm" (332-
3); his resolution is unequivocal, "Calm, he still pursued / The stream" (539-40). Perhaps the 
reason for this steadfast course is a subliminal compliance with some higher force. Spaced 
throughout the narrative is the Poet's tripartite vow to metaphysical forces: "Obedient to high 
thoughts" (107); "Obedient to the sweep of odorous winds" (317); "Obedient to the light / That 
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shone within his soul, he went, pursuing" (492-3). The repetition of "calm" and the parallel 
syntax in these phrases connote a disturbing sense of subconscious enthraldom. But whether 
the Poet's path to follow '"Vision and Love!'" (366) is swept along by an internal or external 
momentum is indeterminate. The intimation of an inescapable destiny distinctly suggests the 
idea of necessity, a doctrine of ultimate causality dramatically evoked by Shelley in Queen 
Mab: '"Spirit of Nature! all-sufficing Power, / Necessity! thou mother of the world!" (VI. 197-
8). In this scheme of reality 
No atom of this turbulence fulfils 
A vague and unnecessitated task, 
Or acts but as it must and ought to act. 
Even the minutest molecule of light, 
That in an April sunbeam's fleeting glow 
Fulfils its destined, though invisible work, 
The universal Spirit guides. . . . (VI.171-7) 
Recalling that Alastor opens with the narrator's supplication to the "Mother of this 
unfathomable world!" (18) and that the Poet's course appears inexorably driven, it might seem 
that necessity is the dominant creed in Alastor. The loving filial relationship sustained in the 
narrative indicates a significant degree of ontological intimacy: 
Earth, ocean, air, beloved brotherhood! 
If our great Mother has imbued my soul 
With aught of natural piety to feel 
Your love, and recompense the boon with mine. (1-4) 
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But at times the Poet's life seems to be subjected to random natural forces, such as in the 
climactic tension in when he is saved by "A wandering stream of wind" (397). But before the 
Poet's destiny is divulged, the reader is confronted by an unresolved dilemma about the 
fundamental nature of reality: whether the boat is guided by the "universal Spirit" of 
necessity, or whether "All seems unlinked contingency and chance" (Queen Mab VI 177, 
170):38 
the boat paused shuddering.— Shall it sink 
Down the abyss? Shall the reverting stress 
Of that resistless gulph embosom it? 
Now shall it fall?—A wandering stream of wind, 
Breathed from the west, has caught the expanded sail, 
And lo! with gentle motion, between banks 
Of mossy slope, and on a placid stream, 
Beneath a woven grove it sails. . . . (394-401) 
This fluctuation and irresolution between "necessity" and "chance" is indicative of a transition 
in Shelley's thought, a movement away from the impartial force of "necessity" towards finding 
a more self-determining view of life. 
n 
There is an elegiac consonance between the Poet's restless yearning to "meet lone Death on the 
drear ocean's waste" (305) and Shelley pondering his own dissolution, prior to the composition 
of Alastor. Mary Shelley's "Note on Alastor" observes how Shelley's emotive meditations on 
the possibility of dying proved to be an elevating experience which inspired his creativity: 
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The death which he had often contemplated during the last months as certain and 
near, he here represented in such colours as had, in his lonely musings, soothed his 
soul to peace. The versification sustains the solemn spirit which breathes 
throughout; it is peculiarly melodious. The poem ought rather to be considered 
didactic than narrative: it was the out-pouring of his own emotions, embodied in 
the purest form he could conceive, painted in the ideal hues which his brilliant 
imagination inspired, and softened by the recent anticipation of death. 
(Julian I . 198) 
Whereas Alastor elegizes the individual death of the Poet, the far-reaching implications of his 
dissolution are situated within a universal frame of reference: 
It is a woe too "deep for tears," when all 
Is reft at once, when some surpassing Spirit, 
Whose light adorned the world around it, leaves 
Those who remain behind, not sobs or groans, 
The passionate tumult of a clinging hope; 
But pale despair and cold tranquillity, 
Nature's vast frame, the web of human things, 
Birth and the grave, that are not as they were. ( 713-20) 
For Shelley, reflecting on death becomes an imperative philosophical inquiry, as it promises 
a revelation into the nature and origins of existence. Whilst the Alastor volume is pervaded 
by Shelley's inimitable fascination with educing "The secret things of the grave",39 it concedes 
that death is an unfathomable mystery. Significantly this fixation with death appears to augur 
an insight into the determination of futurity. In "On Death" the repetition of an anonymous 
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persona and archaic verb forms evoke connotations of a mystical figure who might "untieth 
the hopes of what shall be" (PW. 29). Shelley's juxtaposition of death with the possibility of 
unveiling the future is a recurrent theme in his poetry: "Who telleth a tale of unspeaking 
death? / Who lifteth the veil of what is to come?" (PW. 25-6). 
The final stanza of "A Summer Evening Churchyard, Lechlade, Gloucestershire" can be 
construed as a dignified exemplification of the way in which Shelley poetically explored and 
attempted to quell fear about death. 
Thus solemnized and softened, death is mild 
And terrorless as this serenest night: 
Here could I hope, like some inquiring child 
Sporting on graves, that death did hide from human sight 
Sweet secrets, or beside its breathless sleep 
That loveliest dreams perpetual watch did keep. (PW, 25-30) 
Yearningly lured by the "Sweet secrets" of death, these lines suggest yet undercut anxiety, 
finally inducing Shelley into a state which "soothed his soul to peace" (Julian I , 198). No 
such quiescent conciliation is found in Alastor; the poem ambivalently uncovers a turbulent 
emotional debate, bom in the rhetoric of uncertainty: "Does the dark gate of death / Conduct to 
thy mysterious paradise, / O Sleep?" (211-13). But far from being denigrated as morbid 
pessimism, the Poet's anxious confrontation of impending death can be understood as an 
"authentic" state of existence; a mode of being defined in the Heideggerian concept of 
"Being-towards-death." Living with this apprehensive awareness encourages a realization of 
the fullness of being: "an impassioned freedom towards death —a freedom which has been 
released from the Illusions of the 'they', and which is tactical, certain of itself, and anxious" 
(BT. 3 l l ) . 4 0 To understand Heidegger's principle of "authenticity" the following citation, in 
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meticulously detailed Heideggerese, explores how "Being4owards-death" concentrates on 
individuality and in so doing enhances the life-force: 
With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being . . . . 
If Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, it has been fully assigned to its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being . . . . This ownmost non-relational possibility is at 
the same time the uttermost one. (BT, 294) 
Does Shelley present a coherent view of existence in Alastor? Notwithstanding the 
complex ambivalences in the poem, Alastor can be interpreted as having a unifying theme i f 
the essential principle is understood as "authenticity", where the Poet's life is aligned to his 
innermost being. This is evident in that the Poet's desire to fulfill his "ownmost potentiality-
for-Being" arises from his perilous journey, fearlessly undertaken in accordance with his own 
inner wisdom: "Obedient to the light / That shone within his soul" (492-3). But the Poet's 
uncompromising choice between extremes, love or death, is contentious. For Heidegger, 
"Being-towards-death" is "a basic state-of-mind of Dasein . . . Being towards its end" and not 
intended as an event because "Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein" 
(BT. 294). In Alastor the Poet's solitariness, his "ownmost non-relational possibility", where 
"He lived, he died, he sung, in solitude" (60), provokes a major critical issue. 
Alienated, self-absorbed figures populate the Romantic- landscape, -perhaps none more so 
than Rousseau, who confesses a '^ total renunciation of the world and the great love of solitude" 
(RSW. 52). For Rousseau detachment from humanity is a resourceful practice, a means to 
know oneself more fully and pursue his "inner enlightenment" (RSW. 49). His "own experience 
that the source of true happiness is within us" (RSW. 36) originates from a point of 
desolation: "losing all hope for this life and finding no food left on earth for my soul, I 
gradually learnt to feed it on its own substance and seek all its nourishment within myself 
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(RSW. 35). But in AJastor Shelley eschews condoning, or offering an easy solution to, the 
Poet's desperately experienced isolation. The moment of crisis occurs when the Poet 
questions whether there is anything to anchor him to the physical world and is tempted by the 
"shadowy lure" (294) of death. 
And what am I that I should linger here, 
With voice far sweeter than thy dying notes, 
Spirit more vast than thine, frame more attuned 
To beauty, wasting these surpassing powers 
In the deaf air, to the blind earth, and heaven 
That echoes not my thoughts?" . . . (285-90) 
In a devastating, but temporary, aberration the Poet loses his sense of connection to the world. 
Sentient consciousness is graphically withdrawn from nature "In the deaf air, to the blind 
earth" and an unresponsively perceived "heaven / That echoes not my thoughts." This crisis 
occurs when a soaring swan foregrounds the Poet's sense of estrangement: "Thou hast a 
home, / Beautiful bird; thou voyagest to thine home" (280-1). To Heidegger "Homelessness is 
the symptom of oblivion of Being. Because of it the truth of Being remains unthought" (BW, 
242). But this is barely applicable to the Poet's soul-searching to find his true essence: "And 
what am I " (285)? Shelley investigated the mature of existence with relentless interest. An 
insight into why the Poet feels alienated is offered in Charles Robinson's reading which 
examines Alastor's influences on Byron's Manfred. Robinson contends that '*the Poet and 
Manfred soon realized that the Tree of Knowledge was not the Tree of Life, for they became 
aware of their own psychological inadequacy" (SB. 49). Here is the essential point in the 
Ovidian myth: Tiresias's prophesy enigmatically states that Narcissus will only grow old " i f 
he does not come to know himself."41 But what might knowing oneself mean? Conceivably 
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what the Poet experiences in Alastor is a paradoxical apprehension of love that was to 
tantalize Shelley endlessly: the dichotomy between spiritual and sensual love. 
A dominant theme that strives for, but resists, resolution in Alastor is the tension 
concerning the nature of relationship, enacted both on cosmic and human levels. Conceivably it 
is the Poet's failure to establish meaningful interpersonal bonds, such as with the "Arab 
maiden" (129), that precipitates his dream: "The spirit of sweet human love has sent / A vision 
to the sleep of him who spurned / Her choicest gifts" (203-5). Although the Poet's complicity in 
the generation of his vision renders it a "demon of his own creation" (SAM. 21), the reasons 
why "He eagerly pursues / Beyond the realms of dream that fleeting shade" (205-6) are more 
subtly complex than those advanced by Stuart Curran: a "wrongheaded intensity" 
culminating in a "narcissistic solipsism" (SAM. 21). A more conciliatory interpretation of the 
Poet's self-imposed isolation suggests an inadvertent and "innocent neglect of a vital part of 
the human soul."42 The Preface overtly details the spiritual need for loving relationships and 
condemns those who augment the "loneliness of the world": 
Among those who attempt to exist without human sympathy, the pure and tender-
hearted perish through the intensity and passion of their search after its 
communities, when the vacancy of their spirit suddenly makes itself felt. (PP. 70) 
The subtle manoeuvrings of the Preface, constructed through a series of-negatives, 
complicate the didactic comments and discussion concerning relationship. However, even 
though the Poet rejects the "youthful maidens, taught / By nature" (266-7), it can be 
ascertained that he is not one of the "selfish, blind, and torpid," of the "unforeseeing 
multitudes . . . who love not their fellow-beings live unfhutful lives, and prepare for their old 
age a miserable grave" (PP. 70) 4 3 From the poem's depiction it must be assumed that the 
Poet is one of '*the pure and tender-hearted" (PP, 70) whose mission, to realize a relationship 
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with mutual empathy, allows no compromise. Consequently, true to his elevated nature, the 
Poet eschews a path of mediocrity, recognizing as "false names / Brother, and friend" (268-9) 
and leaving those who are only able to "interpret half the woe / That wasted him" (267-8). 
Central to Heidegger's expression of "authenticity" is his declaration that "Conscience 
summons Dasein's Self from its lostness in the 'they'" (BT, 319). By listening to such a call of 
"conscience" the Poet retains his authenticity by resisting, rather than surrendering to, the 
maidens' emotive pleas, who "would press his pallid hand / At parting, and watch, dim 
through tears, the path / Of his departure from their father's door" (269-71). 
The prefatory epigraph from St. Augustine's Confessions playfully renders explicit the 
centralhy of love to the soul's needs: "Not yet did I love, yet I was in love with loving; . . . 1 
sought what I might love, loving to love" (PP. 70 n. 1). Perhaps what most intrigued Shelley 
about St. Augustine was an enduring dichotomy between his aspiration to divine love mingled 
with a proclivity to sexual temptation. St. Augustine readily confesses his own culpability for 
sensuously pursuing spiritual love and his yearning for fulfilment: 
To love and to have my love returned was my heart's desire, and it would be all 
the sweeter i f I could also enjoy the body of the one who loved me . . . I also fell in 
love, which was a snare of my own choosing.44 
At a literary level Shelley's consciousness was saturated with the idea of love as the-sine 
qua non of being. In his Utopian vision of "The Assassins" (1814-15), Shelley delineated the 
"happy enthusiast" as the precursor of the Alastorian Poet: 'To love, to be beloved suddenly 
became an insatiable famine of his nature which the wide circle of the universe . . . appeared 
too narrow and confined to satiate" (PWS, 129). Love is accorded an ontological status in 
Shelley's intellectual system with a unifying significance. He later defines love as "the bond 
and the sanction which connects not only man with man, but with every thing which exists" 
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(PR, 473). In Heidegger's existential philosophy his distinct notion of "care" has a similar 
pervasive presence because "Being-in-the-world is essentially care" (BT. 237). As with many 
Heideggerian concepts "care" (from the German "Sorge") is given a complex inflection and 
conveys an all-embracing significance to being.43 
The antecedent principle to Alastor's poetic quest to concretize an imaginative image of 
the beloved, is rooted in Shelley's personal experiences during the spring of 1814: he likewise 
"thirsts for intercourse with an intelligence similar to" (PP. 69) himself and "speedily conceived 
an ardent passion to possess"'(LS I , 403) Mary Godwin. In this respect the letter to Hogg, 4 
October 1814, demands attention as one of the most intriguing revelations of Shelley 
creatively visualizing his future: in true Alastorian spirit he "images to himself the Being whom 
he loves" (PP. 69). Shelley's letter reads as a lucid account of his creative abilities; he deftly 
defines the interweaving of his conscious and sub-conscious processes which renders him in a 
state of semi-entrancement: 
Manifestations of my approaching change tinged my waking thoughts, & afforded 
inexhaustible subject for the visions of my sleep . . . A train of visionary events 
arranged themselves in my imagination until ideas almost acquired the intensity of 
sensations. Already I had met the female [Mary Godwin] who was destined to be 
mine, already had she replied to my exulting recognition, already were the 
difficulties surmounted that opposed an entire union. I had even proceeded so far 
as to compose a letter to Harriet on the subject of my passion for another. 
(LSI , 402) 
Here Shelley totally re-envisions his current situation; not as some future oriented goal 
conditional on probability, but in a tone that resonates with finality. The repetition of 
"already" combined with the pluperfect tense "had met" and "had she replied" effectively 
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historicizes this "approaching change" as an accomplished fact. Although this letter is a 
retrospective account of Shelley's actual experience, which occurred approximately six 
months previously, it nevertheless conveys an authenticity which is "passionately 
convincing."46 Credence as to the veracity of Shelley's personal recollection, and the correlation 
with his poetic expression, arises from a statement that later forms the basis of one of his 
most significant theories concerning the nature of creativity: "ideas almost acquired the 
intensity of sensations." To Shelley it is the coagulation of thoughts and emotions into deeply 
ingrained impressions which transforms the state of being and becomes the central tenet of his 
creative theories. If , as Shelley affirms in On Life. '*that the solid universe of external things 
is 'such stuff as dreams are made o f " (PP. 476), might the implicit significance of this 
statement be that Shelley conceived it was possible to dream or envision events into existence? 
Certainly dreams as the basis of reality is a conception that Shelley believed and did not 
advocate lightly: "I t is a decision against which all our persuasions struggle, and we must be 
long convicted, before we can be convinced" (PP. 476). Perhaps the reason for this belief 
originates from his artistic integrity; Shelley's own life validated his conviction about the 
power to transform life through emotively charged thought forms. 
That the "train of visionary events" seemed involuntary to Shelley and not consciously 
manipulated, can be traced to the empirical influence of William Drummond: 
Our passions are not the children of our choice. We neither feel, nor cease to feel 
according to any supposed power of the wil l . What, indeed, is the will , but the 
sentiment of desire, which prevails in our minds? (AO. 20) 
But what seemed like a spontaneous production of the psyche had hitherto been inspired by his 
absorbing passion for love. In relation to Shelley's ideas on love Alastor exemplifies a pivotal 
development in his vision. As a poet he synthesizes the following attributes into "a single 
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image" of the imagined beloved: "The intellectual faculties, the imagination, the functions of 
the sense" (PP. 69). On a personal level, Shelley had seemed content to have separate 
relationships before meeting Mary Godwin: a marital relationship with Harriet, and Elizabeth 
Hitchener whom Shelley initially acknowledged as '*the sister of my soul" (LS I , 151), before 
he later became extremely disillusioned with her. The impetus towards a poetic unification 
produces an increasingly sophisticated and unattainable ideal of the beloved: in Epipsychidion 
Emily is paradoxically venerated as "Spouse! Sister! Angel!" (PP, 130). 
To what extent might Shelley have been aware of meaningful connections between his 
poetic expression and his particular circumstances? Did Shelley consciously draw on his own 
physical experiences and exploit passion to create a tenable metaphysical theory? Certainly 
the antithetical denouements, resulting from Shelley's individual creative envisioning and the 
Poet's erotic vision, exemplify a certain artistic distance: Shelley blissfully enthuses to Hogg 
about his successfully created "new state of being" (LS I , 403) which is entwined with Mary 
Godwin's, "so intimately are our natures now united" (LS I , 402); the poet of Alastor is unable 
to materialize his vision: "He seeks in vain for a prototype of his conception. Blasted by his 
disappointment, he descends to an untimely grave" (PP. 69). However the underlying principle 
demonstrates a remarkable degree of similarity. Indeed the dominant quest in Alastor is to find 
a physical embodiment of the poet's psychic projection of his soul's "prototype." This 
relentless pursuit is initiated when the poet dreams of "a veiled maid" (151) who is 
empathetically compliant with-his innermost-being: "Her voice was like the voice of his own 
soul / Heard in the calm of thought" (153-4). Instantaneously the Poet becomes cognizant of his 
soul's needs. It is this loss of vision which precipitates a spiritual and erotic epiphany 
instigating an unquenchable desire. Indeed the Poet's conception of the "veiled maid" (151) is 
such an intense psycho-emotional experience that, once apprehended, the vision functions 
autonomously and is rekindled at the loss of conscious awareness: 
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At night the passion came, 
Like the fierce fiend of a distempered dream, 
And shook him from his rest, and led him forth 
Into the darkness.— . . . . (224-7) 
Divisively the alternation of conscious and subconscious processes sunders his being: 
"While day-light held / The sky, the Poet kept mute conference / With his still soul. At night the 
passion came" (222-4). In Shelley's vision intense passions are a powerful generative source 
symbolized by the element of fire, "a potency missing from the opening invocation to its three 
brother elements",47 "Earth, ocean, air" (1). Kirchhoff deduces that the narrator "himself is 
the fourth element—fire", but he finds "the sexuality of Shelley's imagery" surprising.48 In 
relation to Shelley's thought, the Poet's quest symbolizes the acquisition of the creative 
Promethean fire; an element not stolen from the Gods, but intellectually discovered and 
mystically experienced during the Poet's quest. Although ''the furies of an irresistible passion" 
(PP, 69) are an uncontrollable force that is ultimately destructive in Alastor, they vitally mark 
the inception of passion's pre-eminent role in Shelley's mature ideas. Passion becomes 
governable in Shelley's vision and the potential for transformation through intellectual 
refinement: Hellas is a notable example where passion's creative capacities are carefully 
tempered by other constituents such as "reason" and "imagination." What is uniquely 
Shelleyan, and becomes more pronounced in his poetry, is the notion that passion emanates 
from intellectual communion with the "pure mind" of the beloved: 
Knowledge and truth and virtue were her theme, 
And lofty hopes of divine liberty, 
Thoughts the most dear to him, and poesy, 
Herself a poet. Soon the solemn mood 
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Of her pure mind kindled through all her frame 
A permeating fire. . . . (158-63) 
Shelley's correspondence of 1814 details instances of him being inspired by the idea of 
cultivated women: "The contemplation of female excellence is the favorite food of my 
imagination" (LS I , 401). To Shelley it was essential that his wife shared his intellectual life, 
although his determined efforts to educate Harriet failed as they were contrary to her own 
inclinations: " I would have superintended the progress of your mind, & have assisted you in 
cultivating an elevated philosophy" (LS I , 399). Conversely in Mary Godwin Shelley found his 
desired creative muse: "Your thoughts alone can waken mine to energy. My mind without 
yours is dead & cold" (LS I , 414). Shelley and Mary communicated quasi-telepathically when 
parted: "Your goodnight my own love came most welcomly. I did not forget to kiss your 
etbraXov KEVOV [unsubstantial image] before I slept" (LS I , 420). A few days earlier Shelley 
closed his letter to Mary with the comments: "Adieu remember love at vespers—before sleep. I 
do not omit my prayers" (LS I , 413). Quite possibly Shelley's personal imaginative play with 
the intensity of sexual desire, virtually to render the absent Mary present, inspired the scene 
which almost concretizes the "veiled maid" (151): 
Her glowing limbs beneath the sinuous veil 
Of woven wind, her outspread arms now bare, 
Her dark locks floating in the breath of night, 
Her beamy bending eyes, her parted lips 
Outstretched, and pale, and quivering eagerly. 
His strong heart sunk and sickened with the excess 
Of love. . . . ( 176-82) 
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William Drummond's Academical Questions (1805) examines the way in which passionate 
sensations influence the human mind. It is not Drummond's position of classical scepticism, 
but his empiricism that most insistently resonates in Shelley's work and is pivotal to Alastor. 
Hence as Hoffman argues "the clues to both preface and poem lie in the psychology of 
sensation and in a system of philosophy founded upon i t . " 4 9 An overt example of a 
"psychology of sensation" occurs with the Poet's acquisition of wisdom: 
The fountains of divine philosophy 
Fled not his thirsting lips, and all of great 
Or good, or lovely, which the sacred past 
In truth or fable consecrates, he felt 
And knew. . . . (71-5) 
Not surprisingly, in a poem exploring the depths of human sentiments, this passage concedes 
that the primary mode of enlightenment is feeling; inner emotional cognition precipitates a 
sense of knowing. An interconnection between knowing and being, outlined by Heidegger, is 
relevant here: "in knowing, Dasein achieves a new status of Being [Seinsstand]" (BT. 90). 3 0 
Throughout Alastor the reader is aware that acquiring knowledge initiates a process where 
the Poet's being is in a state of continual re-definition. 
Knowledge is attained by the Poet-through-esoteric, quasi-mystical experiences, rendering 
his apprehension and experience of life decidedly metaphysical: "By solemn vision, and bright 
silver dream, / His infancy was nurtured" (67-8). In this he shares a consensual perception of 
reality with the narrator who is similarly initiated, although with less yielding experiences, 
"from incommunicable dream, / And twilight phantasms, and deep noonday thought" (39-40). 
Although the narrator is like a "lyre" (42), suggesting a poetic consciousness, he is denied 
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access to the "inmost sanctuary" (38) of knowledge. Wandering through "The awful ruins of 
the days of old" (108), the Poet experiences an imaginative transportation: 
He lingered, poring on memorials 
Of the world's youth, through the long burning day 
Gazed on those speechless shapes, nor, when the moon 
Filled the mysterious halls with floating shades 
Suspended he that task, but ever gazed 
And gazed, t i l l meaning on his vacant mind 
Flashed like strong inspiration, and he saw 
The thrilling secrets of the birth of time. (121-8) 
Here "the strained, hypnotic quality of the syntax"51 mesmerically depicts the Poet's gradual 
self-entrancement; he slowly activates his subconscious perceptual resources and regresses 
to an atemporal perspective: he beholds "The thrilling secrets of the birth of time." It seems 
plausible to suggest that these '^thrilling secrets" are in some way connected with an initiation 
into a sense of duality; "the birth of time" actuates temporality. Emptied of its conscious 
contents, the Poet's "vacant mind" becomes a channel for the retrieval of wisdom from 
ancient civilizations. Possible elucidations of me Poet's psychic link with antiquity have been 
offered by Stuart Sperry as: "an act of archaeological reconstruction", "autosuggestion" or 
imaginative invention.52 The most penetrating exposition of why the Poet visits the sites of 
ancient civilizations "Of the world's youth" (122) is derived from examining Shelley's 
absorbing interest in the nature of creativity. 
Alastor is dominated by a backward orientation in time. This regression, commencing with 
Shelley's most revered culture, that of "Athens" (109), facilitates the Poet's immersion into his 
cultural inheritance. In Heidegger's conception of Dasein's "Being-a-whole", which explores 
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the parameters of existence, the "'authentically historical' person who 'takes over' his heritage 
will draw these possibilities precisely from that heritage" (H, 45). The Poet, who is rarely 
located as living in the present moment, decides to "resign his high and holy soul / To images 
of the majestic past" (628-9). In relation to the progression of Shelley's thought, once "images 
of the majestic past" have been fully assimilated into his consciousness, Shelley focuses on 
creatively conjecturing futurity. 
Alastor recounts the Poet's initiation into love through unleashing "an irresistible passion" 
(PP. 69) where uncontrollable feelings are the motivating force. That the Poet's fate is, 
perhaps, inexorable, sealed by the recurrent "fierce fiend of a distempered dream" (225), can be 
ascertained from Drummond's empiricism: once intense passions have been evoked 'There is 
no power, by which men can create, or destroy their feelings. Sensation alone overcomes 
sensation" (AO. 21). Consequently only a more powerfully energized feeling could supplant 
the "insatiate hope" (221) awakened by the Poet's vision and arrest his resolution to seek a 
path that he knows will result in his self-destruction: 
A restless impulse urged him to embark 
And meet lone Death on the drear ocean's waste; 
For well he knew that mighty Shadow loves 
The slimy caverns of the populous deep. (304-7) 
Interpreted in this light, the Poet inspires admiration as he pursues a courageous course, 
"Following his eager soul" (311). His mission is necessarily solitary as it is in accord with 
his own innermost nature; yet mysteriously driven by an unknown force: ''the Poet's path, as 
led / By love, or dream, or god, or mightier Death" (427-8). Shelley bestowed exceptional 
qualities on his protagonist, delineating him as "The brave, the gentle, and the beautiful, / The 
child of grace and genius" (689-90). In distinct Wordsworthian spirit, the Poet has an elevated 
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nature, possessing a "high and holy soul" (628), which naturally sets him apart from 
humanity. 
The predominance of passionate feelings in Alastor is not derived from pure emotional 
excess, but ineluctably linked to the poem's exploration into the nature of being. Drummond's 
empirical affirmation confirms what was most undeniably an accurate insight for Shelley: 
"The state of our feelings is in fact the state of our soul" (AO. 18). Mary Shelley's "Note on 
Alastor" explains Shelley's introspective predisposition "to brood over the thoughts and 
emotions of his own soul" and how Alastor typifies "the broodings of a poet's heart in 
solitude" (Julian 1, 198). Shelley's own thoughts on love are similarly awakened by nature; he 
"never had before felt so intensely the subduing voluptuousness of the impulses of Spring" (LS 
I , 402). The poeticization of this experience occurs in a tone of heightened eroticism: 
"spring's voluptuous pantings when she breathes / Her first sweet kisses, have been dear to 
me" (11-12). 
Comparisons between Shelley's personal correspondence and his intellectual ideas in 
Alastor proliferate. Accordingly it is my contention that Alastor does not present some 
untenable theory about the extent of the imaginative powers, but can be termed experiential: 
Shelley successfully mastered Alastor's poetic quest to manifest vision and subsequently 
entered into a mutually creative relationship with Mary Godwin; a liaison in which he 
perceived himself attaining oneness: "to consider myself as an whole accurately united rather 
than an assemblage of inconsistent & discordant portions" (LS I , 403). Here what Hoffman 
terms Shelley's inherent "nympholeptic tendency" 3 3 proves to be an imaginative projection 
that is tangibly realized. 
Alastor raises questions about the power of the imagination to influence the nature of 
being, a premise that becomes pivotal to Shelley's poetic vision. Shelley's open appraisal of 
mortality heightens his own sense of existence and generates a creative freedom to explore 
more fully the parameters of human existence: "Birth and the grave" (720). 
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Chapter 3 
"Immortal Hopes": Laon and Cvthna's Epic Vision of Freedom 
My soul spurned the chains of its dismay, 
And in the rapid plumes of song 
Clothed itself sublime and strong. 
("Ode to Liberty", 5-7) 
I 
My interpretation of Laon and Cythna focuses on the poem's epic adventure into the limitless 
potential of human consciousness as a force for transforming society: "A tale of human 
power — despair not — list and learn!'" (CP. 648).1 Priority is given to philosophical 
discussion in a poem which has justly been designated an "invaluable storehouse of Shelley's 
ideas" (SGY, 311). and "was planned by him as a considered statement of his comprehensive 
vision."2 However, the poem's philosophical significance has often been neglected and critical 
appreciation has been far from unanimous. Whilst The Examiner praised the depth of 
Shelley's thought, finding that '*the object of the work is decidedly philosophical"1, 
Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine censured Shelley's theoretical speculations: "As a 
philosopher, our author is weak and worthless."4 More recently in Shelley's Mythmaking 
Harold Bloom denounced Laon and Cvthna as "an abortive allegorical epic."5 Conversely, I 
interpret Shelley's "first serious appeal to the Public" (CP, p. 104) as a studied attempt to 
develop a convincing theory about the nature of existence from which to effect "a great and 
important change in the spirit which animates the social institutions of mankind" (CP, p. 106). 
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Shelley remarked on his gradual assimilation of philosophical ideas: "And, although the mere 
composition occupied no more than six months, the thoughts thus arranged were slowly 
gathered in as many years" (CP, p. 105). 
In Laon and Cythna mental strength is crucial if human beings are to "shake the Anarch 
Custom's reign" (CP. 86) and realize a greater degree of autonomy. Cythna's rousing speech 
to the mariners declares that the mind determines the individual's experience of reality: "Look 
on your mind—it is the book of fate—" (CP. 3372). Through conquering personal adversity, 
Cythna's experience verifies this axiom: '"We live in our own world, and mine was made / 
From glorious fantasies of hope departed" (CP, 3091-2). However, the extent to which Shelley 
envisaged a creative capacity for the mind in his overall vision is contestable. In On Life 
Shelley declared that the "Mind, as far as we have any experience of its properties, . . . cannot 
create, it can only perceive" (PP. 478). But this prose denial is incompatible with Shelley's 
poetic conception; thoughts, in conjunction with intense emotions, fuel revolutions. Shelley 
maintained that "The French Revolution may be considered as one of those manifestations of a 
general state of feeling among civilized mankind" (CP. p. 101). Accordingly he strives to 
"awaken the feelings" of his readers with "a story of human passion in its most universal 
character" (CP, p. 100). 
In the opening canto a radical transformation in the state of being is outlined as a 
precondition for emancipation: evil was vanquished and Greece's glory emerged when 
"earth's immense and trampled multitude / In hope on their own powers began to look" (CP. 
403-4). It is my contention that Shelley's plan for liberating humanity emanates from a deep 
understanding of the effects of thoughts and emotions on the state of being and presents a 
vision of freedom which has an enduring psychological relevance. To elucidate Shelley's 
attack on the pervasive influence of mental enslavement Heidegger's existential concepts, 
particularly h^ s differentiation between "authentic" existence and "inauthentic" existence 
under the "dictatorship of the 'they'" (BT. 164), are discussed. Heidegger's ideas have a 
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specific relevance to Laon and Cvthna with their "blending of large philosophical issues with 
cultural critique."6 My interpretation of Laon and Cvthna is based on questions of ontological 
significance, since Shelley's fundamental concern is with eliciting insight into the origins of 
existence. Poetically he encapsulates being driven by this aim: '"Twas many years ago, / Since 
first my thirsting soul aspired to know / The secrets of this wondrous world" (CP. 436-8). 
Here a Heideggerian approach is particularly germane: "every question of philosophy 'recoils 
upon existence'" (BW, 245). 
Shelley explores the nature of human consciousness and its effects on life to formulate a 
theoretical paradigm which could liberate the masses by "the blooodless dethronement of their 
oppressors" (CP. p. 100). Sweeping reforms are envisaged to overthrow entrenched power 
relations; the offensive is against "Priests and Kings, / Custom, domestic sway, ay, all that 
brings / Man's freeborn soul beneath the oppressor's heel" (CP, 3256-8). Although Shelley's 
reformatory aims are radical, they benefit from '*the lesson which experience teaches now" 
(CP. p. 101) about the French Revolution; he therefore advocates a gradual transition by 
"resolute perseverance and indefatigable hope, and long-suffering and long-believing courage, 
and the systematic efforts of generations of men of intellect and virtue" (CP. 101). Significantly 
the real combat, fought against "Fear, Hatred, Faith, and Tyranny, who spread / Those subtle 
nets which snare the living and the dead" (CP. 386-7), occurs below the level of tangible 
reality in a "war of earthly minds" (CP. 3134). It is the mental clash between competing value 
systems that empowers Cythna's creative visions, generating "The power which has been mine 
to frame their thoughts anew" (CP, 3135). Here Shelley presents a cogent hypothesis about the 
nature of human creativity; he demonstrates how emotively charged thoughts instigate the 
destruction of tyranny and the creation of a new egalitarian order. Accordingly Laon and 
Cvthna primarily delineates a metaphysical battle; human thoughts reinvigorate values, such 
as "Justice and truth", which contend with reified social systems in a continual contest to re-
shape the world's destiny: 
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when free thoughts, like lightnings, are alive, 
And in each bosom of the multitude 
Justice and truth with Custom's hydra brood 
Wage silent war; when Priests and Kings dissemble 
In smiles or frowns their fierce disquietude, 
When round pure hearts a host of hopes assemble, 
The Snake and Eagle meet—the world's foundations tremble! 
(CP, 417-23) 
These lines metaphorically imply that conflicting mental and emotional states precipitate 
cataclysmic reverberations in the cosmos. On a physical level the French Revolution literally 
shook "the world's foundations." Shelley interpreted this political upheaval as being instigated 
by a communication of acutely focused emotions: "The year 1788 may be assumed as the 
epoch of one of the most important crises produced by this reeling. The sympathies connected 
with that event extended to every bosom" (CP. p. 101). With the predominant emphasis on 
thoughts and emotions, Laon and Cvthna confronts the reader's assumptions about the 
structure of reality; the phenomenal world appears precariously unstable once exposed to 
humanity's "unconquerable will" (CP. 3531). In Cythna's speech to the mariners she declares 
that "Dungeons and palaces are transitory — / High temples fade like vapour—Man alone / 
Remains, whose will has power when all beside is gone" (CP. 3340-2). Shelley's focus on the 
power of the human will is sustained throughout the epic. Relying on "rapid and subtle 
transitions of human passion" (CP. p. 99), Shelley skilfully manipulates perceptions of reality 
to undermine the aggressors' apprehension of victory: 
A band of brothers gathering round me, made, 
Although unarmed, a steadfast front, and still 
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Retreating, with stem looks beneath the shade 
Of gathered eyebrows, did the victors fill 
With doubt even in success; deliberate will 
Inspired our growing troop. . . . (CP. 2407-12) 
Raising "doubt even in success" is a psychological strategy that is even more 
successfully deployed in Hellas (1821). In the later poem, discussed in Chapter Seven, 
Shelley's metaphysical campaign is philosophically complex; he subtly combines "Thought", 
"Will", "Passion", "Reason" and "Imagination" to undermine the Turkish conquest of Greece. 
In Laon and Cvthna the "band of brothers" are empowered by "deliberate will" and it is on the 
wielding of this revolutionary power that Shelley relentlessly focuses his attention: '*the 
millennium could happen if there is a rapid transformation of social consciousness . . . but even 
if it does not occur, the philosopher-poet has to act in a millennial way."7 As Michael O'Neill 
observes, the poem's "affirmation of hope and idealism in the face of political defeat sets The 
Revolt of Islam apart from other works of the day" (LL. 52). That a millennial awakening will 
ensue seems inevitable considering that 4<the Spirit of evil" (CP. 361) has an empire which is 
only "as firm / As its foundations" (CP, 397-8) and, being built on destruction is inevitably 
doomed: "His triumph dearly won, which soon will lend / An impulse swift and sure to his 
approaching end" (CP, 431-2). However a new age founded upon freedom must be 
imaginatively constructed by the poetic consciousness before it can become an actuality. 
Paradoxically despair initiates new visions of hope: 
WHEN the last hope of trampled France had failed 
Like a brief dream of unremaining glory, 
From visions of despair I rose, and scaled 
The peak of an aereal promontory, 
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Whose cavemed base with the vexed surge was hoary; 
And saw the golden dawn break forth, and waken 
Each cloud, and every wave:—. . . . (CP. 127-33). 
Pivotal to the poem's revolutionary metaphysics is the construction of a myth of 
origination that, to the twentieth-century reader, can be seen to anticipate the Big Bang 
theory. Shelley depicts a cosmic explosion in which being bodies forth from the void: "when 
life and thought/ Sprang forth, they burst the womb of inessential Nought" (CP, 350-1). 
Implicit in this "awful tale" (CP. 334) of creation is that thought is a divine permeating force 
sharing an ontological primacy with being: 
Know then that from the depth of ages old 
Two Powers o'er mortal things dominion hold 
Ruling the world with a divided lot, 
Immortal, all-pervading, manifold, 
Twin Genii, equal Gods—when life and thought 
Sprang forth, they burst the womb of inessential Nought. 
(CP, 346-51) 
Ostensibly this passage appears to delineate a dualistic-Cartesian framework emphasized by 
'Two", "divided" and 'Twin." But a closer examination undermines this assumption; "all-
pervading" evokes an underlying notion of interrelationship, a conception of existence that 
becomes more prominent as the poem progresses. Once there is a human being to perceive and 
interrelate with the universe, Shelley creates a Manichean scheme from opposing cosmic 
forces: 
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'The earliest dweller of the world, alone, 
Stood on the verge of chaos. Lo! afar 
O'er the wide wild abyss two meteors shone, 
Sprung from the depth of its tempestuous jar: 
A blood-red Comet and the Morning Star 
Mingling their beams in combat. As he stood, 
All thoughts within his mind waged mutual war, 
In dreadful sympathy (CP, 352-59) 
Significantly the site of interaction, between evil and good, transpires and is synthesized 
within the human mind: "All thoughts within his mind waged mutual war, / In dreadful 
sympathy." This statement exemplifies Shelley's idea that human minds participate in 
restructuring reality. Indeed the earlier symbolic drama, between "An Eagle and a Serpent 
wreathed in fight" (CP, 193), conveys the impression of being imaginatively conjured. 
Contending elemental forces create an "irresistible storm" (CP, 154) in which the protagonist is 
overcome by "a fascination" and compelled to engage with the scene, " I could not choose but 
gaze" (CP, 172). "Gaze" is underlined in the draft (BSM XIII, E . 19, p. 12, 2), stressing a 
sense of captivation. Magnetized by the "moon, and sky, and clouds" (CP, 173), in anticipation 
of some momentous event, the narrator discerns the "heaven so blue, / Suddenly stained with 
shadow" (CP, 176-7) which unfolds into "A speck, a cloud, a shape" (CP, 178). Searchingly, 
through simile he tries to ascribe form to vision: "Like a great ship" (CP, 179); "Even like a 
bark" (CP, 181). Shelley delineates the spectacle like a chiaroscurist, in a succession of 
collapsing and regrouping energy patterns: "So, from that chasm of light a winged Form / On 
all the winds of heaven approaching ever / Floated, dilating as it came" (CP. 186-8). 
Unequivocally the narrator is not presented as a detached observer, but implicated in 
configuring "the event / Of that portentous fight" (CP, 245-6). The phrase "drew / My fancy 
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thither" (CP. 173-4) artfully suggests a creative contribution, which can be substantiated by 
Shelley's prefatorial comment of engaging "the ethereal combinations of the fancy" (CP. p. 
99). Momentarily, before the vision is finally stabilized into form, "A course precipitous, of 
dizzy speed, / Suspending thought and breath" (CP. 190-1) evokes the notion of a dramatic 
shift in consciousness. The inversion of syntax "For in the air do I behold indeed" (CP. 192) 
affirms, yet delicately questions whether the "monstrous sight!" (CP. 191) is real or 
imagined. The scene is invoked from an "aereal rock" (CP. 195) which further interweaves 
the ethereal with the tangible. 
What credence might the reader give to a narrative that is not presented as a cogent 
philosophical view, but by an anonymous Woman who professes esoteric knowledge and a 
prophetic ability to delve into ''the dark Future's ever-flowing urn" (CP, 345)? Perhaps Shelley 
is exploiting his personal fascination with the supernatural in an attempt to engage his reader's 
emotive involvement: "the power of awakening in others sensations like those which animate 
my own bosom" (CP. p. 103). '"Twas midnight" (CP, 337) evokes the witching hour and the 
tale is presented in an air of mysterious intrigue: "Much must remain unthought, and more 
untold" (CP, 344). Certainly the Woman appears like an enchantress; her "majestic theme" 
(CP. 338) unfolds "like such mysterious dream / As makes the slumberer's cheek with wonder 
pale!" (CP. 335-6). At a deeper level these lines simultaneously evoke and undermine the 
archetypal image of woman as temptress. Indeed Shelley subverts the biblical myth of Eve's 
temptation; he rewrites the role of woman so that knowledge is not acquired at the expense of 
man's fall, but utilized as wisdom to instigate his regeneration. Far from being tempted, the 
Woman willingly embraces experience, and controls the Serpent: "the Serpent did obey / Her 
voice, and, coiled in rest in her embrace it lay" (CP. 305-6). The Woman presents an 
intriguing invitation: " i f thou dost dare / With me and with this Serpent, o'er the deep, / A 
voyage divine and strange, companionship to keep'" (CP. 313-5). The "voyage divine" 
intimates that paradise will be regained, rather than lost, by her intuitions. Later, in Canto IV 
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it is evident that the "Serpent" signifies wisdom, which is paradoxically melded with 
innocence in Cythna's smile; she is appropriately 
veiled 
In virtue's adamantine eloquence, 
'Gainst scorn, and death and pain thus trebly mailed, 
And blending, in the smiles of that defence, 
The Serpent and the Dove, Wisdom and Innocence. 
(CP. 1580-4). 
However the poem's shifting semantics undermines consistency of meaning and the "serpent" 
can equally denote evil. In Canto X the "Christian Priest" (CP. 4072) expounds an evil creed: 
"for in his breast / Did hate and guile lie watchful, intertwined, / Twin serpents in one deep and 
winding nest" (CP, 4076-8). But in relation to Cythna, unquestionably the most faithful devotee 
of Shelley's belief in transformation through love, the Serpent symbolizes a radiating 
beneficence that is paradisal: "She turned to me and smiled—that smile was Paradise!" (CP. 
3792). 
Shelley's sustained exploration of the relationship between imaginative vision and 
empirical reality proposes an eternally creative role for human thought and emotions in the 
nature of existence: 
'Our many thoughts and deeds, our life and love, 
Our happiness, and all that we have been, 
Immortally must live, and burn and move, 
When we shall be no more (CP, 3730-3) 
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Throughout his epic, Shelley conceives of a role for human consciousness which has a 
generative impetus; it is more fundamentally creative than simply consciousness-raising: '*the 
vital words and deeds / Of minds whom neither time nor change can tame" (CP. 681-2). 
Accordingly, in the war against tyranny '"Perchance blood need not flow" (CP. 1567) because 
it is fought beneath the threshold of manifest reality: 
—Oh, what a might 
Of human thought was cradled in that night! 
How many hearts impenetrably veiled 
Beat underneath its shade! What secret fight 
Evil and good, in woven passions mailed, 
Waged through that silent throng—a war that never failed! 
(CP, 1732-7) 
A philosophical, quasi-magical apprehension of being is a dominant theme in Laon and 
Cythna: poet and poetic personae unite in a mutual enterprise "to know / The secrets of this 
wondrous world" (CP, 437-8).8 Indeed, Shelley, the Woman of Canto 1, Laon, Cythna, and the 
Hermit all proffer theories concerning the principles that constitute physical reality, albeit 
with varying degrees of success. Shelley's autobiographical opening stanzas 'To Mary 
[Wollstonecraft] [Shelley]" show how his compassion for human subjection, where "The selfish 
and the strong still tyrannize / Without reproach or check'" (CP. 34-5), provoked a Faustian-
like quest. However, contrary to Faust's overweening personal ambition, Shelley's 
appropriation of arcane wisdom is not sought for self-gratification, but "devoted to the love 
of mankind" (CP, p. 100): 
And from that hour did I with earnest thought 
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Heap knowledge from forbidden mines of lore, 
Yet nothing that my tyrants knew or taught 
I cared to learn, but from that secret store 
Wrought linked armour for my soul, before 
It might walk forth to war among mankind; 
Thus power and hope were strengthened more and more 
Within me. . . . (CP, 37-44) 
Shelley carefully revised this passage, rejecting phrases which conveyed a sense of personal 
power; for instance he discarded the following: "my powers and hopes"; "And thus my powers 
were strengthened more & more" (BSM XIII, E . 14, p. 15, 25, 28-9). Although the omission of 
the personal pronoun may appear a minor nuance, its importance arises as the source of 
power is left deliberately opaque. The idea of a personal vacancy in the face of external forces 
is a concept which Shelley continually refined. In relation to "the rejected Introduction" 
Wasserman discusses Shelley's notion of a "transcendent Spirit": "Man is a passive 
instrument on which the Spirit . . . performs its hymns" (SCR, 188). This notion raises 
disturbing connotations of varying degrees of mind control inherent in Laon and Cvthna. 
Passivity occurs in interpersonal relationships where a stronger mind dominates the weaker; the 
Hermit is in service to Laon's ideals of freedom and acts as his "passive instrument" (CP. 
1549). Moreover authors areineluctably subjected "to a common influence which arises out of 
an infinite combination of circumstances belonging to the times in which they live" (CP. 103). 
Hence autonomy is partially subordinated to "the very influence by which his being is thus 
pervaded" (CP, p. 103). Ascertaining the cardinal element in the "secret store" of wisdom is of 
significance to Shelley's revolutionary strategy. His initial consideration was "linked 
thought", (BSM XIII, E . 14, p. 15, 20) and "linked" highlights the importance of a 
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communication between minds as a key to social transformation. A discussion of this concept is 
deferred until later. 
The "gentle Hermit" possibly modelled on Shelley's Etonian master Doctor Lind,9 shares a 
"Deep thirst for knowledge" (CP, 1484) and conveys a spiritual and intellectual radiance, like 
"a lamp / Of splendour" (CP. 1481-2). But unlike the visionary Laon, whom Mary Shelley 
describes as "a youth nourished in dreams of liberty" (CP. p. 271), the Hermit's philosophy of 
determinism sees humanity inescapably trapped because he "deemed that fate / Which made 
them abject, would preserve them so" (CP. 1488-9). This fatalistic acceptance preserves the 
status quo and is therefore censurable: "custom maketh blind and obdurate/ The loftiest hearts" 
(CP. 1486-7). The way in which "custom" has a pervasive stultifying influence, and affects 
even "The loftiest hearts", can be elucidated by philosophical insight. In existential terms one's 
being is subjected to "the 'tranquillizing' ways of that faceless public Heidegger calls 'the 
They'" (H, 37). A significant characteristic of "the They" is "idle talk." Noticeably Heidegger 
points out that this is not a "'disparaging' signification" but a general "interpretedness, which 
controls and distributes the possibilities of average understanding" (BT. 211). Under the 
influence of the "They" the individual is subconsciously controlled and subtly manipulated 
into a soporific compliance: 
This Bemg-wrth-one-an other dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind 
of Being of 'the Others', in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable 
and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and 
unaswrtamabihty, the real dictatorship of the "they" is unfolded. (BT. 164) 
Shelley was vigilantly alert to the persuasive influence of dominant creeds and one of his 
frequent metaphorical analogies in Laon and Cvthna is that of awakening the multitude, "to 
awaken public hope, and to enlighten and improve mankind" (CP. 100). 
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Hope is wielded at every conceivable opportunity in Laon and Cvthna and emanates from 
a seemingly inexhaustible source: "Hope's immortal urn" (CP, 647). Throughout the poem the 
reader detects an optimism that is compellingly infectious: "Thoughts have gone forth whose 
powers can sleep no more!" (CP, 2260). Tracing "Patterns of Hope" in Shelley's poetry, 
Timothy Webb finds that "The poem constantly acknowledges the grounds for despair only to 
rise triumphantly above them."10 Shelley's notebooks show that in revision he vigilantly 
guarded against conveying "infectious gloom" (CP. p. 102) by consciously altering words to 
convey a positive note. In the published poem, Cythna's vision of regeneration resonates with 
anticipation: "Spring's messengers descending from the skies, / The buds foreknow their 
life—this hope must ever rise" (CP, 3161-2). But this polished affirmation of renewal 
originated somewhat pessimistically: "The buds foreknow their doom; [these] [hopes] [within]" 
(BSM XVII, E.10, p. 76, 19). To have portrayed the future as one of "doom" would have 
transgressed Shelley's creed of optimism: he celebrates poetry that is inspiriting and 
admonishes the "gloom and misanthropy" that have '^ tainted the literature of the age with the 
hopelessness of the minds from which it flows" (CP, 102). Shelley realistically acknowledges 
that "those who now live have survived an age of despair" (CP. p. 101). Yet his unfaltering 
optimism affirms '*the transient nature of ignorance and error, and the eternity of genius and 
virtue" (CP. p. 100). Shelley's depiction of the atrocities in the aftermath of the French 
Revolution is heedful of the manifold evils. 
the consequences of legitimate despotism,—civil war, famine, plague, 
superstition, and an utter extinction of the domestic affections; the judicial murder 
of the advocates of Liberty; the temporary triumph of oppression. . . . (CP. p. 
100) 
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Although Shelley graphically portrays a "death-polluted land" (CP, 3902) it is more in an 
abstract universal sense, heightened by the classical contextualization: "Faith, and Plague, and 
Slaughter, / A ghastly brood conceived of Lethe's sullen water" (CP. 3944-5). At times the 
depiction is hellishly Dantesque: "Each well / Was choked with rotting corpses, and became / 
A cauldron of green mist (CP. 3973-5). Why does Shelley re-invoke such abjections in the 
contemporary imagination? Perhaps, as Richard Cronin suggests, "Laon and Cvthna is an 
attempt to revive the memory in order that the trauma it produced might be healed.In the 
poem's vast historical overview from the creation, evil is perceived as a temporary aberration 
and Shelley affirms eternal ideals: " i f aught survive, I deem / It must be love and joy, for they 
immortal seem" (CP, 4376-7). 
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One of the poem's crucial scenes occurs when Laon, bound naked to a column, witnesses 
Cythna's abhorrent fate: he watches the ship that "bore Cythna o'er the plain / Of waters, to 
her blighting slavery sold, / . . . with such thoughts as must remain untold" (CP. 1258-60). 
Having already killed three guards in an effort to save Cythna, Laon faces a supreme mental 
ordeal which is at the heart of the poem's quest for spiritual reformation: how to avoid 
experiencing "violent and malignant passions" (CP, p. 106) when confronted by tyranny. 
Shelley's warning against retribution is clear: "to avenge misdeed / On the misdoer, doth but 
Misery feed / With her own broken heart!" (CP, 1813-15). In The Mask of Anarchy (1819), 
written in response to the Peterloo Massacre, Shelley plainly outlines his ideas on slavery. 
Most prominent is his conception of a self-induced mental and emotional bondage: 
"Then it is to feel revenge 
Fiercely thirsting to exchange 
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Blood for blood — and wrong for wrong— 
Do not thus when ye are strong. (193-6) 
If, as Shelley asserts in the Preface to Laon and Cvthna. "There is no quarter given to 
Revenge, or Envy, or Prejudice" (CP. p. 106) because "Hate must be / The nurse and parent 
still of an ill progeny" (CP. 4358-9), then Laon's thoughts are of immense significance, 
especially in a poem where thought is the principal determinant of futurity. Herein lies the 
challenge that has already been addressed by Cythna, a heroine who, like Laon, is ceaselessly 
"animated throughout by an ardent love of virtue" (CP. p. 271). Cythna's personal courage is 
inspiring; she urges Laon to "say farewell in hope" (CP. 1180) but this insight falls on his 
"unheeding ear" (CP. 1189). Laon had earlier visualized a future in which he would 
experience desolation at Cythna's departure: " I with tears shall stand / Watching thy dim sail 
skirt the ocean gray;" (CP. 1064-5). Consequently, his anticipated vision of futurity unfurls 
into a scene of utmost despair: 
I gnawed my brazen chain, and sought to sever 
Its adamantine links, that I might die: 
O Liberty! forgive the base endeavour, 
Forgive me if, reserved for victory, 
The Champion of thy faith e'er soughtio flyT^-
(CP, 1270-4) 
Although Laon does not succumb to enmity, his emotions, oscillating between suicidal 
despair, remorse and hope, disclose Shelley's awareness of the endeavour necessary to 
transcend despondency.12 " I f adds a note of humility to Laon's intuitive role of liberator and 
reveals an uncertainty concerning his future that is voiced again later: "We know not where 
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we go" (CP. 2587). The reader detects an ambivalence in Shelley's vision concerning futurity; 
the poem is at once fascinated by, yet denies the legitimacy of attaining, pre-vision: "Nor 
should we seek to know" (CP. 2592). Laon's despondency, echoing the narrator's in the 
opening Canto, violates the poem's spiritual ideals. Earlier the Woman had warned that "'To 
grieve is wise, but the despair / Was weak and vain" (CP, 311-12). As the advocate of 
Shelley's principles, Laon accepts the poem's uncompromising choice: "To breathe, to be, to 
hope, or to despair / And die, I questioned not" (CP. 1279-80). 
The Preface rhetorically emphasizes the dramatic change in consciousness necessary to 
experience freedom: "Can he who the day before was a trampled slave suddenly become 
liberal-minded, forbearing, and independent?" (CP, p. 101). Laon and Cvthna directly 
addresses this question. The primary objective is to effect a radical transformation in 
consciousness by de-hypnotizing an entranced population from a mutual complicity in their 
own enthraldom: to "dissolve the world's unquiet trance" (CP. 1068). To accomplish "the 
awakening of an immense nation from their slavery and degradation to a true sense of moral 
dignity and freedom" (CP. p. 100), Shelley examines the role of the oppressed as a trance-
induced behavioural response to despotism. Clarification of Shelley's understanding of slavery 
is rendered explicit in The Mask of Anarchy: '"What is Freedom?—ye can tell / That which 
slavery is, too well— " (156-7). By not exercising mental strength and personal volition 
mankind lose their autonomy: 
'"Tis to be a slave in soul 
And to hold no strong controul 
Over your own wills, but be 
All that others make of ye. (184-7) 
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Existentially to "be / All that others make of ye" is to be inauthentically immersed in 
Heidegger's '*the they", which echoes Kierkegaard's the "Public." Exacting demands are 
placed on the subjugated in Laon and Cythna; the text outlines a dynamic role for the 
oppressed to transform their mental patterns and overcome their servitude. Conversely in 
Hellas (1821) Shelley envisioned the overthrow of Turkish domination and Greek liberation, by 
concentrating solely on manipulating the tyrant's consciousness to concede defeat.13 Nathaniel 
Brown makes a cogent point about the failure of the revolution in Laon and Cvthna: "Though 
temporarily bereft of power, the Tyrant has not yielded inwardly."1 4 Shelley's insistence on 
the necessity of internal changes is one of his most perspicuous insights. As William Ulmer 
remarks, the rebellion failed "because action preceded the inner moral revolution that provides 
social reform its only secure basis . . ," 1 5 It is in "man's deep and searchless heart" (CP. 4204) 
that there is transforming potential: '*those dim labyrinths, where / Hope, near imagined 
chasms, is struggling with despair" (CP, 4205-6). 
The downtrodden multitude have been inculcated into submissively accepting despair: 
"Even from our childhood have we learned to steep / The bread of slavery in the tears of woe, / 
And never dreamed of hope or refuge until now" (CP, 3403-5). Oppressors and oppressed are 
mutual accomplices; both are culpable because they perpetuate their position with despair and 
hatred: "hence each one / Is slave or tyrant; all betray and bow, / Command, or kil l , or fear, or 
wreak, or suffer woe" (CP, 3277-9). There is no distinction between acts of atrocity and 
despairing vindictive thoughts against the aggressors. 
For they all pined in bondage; body and soul 
Tyrant and slave, victim and torturer, bent 
Before one Power, to which supreme control, 
Over their will by their own weakness lent, 
Made all its many names omnipotent. (CP, 730-4) 
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Again and again Shelley reiterates that slaves participate in their own bondage by their 
loathing: "all vied / In evil, slave and despot; fear with lust / Strange fellowship through mutual 
hate had tied," (CP, 698-700). Shelley later defined evil in A Defence of Poetry with his 
discussion of Paradise Lost and redressed the balance of culpability more towards tyrants: 
"Implacable hate, patient cunning, and a sleepless refinement of device to inflict the extremest 
anguish on an enemy, these things are evil; and although venial in a slave are not to be forgiven 
in a tyrant." (PP. 498). In the final canto of the epic, Laon is the ideal Shelleyan captive. 
Although he is physically enslaved, "His head and feet are bare, his hands are bound / Behind 
with heavy chains" (CP. 4468-9), Laon's spirit is undefiled: 
There are no sneers upon his hp which speak 
That scorn or hate has made him bold; his cheek 
Resolve has not turned pale,—his eyes are mild 
And calm, and like the morn about to break, 
Smile on mankind—his heart seems reconciled 
To all things and itself, like a reposing child. 
(CP. 4471-76) 
The greatest obstacle to freedom is not physical violence or enslavement, but the emotive 
response that this provokes in the oppressed. Cythna recollects how a slave transfbrmed-his 
seemingly abject fate, by not focusing on hatred, but by uplifting his arbitrator: 
How once, a slave in tortures doomed to die, 
Was saved, because in accents sweet and low 
He sung a song his Judge loved long ago, 
As he was led to death — (CP, 1029-32) 
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Self-defence against tyranny is explored as an option when the most courageous 
revolutionaries are armed with "A bundle of rude pikes, the instrument / Of those who war but 
on their native ground / For natural rights" (CP. 2444-6). But there is an utter revulsion 
against violence even though it is for what Shelley deemed the highest cause: "how ugly and 
how fell / O Hate! thou art, even when thy life thou shedd'st / For love" (CP, 2471-3). 
Shelley's ideal revolutionaries are liberated by "conducting themselves with the wisdom and 
tranquillity of freemen" (CP. p. 101). Indeed " I f blood be shed, 'tis but a change and choice / 
Of bonds,—from slavery to cowardice: / A wretched fa l l !—" (CP. 1657-9). Shelley's "moral 
and political creed" (CP, p. 100) emanates from a keen awareness and sympathy for human 
subjugation: "The revulsion occasioned by the atrocities of the demagogues, and the re-
establishment of successive tyrannies in France, was terrible, and felt in the remotest comer of 
the civilised world" (CP, p. 101). E. P. Thompson's analysis of the contemporary milieu 
depicts a fearful ruling class dominating by a descent into coercion: "England, in 1792, had 
been governed by consent and deference, supplemented by the gallows and the 'Church-and-
King' mob. In 1816 the English people were held down by force."1 6 Even in the light of this 
extreme repression, Shelley dissuades the revolutionaries from seeking vengeance; he 
advocates "the contrition / Of anger turned to love" (CP. 1866-7) to counteract escalating 
oppression and "with soft attraction ever draw / Their spirits to the love of freedom's equal 
law" (CP, 1871-2). 
Cythna, the poem's "prophetess of Love" (CP. 3641), explains to the mariners the 
centrality of love in the regeneration of society: "To live, as i f to love and live were one,—" 
(CP. 3304). In Laon and Cvthna "Love is celebrated everywhere as the sole law which should 
govern the moral world" (CP, p. 106), because it is the poem's ultimate power of liberation: "a 
nation / Made free by love;—a mighty brotherhood" (CP. 1839-40). Love and its attendant 
forces are conceived in Platonic terms as the eternal primary reality: "Virtue, and Hope, and 
Love, like light and Heaven, / Surround the world" (CP. 3667-8). However in contrast to 
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Plato's ideal world, located in an intellectual realm beyond mortal reach, Shelley suggests the 
possibility of achieving an earthly perfection because love is implicit in creation; Cythna "tore 
the veil that hid / Nature, and Truth, and Liberty, and Love,—" (CP. 3523-4). Moreover 
physical oppression is delineated as immaterial: "And violence and wrong are as a dream / 
Which rolls from steadfast truth, an unretuming stream" (CP. 3647-8). 
Shelley addresses not only the intellectuality of his readers, but he is determined to elicit 
a sense of mutual empathy by appealing '*to the common sympathies of every human breast", 
in an epic of "lofty passions" deliberately calculated to "excite in the reader a generous 
impulse, an ardent thirst for excellence" (CP. p. 100). It is an active engagement with the 
concept of freedom, experienced as an emotional cognition that will liberate humanity. Cythna 
envisages a victorious scenario where "Hearts beat as mine now beats, with such intent / As 
renovates the world; a will omnipotent!" (CP. 1034-5). In relation to the consequence of ardent 
passions, William Drummond's "very acute and powerful metaphysical criticism" (CP. p. 102 
n. 1) is apposite: 
Yet these are the moments, when emotions are forcibly felt, and are easily 
imparted; when bold expression conveys strong meaning—mind speaks to 
mind—thoughts are breathed in words—and eloquence, exciting, and excited by, 
passion, surprises, disturbs, and bears away the soul. (AO. 16) 
Drummond's expression of heightened emotions influencing the state of being is central to 
Shelley's metaphysical theories in Laon and Cythna. One of the secrets imparted by the 
anonymous Woman, "nurtured in divinest lore" (CP. 453), is that an intensity of passionate 
feelings has a kinetic impact in the world: 
For I loved all things with intense devotion; 
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So that, when Hope's deep source in fullest flow, 
Like earthquake, did uplift the stagnant ocean 
Of human thoughts,— mine shook beneath the wide commotion.17 
(CP, 465-8) 
Shelley felt that he was acutely susceptible to emotions and the way in which they pervaded 
all levels of existence: he considered himself able 
to apprehend minute & remote distinctions of feeling whether relative to external 
nature, or the living beings which surround us, & to communicate the conceptions 
which result from considering either the moral or material universe as a whole. 
(LS I , 577) 
Shelley's holistic conception is clarified in his fragmentary Speculations on Metaphysics: 
he refuses to assume "a distinction between the moral and material universe" (Julian VI I , 62). 
His understanding of metaphysics uniquely comprehends the totality of existence. 
Metaphysics may be defined as the science of all that we know, feel, remember 
and believe: inasmuch as our knowledge, sensations, memory and faith constitute 
the universe consideredrelatively to human-identity. (Julian V I I , 62-3) 
Shelley consciously studied human nature and relationships so that his conceptions would be 
accurate: he "watched the passions which rise and spread, and sink and change, amongst 
assembled multitudes of men" (CP, p. 103). Mary Shelley's note on Laon and Cythna outlines 
his personal involvement to help alleviate "the most heart-rending evils to the poor", deeming 
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that his "active sympathy with his fellow-creatures gives a thousandfold interest to his 
speculations, and stamps with reality his pleadings for the human race" (CP. p. 272). 
Cythna's mission, to "lead a happy female train" (CP, 1003) to liberty, demands that she is 
physically enslaved; she chooses "among captives willing chains to wear" (CP. 1184). In 
Shelley's hierarchy of human degradations, Cythna's rape is perhaps the most abject: " A l l 
torture, fear, or horror made seem light / Which the soul dreams or knows" (CP. 2879-80), 
compared with her "loathsome agony" (CP, 2875). Subjected to "the thralls / Of the cold 
Tyrant's cruel lust" (CP. 2857-8), Cythna's emotions become inwardly destructive resulting in 
her derangement: "bome, a loveless victim, and she tore / Her locks in agony" (CP. 2870-1). 
Authorial abhorrence at this scene is cleverly contrived to avoid compromising Cythna's 
ideals; "Deep curses" (CP, 2892) are voiced by slaves who sympathize with her defilement. 
Self-centred carnality is condemned as a perversion of natural affections because "selfishness 
mocks love's delight" (CP. 2876). Despite being repeatedly raped by the tyrant, who "bore / 
Again his load of slavery" (CP, 2872-3), Cythna's mental and spiritual resistance is resolute; 
she does not violate Shelley's spiritual creed with vindictive thoughts. Therefore her purity is 
intact, confirming Shelley's ideal of '^ the female mind / Untainted by the poison-clouds which 
rest / On the dark world" (CP. 973-5). Cythna's forced surrender is solely physical, "Where 
like a Spirit in fleshly chains she lay / Struggling, aghast and pale" (CP. 2882-3). Consequently 
in a text where thought is pre-eminent and determines experience, Cythna is never totally 
enslaved. The significance of this concept of inner freedom can be elucidated by Laon's 
speech to the revolutionaries; he demands that they search their consciousness to determine 
whether their "hearts are tried / In the true love of freedom" (CP, 2010-11). Laon rhetorically 
elaborates the need for self-awareness: "What call ye justice? Is there one who ne'er / In 
secret thought has wished another's i l l?—/Are ye all pure?" (CP, 2017-19). 
Although Cythna's circumstances are an extreme exemplar, she typifies the condition of 
early nineteenth-century women: "Woman as the bond-slave dwells / Of man a slave; and life 
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is poisoned in its wells" (CP, 3314-5) In this way her experience harmonizes in a universal 
voice the plight of subjugated women: "Like broken memories of many a heart / Woven into 
one" (CP. 2849-50). The process through which Cythna attains her liberation provides a 
convincing illustration of Shelley's metaphysical concepts. At first she concentrates her efforts 
solely on her current position of imprisonment: 
I might be free, 
Could I but win that friendly bird to me, 
To bring me ropes; and long in vain I sought 
By intercourse of mutual imagery 
Of objects, i f such aid he could be taught; 
But fruit, and flowers, and boughs, yet never ropes he brought. 
(CP, 3085-90) 
Surprisingly Cythna's thinking is in a causal sequential manner; she seeks release through a 
manipulation of her external circumstances. "Ropes" in connection with freedom are dubious 
since their usual signification is bondage. The futility of this endeavour illustrates that a 
miraculous unforeseeable solution is necessary to win freedom. Before her deliverance Cythna 
dissolves the boundaries between self and world: her captivity is no longer personal and 
localized, but universal and contextualized within the earth's bondage: "And thus my prison 
was the populous earth" (CP. 3136). Consequently it is through cosmic intervention that 
Cythna is released from her watery dungeon, "when sudden earthquake rent / The depth of 
ocean, and the cavern cracked / With sound" (CP, 3163-5). In addition to Cythna's expansion 
in consciousness to encompass the earth, she actively visualizes liberty: "Religion's pomp 
made desolate by the scorn / Of Wisdom's faintest smile, and thrones uptorn" (CP, 3139-40). 
Prisons need not signify defeat i f they are "Dungeons wherein the high resolve is found" (CP. 
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3151). Tenacious resistance to despair is paramount: "Al l is not lost! There is some 
recompense / For hope whose fountain can be thus profound,—" (CP, 3145-6). Prior to her 
release, Cythna questions the structure of her prison and undermines its solidity with a 
comparison to the human mind. 
—What was this cave? 
Its deep foundation no firm purpose knows 
Immutable, resistless, strong to save, 
Like mind while yet it mocks the all-devouring grave. 
(CP. 3078-81) 
Even during her confinement, Cythna's vision is always focused on victory: "And love made 
free,—a hope which we have nursed / Even with our blood and tears,—until its glory burst" 
(CP, 3143-4). Cythna's personal experience of gaining freedom serves as the prototype for 
female emancipation. An emotional and mental transformation is envisaged for women to be 
"possessed / By hopes" (CP. 3547-8) and break "their cold, careless, willing slavery" (CP, 
3551). Servitude is seen as a self-imposed bondage and liberation occurs with the realization 
of this concept: "They looked around, and Io! they became free!" (CP. 3553). The human mind 
empowered by emotion is depicted as vanquishing physical circumstances: "Those who were 
sent to bind me, wept, and felt / Their minds outsoar the bonds which clasped them round" 
(CP, 3559-60). 
To eliminate women's acquiescence in their subordination, Shelley's objective in Laon and 
Cythna is "the revolutionizing of the female w i l l . " 1 8 But the French endeavour of liberating the 
"female wi l l " proved to be fatal for its chief exponent. Marie Gauzes, writing under the name 
of Olympe De Gouges, outlined women's rights in Les Droits de la Femme et du Citoyen 
(1791). One of her most egalitarian propositions, that society should be founded on sexual 
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equality, would have resonated with Shelley's beliefs: "The Principle of sovereignty resides in 
essence in the Nation, which is nothing other than the conjunction of Woman and Man." 1 9 
Ironically Gauzes was herself a victim of radical excesses; she was guillotined for voicing 
antagonism towards Robespierre's Jacobin Terror. There is a poignancy in her claim that "The 
exercise of Woman's natural rights has no limit other than the tyranny of Man's opposing 
them."20 However Gauzes' "ferocious legion of female militia" 2 1 and rhetorical incitement to 
violence would have been untenable to Shelley. Indeed, although Cythna wields a sword, it is 
more a question of her role as an active liberator and the subversion of conventional gender 
stereotypes. Cythna's purity is unimpeachable: "like to an Angel, robed in white" (CP, 2502). 
Accounts of Shelley's feminist poetics are diverse: Laon and Cvthna has been heralded as 
"the most powerful feminist poem in the language"22 and also seen to perpetuate patriarchal 
values with the criticism that Cythna "speaks only through Laon's Romantic ventriloquism . . . 
effectively denying her any voice at all in the regions of eternity."23 My interpretation finds 
that Shelly^ paradigm of sexual equality is a convincing achievement, with the creation of a 
dynamic heroine who confronts the patriarchal view of female subservience. Even in captivity 
Cythna exemplifies the Shelleyan ideal of womanhood, fearlessly seeking wisdom: "calm and 
sad, musing alway / On loftiest enterprise" (CP. 2860-1). Unlike Laon who recovers his sanity 
with the help of a hermit, Cythna is totally reliant on her own inner resources. By being 
"fearless-hearted" (CP, 3095), she is able to initiate her regeneration: 
'My mind became the book through which 1 grew 
Wise in all human wisdom, and its cave, 
Which like a mine I rifled through and through, 
To me the keeping of its secrets gave— 
One mind, the type of all, the moveless wave 
Whose calm reflects all moving things that are: 
100 
Necessity, and love, and life, the grave 
And sympathy (fountains of hope and fear), 
Justice, and truth, and time, and the world's natural sphere. 
(CP, 3100-8) 
Shelley's deepest concern with the tyrant's rape of Cythna is in relation to the effects on 
the human soul: Cythna being physically abused seems less significant when juxtaposed with 
the spiritual violation of her "rent soul" (CP, 2885). In the loving relationship between Laon 
and Cythna, clothed in "Nature's modesty" (CP, 2686), desire pulsates to coition in a 
consummation that unifies all levels of being: "Al l thought, all sense, all feeling, into one / 
Unutterable power" (CP, 2642-3). Conversely when Cythna is forcefully taken by the tyrant it 
divisively sunders her being. Shelley inverts the conventional roles of masculinity and 
femininity; Laon's amatory reticence is characteristically associated with women: "some 
impulse made my heart refrain / From seeking her that night" (CP. 2322-3). This leaves the 
sensual pursuit in their relationship to Cythna. Indeed her rescue is couched in a sexually 
provocative idiom: '"Mount with me, Laon, now!" (CP, 2514). Laon's deliverance by Cythna 
from "the grasp of bloody hands" (CP. 2495), has a dual significance; he is literally rescued 
from physical death, but also symbolically from the Alastorian death of unrealized sexual 
communion. Here Laon's position is typically Shelleyan as outlined in his autobiographical 
stanzas 'To Mary": "And-Death and Love are yet contending for their prey" (CP. 90). Prior to 
these lines Shelley presents a metaphorical account of his relationship with Mary who defied 
social mores: "when the mortal chain / Of Custom thou didst burst and rend in twain, / And 
walk as free as light the clouds among" (CP. 58-60). Consequently Shelley's "spirit sprung / 
To meet thee from the woes which had begirt it long!" (CP. 62-3). 
Shelley's humanitarian desire for sexual equality and social reform is inspired by his 
personal quest for a passionate involvement with an intellectual equal; his sense of dejection 
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before meeting Mary is acute: "Hard hearts, and cold, like weights of icy stone / Which crushed 
and withered mine—that could not be / Aught but a lifeless clod, until revived by thee" (CP. 
52-4) Consequently his poetics are not purely altruistic, but spring from a deep-seated 
personal need. Shelley's loveless marriage to Harriet was most damningly described to Hogg in 
October 1814: " I felt as i f a dead & living body had been linked together in loathsome & 
horrible communion" (LS 1, 402). Shelley certainly considered the depths of his "woes" as 
life-denying; in his notebook he wrote and then crossed through 'To meet thee as from death" 
(BMS X I I I , E . 14, p. 17, 22). Here Shelley's citation from Chapman's The Conspiracy and 
Tragedy of Charles. Duke of Byron is of relevance: 
There is no danger to a man, that knows 
What life and death is: there's not any law 
Exceeds his knowledge; neither is it lawful 
That he should stoop to any other law.— CHAPMAN. 
(CP. p. 106) 
Charles Robinson perceives that Shelley "appears to have chosen his epigraph with ironic 
intent" especially since 'lie surely contrasted Byron's misanthropic Manfred with his own 
philanthropic Laon" (SB. 65). Whilst this is certainly a cogent observation there is a more 
imperative philosophical reason, concerned with the utmost parameters of existence, "life and 
death." Wilson Knight's analysis of Chapman's tragic drama determines that "No danger 
touches one who knows 'what life and death is'; the warrior, like the occult adept, is death-
friendly. . . . ' , 2 4 "Death-friendly" understood existentially in Heideggerian terms of "Being-
towards-death" 2 3 is to be focused on the totality of possibilities, and therefore an authentic 
mode of existence. Laon and Cythna is conceived and written under the auspices of Shelley's 
anticipation of his death. But Shelley's fascination with death is not one of existential 
consideration, but conceived as an actual imminent event, the fervent "communications of a 
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dying man" (LS 1, 577). As such Shelley is impelled to communicate his vision: " I felt the 
precariousness of my life, & I engaged in this task resolved to leave some record of myself 
(LS 1, 577). Shelley's indefatigable resolve to "shake the Anarch Custom's reign" (CP, 86), 
irrespective of "temporary praise or blame" (CP. p. 104), conveys an authentic voice; the voice 
defined in existential terms of "Being-one's-Self" (BT. 344), and this "'Resoluteness' 
signifies letting oneself be summoned out of one's lostness in the 'they'" (BT. 345). 
Furthermore Shelley's "resoluteness" has a benign influence on humanity because "When 
Dasein is resolute, it can become the 'conscience' of Others" (BT. 344). In relation to death it 
must be pointed out that Heidegger's understanding of a conceivable existence after one's 
demise is complex and appears paradoxical. As "Dasein" is dependent on "Being-in-the-world" 
it would seem to preclude the notion of a post-mortal existence. But Heidegger states that 
I f "death" is defined as the 'end' of Dasein—that is to say, of Being-in-the-
world—this does not imply any ontical decision whether 'after-death' still another 
Being is possible, either higher or lower, or whether Dasein 'lives on' or even 
'outlasts' itself and is 'immortal.' (BT, 292) 
Conversely Shelley's understanding of being in Laon and Cvthna embraces a post-mortal 
metaphysical realm, "The Temple of the Spirit" (CP. 4815), where the lovers journey after 
being burnt at the stake. In this realm Shelley depicts a disembodied transcendent 
consciousness: '"Then suddenly I stood, a winged Thought, / Before the immortal Senate" (CP. 
4720-1). Death is conceived as an actual experience where conscious awareness is retained: 
"Ay, this is Paradise / And not a dream, and we are all united!" (CP. 4643-4). Such an 
awareness is implausible in Heideggerian thought as the "wholeness in death" means that we 
are "lifted right out of the possibility of experiencing this transition and of understanding it as 
something experienced" (BT. 281). 
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Shelley's personal perception of "being-towards-death" proved to be a liberating artistic 
prerequisite, allowing Laon and Cvthna to be "written fearlessly" (CP, 104) with Shelley ever 
thoughtful of the enduring presence of literary creation in eternity: "the stamp / Of ever-
burning thoughts on many a page" (CP, 1478-9). Accordingly Shelley is driven by a concern 
for authenticity, describing his composition as "a genuine picture of my own mind. I felt that 
the sentiments were true, not assumed" (LS 1, 577). Whilst authorial comment is in no way 
proof of Shelley's genuineness, his lifelong ideals on love, sexual equality and freedom are 
inscribed into the text. Shelley's poetic characters are the emissaries of his personal principles, 
such as his ideas on vegetarianism. Timothy Morton's Shelley and the Revolution in Taste 
investigates the way in which vegetarianism "is an aspect of the revolutionary vision."2 6 In 
Laon and Cvthna he traces the consistency of Shelley's ideas to Queen Mab. In A 
Vindication of Natural Diet (1813) Shelley rebuked the "unnatural craving for dead flesh" 
(PWS. 85) in a cogent ecological argument which posits that "the depravity of the moral 
nature of man originated in his unnatural habits of life" (PWS, 77). His entreaty, "By all that is 
sacred in our hopes for the human race, I conjure those who love happiness and truth, to give a 
fair trial to the vegetable system" (PWS, 83-4), is adopted by the revolutionaries in Laon and 
Cythna: 
'My brethren, we are free! The fruits are glowing 
Beneath the stars, and the night winds are flowing 
O'er the ripe corn, the birds and beasts are dreaming— 
Never again may blood of bird or beast 
Stain with its venomous stream a human feast. 
(CP, 2242-46) 
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One of the most convincing illustrations of Shelley's authenticity is his autobiographical 
connection to the epic, as evidenced in the stanzas 'To Mary." The protagonists embody 
Shelley's metaphysical beliefs endowing his principles with a vitalizing presence: Shelley's 
own desire to "be wise, / And just, and free, and mild, i f in me lies / Such power" (CP. 31-3) is 
similarly the aspiration which impels both Laon and Cythna. For Heidegger, "In 'poetical' 
discourse, the communication of the existential possibilities of one's state-of-mind can become 
an aim in itself, and this amounts to a disclosing of existence" (BT, 205). Laon and Cvthna 
overtly discloses how Shelley's motivation arises from a belief in the egalitarian ideals of 
"Pity and Peace and Love, among the good and free!" (CP, 2211). 
Whilst focusing on "being-towards-death" may confer an existential authenticity on 
Shelley's poetic endeavour there are serious consequences for his theory of creativity; 
thought empowered by intense emotion creates one's experience of reality. Ironically Cythna's 
self-defined role as "the prophetess of Love" (CP. 3641) is one of prophesying her and Laon's 
death: "This is the winter of the world;—and here / We die" (CP, 3685-6). She visualizes "a 
glorious doom" (CP. 3728) creating a mental paradigm of an emotional intensity. Death is so 
vividly imagined that it presides over the canto as a psychic reality: '"And Calumny 
meanwhile shall feed on us, / As worms devour the dead" (CP. 3739-40). Laon and Cythna's 
imminent demise is depicted as a physical actuality: '"So be the turf heaped over our remains / 
Even in our happy youth" (CP. 3721-2). Curiously Cythna affirms that "We know not what 
will come—" (CP. 3640), but-this-is paradoxical in view of her convincing Laon that then-
deaths are inevitable: "0 dearest love! we shall be dead and cold / Before this morn may on the 
world arise" (CP. 3694-5). Consequently the poem's denouement endorses its philosophical 
vision where "winged thoughts did range, / And half-extinguished words, which prophesied of 
change" (CP. 3521-2). Cythna's reasoning is complex; she tells Laon that "Her hps shall rob 
thee of the grace thou wearest, / To hide thy heart, and clothe the shapes which rove / Within 
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the homeless Future's wintry grove" (CP. 3642-4). As "prophetess" Cythna appropriates 
Laon's power and takes responsibility for shaping their destiny. 
Clarification of Cythna's role is found in the drafting of these lines: "The Poet who shall 
steal the grace [thou] [ Twearest] / Around thy heart" (BSM XVII , E . 10, p. 116, 27-8). This 
suggests that Cythna assumes the role of "Poet" and hence creator; nevertheless her vision is 
still in unison with Laon's: "For I now, sitting thus beside thee, seem / Even with thy breath 
and blood to live and move" (CP. 3645-6). In Cythna's calm acceptance of death there is a 
volte-face from her earlier declaration of the mind's invincibility: "Like mind while yet it 
mocks the all-devouring grave" (CP. 3081). Questions concerning the interrelationship of art 
and life arise as biographical details of the Shelleys are inscibed into the poetics of Laon and 
Cvthna. The invocation to Spring reads as a veiled allusion to Mary Shelley's birth: 
Sister of joy, thou art the child who wearest 
Thy mother's dying smile, tender and sweet; 
Thy mother Autumn, for whose grave thou bearest 
Fresh flowers, and beams like flowers, with gentle feet, 
Disturbing not the leaves which are her winding-sheet. 
(CP. 3662-6) 
Ostensibly "Thy mother" is "Autumn", but equally plausible is a biographical-interpretation, 
especially considering that Mary Wollstonecraft died on 10 September 1797. That the 
circumstances of Mary Shelley's birth were prominent in Shelley's mind is apparent from the 
opening stanzas: 
They say that thou wert lovely from thy birth, 
Of glorious parents, thou aspiring Child. 
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I wonder not — for One then left this earth 
Whose life was like a setting planet mild, 
Which clothed thee in the radiance undefiled 
Of its departing glory (CP, 100-5). 
The juxtaposition of death and love became deeply ingrained in Shelley's consciousness and is 
pursued more fully in Chapters Five and Eight. 
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Chapter 4 
"A Tale of Human Power": Vision and Reality in Laon and Cvthna 
for to me is given 
The wonders of the human world to keep, 
And fancy's thin creations to endow 
With manner, being, and reality. 
(Queen Mab VII, 60-3) 
I 
Through the labyrinths of the imagination Laon and Cythna negotiates a network of dreams, 
visions and trances which often collapse into tangible experiences. Laon dreams of being 
apprehended by "Legions of foul and ghastly shapes, which hung / Upon my flight" (CP, 1149-
50). These swirling chimeras materialize into manifest existence: 
And I lay struggling in the impotence 
Of sleep, while outward life had burst its bound, 
Though, still deluded, strove the tortured sense 
To its dire wanderings to adapt the sound 
Which in the light of morn was poured around 
Our dwelling. Breathless, pale, and unaware 
I rose, and all the cottage crowded found 
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With armed men, whose glittering swords were bare, 
And whose degraded limbs the tyrant's garb did wear. 
(CP, 1153-61) 
An interweaving of the material and immaterial planes of existence renders them almost 
inextricable: "A sense of actual things those monstrous dreams among" (CP, 1152). Laon's 
'^terrific trance" (CP, 1306), provoked by physical deprivation, invokes a "giddy dance" (CP. 
1308) of malignant apparitions that are indecipherable from external reality: "thought could 
not divide / The actual world from these entangling evils" (CP, 1311-12). The dominant tension 
in Laon and Cythna is the relationship between imaginative vision and empirical reality.1 True 
to Shelley's Speculations on Metaphysics different apprehensions of existence have equal 
validity; there is no demarcation between "thoughts, which are called real, or external objects" 
and those which "are usually more obscure and indistinct, such as hallucinations, dreams and 
the ideas of madness" (Julian VII, 59). As Wilson Knight remarks in his discussion of "The 
immortality of consciousness" in Shelley's poetry, "image is event and event highly 
imaginative, while all are one with his own conflicting and swift-searching consciousness."2 
Through the characters of Laon and Cythna, Shelley designates consciousness as the decisive 
factor in dispelling tyranny; Laon's "many thoughts: a tameless multitude!" (CP. 747) 
populate the world to enact freedom's call: 
my song 
Peopled with thoughts the boundless universe, 
A mighty congregation, which were strong 
Where'er they trod the darkness, to disperse 
The cloud of that unutterable curse 
Which clings upon mankind:—. . . . (CP. 928-33) 
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Here metaphor concretizes Shelley's ideas; "Peopled" and "A mighty congregation" evoke a 
definite physical presence which is further impressed with vigorous animation: "were strong / 
Where'er they trod." The materialization of thoughts resurfaces in Cythna's imaginative 
visions. 
'For to my will my fancies were as slaves 
To do their sweet and subtile ministries; 
And oft from that bright fountain's shadowy waves 
They would make human throngs gather and rise 
To combat with my overflowing eyes 
And voice made deep with passion—. . . . (CP. 3127-32) 
Although Cythna's "ethereal combinations of the fancy" (CP, p. 99) appear magically 
conjured from the "shadowy waves" of vision, the blending of imagination, "will" and 
"passion" is consistent with Shelley's unfolding ideas on the nature of creativity.3 Before 
deciding on "passion" Shelley initially wrote "And voice made deep [by] [thought]" (BSM 
XVII, E . 10, p.74, 32). From this substitution it seems reasonable to assume that in Shelley's 
consciousness, thought and passion occupy a similar semantic level. Of relevance to Shelley's 
ideas on thought and passion are the scientific insights into being that are explored by David 
Bohm and David Peat in Science. Order, and Creativity. In their discussion of "creative 
intelligence", which they perceive as being "universal and acts in every area of mental 
operation", Bohm and Peat maintain that '*the insights of neurochemistry and the nature of 
nerve networks indicate very strongly that there can be no fundamental separation at this level 
between thought, feeling, and will" (SOC, 219). If, at the level of creativity, these metaphysical 
elements are interrelated, then thought would naturally invoke passion and will and their 
combination is vitally creative. 
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Throughout Laon and Cythna Shelley exploits the interweaving, boundless nature of 
various layers of consciousness: "hallucinations", "dreams" and "madness" are given an 
ontological status which questions common perceptions about familiar reality. This dichotomy 
is most extreme with the birth of Cythna's dream-child, unfurled in "a strange tale of strange 
endurance" (CP, 2848). Immediately before Cythna's intuitive apprehension of pregnancy, her 
senses are deranged by "The misery of a madness slow and creeping" (CP. 2956). Insanity 
forces Cythna to question the credibility of her experiences: "no firm assurance, / So wild were 
they, could her own faith impart" (CP, 2850-1). Cythna's inner turmoil conditions her 
perceptions, rendering the physical world indivisible from her demented anguish. She 
apprehends a confusion between the natural elements "Which made the earth seem fire, the sea 
seem air" (CP, 2957). This chaotic disintegration in the conventional way of perceiving the 
world culminates with Cythna's metamorphosis in consciousness: "Thus all things were / 
Transformed into the agony which I wore / Even as a poisoned robe among my bosom's core" 
(CP. 2962-4). Shelley's understanding of an integral relationship between self and world, 
defined in On Life (1819), is of relevance here. In this essay, Shelley outlines two heightened 
states of awareness where perception disintegrates boundaries: "sensations as children" and 
'*the state called reverie" (TP, 477). Under these states of perceiving, people "feel as if their 
nature were dissolved into the surrounding universe, or as i f the surrounding universe were 
absorbed into their being." (PP. 477). In relation to Shelley's presentation of a unified field of 
being and world, there-is an overt parallel between Cythna's derangement and childlike modes 
of perception. Psychological verification of Shelley's insight into the mental world of 
childhood can be elucidated by Jean Piaget's research 4 
In The Child's Conception of the World Piaget deduces that, during the earliest years, 
children innately experience a sense of oneness: "There is thus in the beginning neither self 
nor external world but a continuum" (CCW. 235). Cythna experiences a regression to the 
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origins of her conscious experience of reality. The catalyst which precipitates this awakening 
is an Eagle relinquishing his hunting instincts: 
'This wakened me, it gave me human strength; 
And hope, I know not whence or wherefore, rose, 
But I resumed my ancient powers at length; 
My spirit felt again like one of those — 
Like thine! —whose fate it is to make the woes 
Of humankind their prey.— (CP, 3073-8) 
Shelley shrewdly redirects the predatory nature of the Eagle to energize his revolutionary 
goals and vanquish adversity. Cythna's self-healing where "time imparted / Such power to 
me" (CP. 3094-5) is not only a process to reintegrate her thoughts and emotions, but more 
importantly to create her destiny. Cythna explains her perception of existence thus: 
'We live in our own world, and mine was made 
From glorious fantasies of hope departed: 
Aye we are darkened with their floating shade, 
Or cast a lustre on them— (CJL 3091-4) 
A sense of personal empowerment is central to Cythna's account of her liberation. In his 
analysis of the child's early mental patterns Piaget's study defines a notion of ontological 
supremacy: "Just as the child makes his own truth, so he makes his own reality" (CCW, 167). 
Of greatest consequence to Shelley's intellectual ideas is Cythna's assumed mastery over 
external events; she wields a quasi-magical power with her ability "to wreak / Ruin upon the 
tyrants" (CP, 1013-4): 
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—Al l shall relent 
Who hear me—tears, as mine have flowed, shall flow, 
Hearts beat as mine now beats, with such intent 
As renovates the world; a will omnipotent! (CP, 1032-5) 
In regard to "a will omnipotent" Piaget's deductions about the child's understanding of the 
structure of reality are germane: 
Reality is impregnated with self and thought is conceived as belonging to the 
category of physical matter. From the point of view of causality, all the universe is 
felt to be in communion with and obedient to the self. There is participation and 
magic. (CCW, 167). 
However, Shelley's and Piaget's theoretical conclusions about the validity of the child's 
perceptions to comprehend the nature of reality are diametrically opposed. For Piaget, the 
child experiences "egocentric illusions" (CCW. 168)5 arising from projection and an ignorance 
of subjectivity. By maturity people become disillusioned: "As adults we are aware of an 
external reality made up of causal connections and an internal subject" (CCW. 158). Here 
Piaget's view is classically Cartesian and in contradistinction to Shelley's holistic view of 
existence examined throughouTthis thesis.6 Shelley's creative ideas demand that Cythna retains 
her childlike sense of oneness with the world and magical capacity to create. 
In the poem Laon and Cythna's "sensations as children" (PP. 477) have a significant 
role. Canto I I , which introduces Cythna as "A child most infantine" (CP. 856), opens with 
"The starlight smile of children" (CP, 667) providing one of the rejuvenating balms for 
Laon's "spirit's folded powers" (CP, 675). Cythna has a spiritual innocence which gives her 
great inner strength: 
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How without fear of evil or disguise 
Was Cythna!—what a spirit strong and mild, 
Which death, or pain or peril could despise, 
Yet melt in tenderness! what genius wild 
Yet mighty, was enclosed within one simple child! 
(CP, 950-4) 
"Simple child" seems ironic given the complexity of Shelley's depiction, but a few lines 
later it is apparent that one meaning of "simple" is innocence. Cythna is unaware of her 
abilities, "Unconscious of the power through which she wrought / The woof of such intelligible 
thought" (CP. 967-8). "Genius wild" denotes an original and anarchic way of thinking. Shelley 
tenaciously insists on Cythna's childlike ingenuity. Even after she is ready to fulfill her mission 
and has "cast off the impotence that binds / Her childhood now" (CP. 1078-9) she is still 
perceived as "that dearest child" (CP, 1170). "Child" has a specific philosophical import in 
Laon and Cvthna; it codifies a way of perceiving the world that is unencumbered by cultural 
conditioning: 
New lore was this —old age, with its gray hair, 
And wrinkled legends of unworthy things, 
Andlcy sneers, is nought: it cannot dare 
To burst the chains which life for ever flings 
On the entangled soul's aspiring wings. (CP. 955-9) 
A "New lore" derived from Cythna's childlike perceptions is pivotal to the furtherance of the 
poem's revolutionary ideals, to overthrow "faiths which long have held the world in awe, / 
Bloody and false, and cold" (CP. 1543-4). Once initiated into Cythna's creed of "new-born 
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liberty" (CP. 3446) even the captives are transformed into "earth's purest children, young and 
fair, / With eyes the shrines of unawakened thought" (CP. 3451-2). 
With the pre-verbal natural bonding between mother and daughter, Cythna is able to re-
experience a state of innocent perception through her creative play: "With heaps of golden 
shells we two did play,— / Both infants, weaving wings for time's perpetual way" (CP, 3017-
8). The Romantic preference for childhood states is, perhaps, best exemplified in 
Wordsworth's ODE: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood. 
Wordsworth enunciates that visionary experience gradually diminishes and disappears in 
adulthood: 
Heaven lies about us in our infancy! 
Shades of the prison-house begin to close 
Upon the growing Boy 
But He beholds the light, and whence it flows, 
He sees it in his joy; 
At length the Man perceives it die away, 
And fade into the light of common day. 7 
In his portrayal of Cythna, Shelley circumvents Wordsworth's suggested loss of visionary 
experience. Not only does Cythna become more spiritual as the narrative progresses, "like to 
an Angel, robed in white" (CP. 2502), she also retains her visionary ideals. Here the 
correspondence between a childlike state of consciousness and madness is incisive. Insanity, 
understood as a derangement of conventional cognitive structures, is a powerful phase of 
consciousness from which to elicit transformation. Paradoxically Cythna's derangement is 
both a debilitating experience, "madness misery brought,—" (CP. 2955), but also heralds 
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regeneration: "Her madness was a beam of light, a power / Which dawned through the rent 
soul" (CP, 2884-5). 
What might Cythna's visionary experiences reveal about the structure of reality? Evidently 
Shelley's presentation of an interconnection between consciousness and world is at variance 
with a Cartesian schema which distinguishes mind from matter. The principles of an holistic 
conception of existence have been outlined by David Bohm's quantum interpretation in 
Chapter One. Bohm's ideas on the reality of thought confer an ontological status that has an 
affinity with Shelley's ideas. He perceives thought 
as a real movement that is actually going on, both inwardly and outwardly, with 
real effects of very widespread and deep significance that interpenetrate and 
ultimately merge with the whole of reality in which we live. (OC, 65) 
In Laon and Cvthna the collapse of a boundary between internal and external reality is 
central to the creative act; from a nebulous vortex of immaterial images Cythna summons a 
"wondrous vision" to supersede her "visionary woes": 
a long 
And wondrous vision wrought from my despair, 
Then grew, like sweet reality among 
Dim visionary woes, an unreposing throng. (CP, 2970-3) 
Shelley's diction is skillfully chosen to realize his metaphysical concepts. "An unreposing 
throng" undercuts the notion of permanence or stability and conveys a sense of anarchism; 
the "woes" are ungovernable because they are not structured by Cythna's conscious attention. 
The juxtaposition of "Dim" and "visionary" suggests fading and weakens their physical 
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presence. By contrast the "wondrous vision" encapsulates a brightness that becomes palpable, 
"grew, like sweet reality." To the reader Cythna's enslavement, rape and subsequent 
imprisonment may appear to be more concrete impediments than her description of "Dim 
visionary woes." However, with the simile "grew, like sweet reality" Shelley negates the 
perpetuation of adversity with one of his central insights about creativity; imaginative vision 
has a generative nature which can displace tangible circumstances. Here the primary evidence 
in the Bodleian Shelley Manuscript is an invaluable guide to the development of Shelley's 
conceptions. He dratted the lines, "Burst like a reality among / Those visionary woes" 
(BSM XVTJ, E . 10, p. 67,12-13). "Burst" invokes an instantaneous explosion, consonant with 
the account of creation in Canto 1: "when life and thought / Sprang forth, they burst the womb 
of inessential Nought" (CP, 350-1). Nevertheless Shelley most probably rejected "burst" and 
chose the more generative "grew", in accord with his conviction that for creation to be lasting 
it must originate without violence: "the light which shows its worth, / Must among gentle 
thoughts and fearless take its birth" (CP. 710-11). Cythna's derangement deconstructs the 
prevailing perceptual modes, allowing access to a multi-dimensional reality of countless 
possibilities from which she is able to construct her desired future: 
'And on the sand would I make signs to range 
These woofs, as they were woven, of my thought; 
Clear, elemental shapes, whose smallest change 
A subtler language within language wrought: 
The key of truths (CP, 3109-13) 
"Signs" making "A subtler language within language" reveal a poetic aim to communicate 
a way of perceiving the world free from established linguistic structures. Heidegger points out 
the impossibility of relaying a primordial encounter of the world as "language already hides in 
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itself a developed way of conceiving" (BT. 199). Having, perhaps, pre-empted this line of 
argument Shelley reveals that the primary experience of reality is unverbalizable; in Canto 1 
the woman's expression is in an "unintelligible strain / Of her melodious voice and eloquent 
mien" (CP. 300-1). Her communication is not through recognizable linguistic structures: "She 
spake in a language whose strange melody / Might not belong to earth" (CP, 289-90). However 
the woman can emotively convey meaning through her compassion: "The pity and the love of 
every tone" (CP. 292). Shelley intimates that the ultimate reality is beyond human reach and 
encapsulation: 
Like what maybe conceived of this vast dome, 
When from the depths which thought can seldom pierce 
Genius beholds it rise, his native home, 
Girt by the deserts of the Universe, 
Yet, nor in painting's light, or mightier verse, 
Or sculpture's marble language, can invest 
That shape to mortal sense—. . . . (CP. 568-74) 
Nevertheless, in humanity's experience of the universe thought and hope are the primary 
motivating agents and their linguistic articulation heralds change: "great is the strength / Of 
words" (CP. 1569-70). Words are alive with-intent, their power is metaphorically depicted as 
the ammunition to destroy tyranny: the Tyrant orders his men "go slay the rebels" (CP. 3865) 
because "the weakest with one word might turn / The scales of victory yet" (CP. 3867-8). 
Metaphysical elements predominate in Laon and Cythna; the elements of evil "In air, and 
light, and thought, and language, dwell" (CP. 389), but equally so does the power of good: 
With deathless minds which leave where they have passed 
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A path of light, my soul communion knew; 
Till from that glorious intercourse, at last, 
As from a mine of magic store, I drew 
Words which were weapons;—round my heart there grew 
The adamantine armour of their power, 
And from my fancy wings of golden hue 
Sprang forth—yet not alone from wisdom's tower, 
A minister of truth, these plumes young Laon bore. 
(CP, 838-46) 
The drafting of these lines offers insight into Shelley's developing thoughts on creativity. 
Although clearly printed here, from Tokoo's editorial decisions, the facsimile highlights the 
problem of editing Shelley's notebooks; this text is cross-written over other lines that are not 
relevant to this discussion and therefore omitted. For ease of reading they have been rearranged 
thus: 
(DRAWING Aa from n mine of mogio8 power, I drew (DRAWING OF 
OF [?Magic ] my soul a TREE) 
TREES) a deep communion knew 
Till from that ceaseless intercourse at last 
As from a mind of magic store I drew 
Words which were weapons; & had 
round my heart there grew 
The adamantine armour of thier power 
(BSMXIII, E . 19, p. 8, 17-24). 
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Of immediate significance is the close proximity of "As from a mine of magic power, I drew" 
to the tree drawing. Nancy Goslee's examination of Shelley's numerous sketches in the 
"Prometheus" Notebooks has a distinct relevance here; she finds in the sketches "a complex, 
fascinating range of interdependence with the developing verbal texts."9 In relation to the 
recurrent tree drawings, Goslee detects a "natural, organic, and generative," impetus which 
appears "closest to the processes of poetic generation."10 Most convincingly, " I drew" and the 
tree drawing, in the above cited lines, establish a powerful link and a source of creative 
inspiration. Noticeably Laon and Cythna was written in a natural setting "where the woods to 
frame a bower / With interlaced branches mix and meet" (CP. 12-13). 
To return to the drafted lines just cited, there is a development in Shelley's conception 
four lines later when "mine" is changed to "mind." Tokoo determines, and this seems to be the 
case from the facsimile, that the "'d' [is] superimposed in darker ink on 'e'" (BSM XIII, E . 19, 
p. 8, 21n.). Although Shelley's final choice was "mine", the implication that "mind" might be 
the magical source of creativity should not be overlooked. With the "ceaseless intercourse", and 
"deep communion" it is reasonable to conjecture that Shelley intimates a natural trance-induced 
state which connects with higher realms of consciousness: 4<the mighty spirits of the post." 
What role might trees play in altering states of consciousness? Shelley's obsessive drawings 
seem to intuitively elicit a natural spellbinding power that was also sensed by "The early 
magnetizers" who "saw animal magnetism as something communicable to large numbers, either 
directly or via such-objects as trees. . . . " n An interconnection between trees-and creativity 
has a germane literary precedent in The Tempest, a play which later became a powerful 
influence on Shelley, most possibly because of Prospero conjuring and controlling the 
elements. Central to Prospero's magic "Art" is the freeing of Ariel from his imprisonment in a 
cloven pine by a witch. Ariel's release, slavishly to implement Prospero's orders, also 
symbolizes a freeing and then harnessing of the creative spirit in nature. 
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To Cythna the heart is pre-eminent, not only as the emotional centre but also as the 
creative sanctum. On a cosmic level monarchies are vanquished and freedom is 
metaphorically born: "the state / Of kingless thrones, which Earth did in her heart create" (CP. 
2945-6). Although Cythna asserts that the human mind determines futurity because "it is the 
book of fate" (CP. 3372), Shelley's initial choice was the heart: "Look on the your hearts — it 
is the book of / fate" (BSM XVII, E . 10, p. 113, 24-5). There is a thematic continuity 
throughout the narrative with the heart as the centre for expression and source of creativity: 
Cythna's experiences are "Like broken memories of many a heart / Woven into one" (CP. 
2849-50). Much earlier, with the anonymous Woman in Canto 1, Shelley located the heart as 
the seat of creation: 
when that majestic theme 
Shrined in her heart found utterance, and she bent 
Her looks on mine; those eyes a kindling beam 
Of love divine into my spirit sent, 
And ere her lips could move, made the air eloquent. 
(CP, 338-42) 
It is in communication, via a radiating female benevolence, that the poem's message of love is 
transmitted: "That love, which none may bind; be free to fill / The world, like light" (CP. 3336-
7). Cythna's stirring rhetoric, to incite the mariners to revolutionary fervour, is underscored by 
a sense of oneness: "we have one human heart— / All mortal thoughts confess a common 
home" (CP. 3361-2). Through the interconnection implicit in a universal heart, the emotional 
counterpart to '*the one mind" (PP. 478) of Shelley's intellectual philosophy, Cythna can 
emotively transmit and receive her visionary ideals: 
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'"Let all be free and equal!— From your hearts 
I feel an echo; through my inmost frame 
Like sweetest sound, seeking its mate, it darts— . 
(CP. 3343-5) 
But just as the heart is the source of creation, it is also the centre of mis-creation; the tyrant, 
enthralled by Cythna's "spirit-thrilling lay" (CP, 2863), abuses "her wondrous loveliness" (CP. 
2866), and in so doing corrupts himself: "The evil thoughts it made, which did his breast 
pollute" (CP, 2865). The drafting of these lines illustrates that Shelley was considering the 
corrupting effects of evil on the heart: 
[With] [evil] thoughts [were] [made] which did 
his heart 
The evil shapes which ruled his [pollute] 
249 heart [it]. (BSM XVII, E . 10, p. 61, 28-31) 
Cythna's initial realization of her pregnancy is bizarrely depicted, like being furtively 
possessed: 
—there seemed a being 
Within me — a strange load my heart did bear, 
As if some living thing had made its lair 
Even in the fountains of my life:—. . . . (CP, 2967-70) 
An uncancelled line in Shelley's notebook confirms that he initially considered portraying a 
malignant progeny from Cythna's forced impregnation by the tyrant: "As if some evil thing 
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had made its lair" (BSM XVII, E . 10. p. 67, 6). The heart is the point where Cythna is most 
vulnerable and open to destruction: '"The fiend of madness which had made its prey / Of my 
poor heart" (CP. 2947-8). With the disappearance of her child, Cythna is consumed by 
devouring images of a "dream, which, like a beast / Most fierce and beauteous, in my memory 
/ Had made its lair, and on my heart did feast" (CP. 3047-9). Like the lone Poet of Alastor. 
Cythna finds solitude, devoid of human empathy, life threatening: 
But I was changed—the very life was gone 
Out of my heart—I wasted more and more, 
Day after day, and sitting there alone, 
Vexed the inconstant waves with my perpetual moan. 
(CP, 3033-6) 
During Cythna's second mania, thoughts, dreams, feelings, and physical signs cohere into a 
distinct sense that she gives birth to a daughter: 
'Methought I was about to be a mother— 
Month after month went by, and still I dreamed 
That we should soon be all to one another, 
I and my chik£ and~stuTnew pulses seemed 
To beat beside my heart, and still I deemed 
There was a babe within— and, when the rain 
Of winter through the rifted cavern steamed, 
Methought, after a lapse of lingering pain, 
I saw that lovely shape, which near my heart had lain. 
(CP. 2974-82) 
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Cythna recounts vivid physical symptoms, such as her "breasts were swoln and changed" (CP. 
3038), which undermines the wavering uncertainty as to whether it was a phantom or 
imaginative pregnancy: "'twas a dream.'—Then Cythna did uplift / Her looks on mine, as i f 
some doubt she sought to shift,—" (CP, 2990-1). The notion that dreams have a physical 
actuality has its origins in the early stage of childhood: "when they first dream all children 
regard their dreams as real. It is principally through the agency of its parents and its social 
environment that the child becomes undeceived" (CCW. 104). Here Piaget's opinion of 
becoming "undeceived" through education runs counter to Shelley's assertion that dreams can 
manifest into material existence. Repeatedly in drafting Laon and Cvthna. as in the finished 
text, there is a commingling of dreams with reality. The following citation shows how 
dreaming and seeing are sometimes confused in Shelley's consciousness. "What then is god? 
some moonstruck [sophist] [sate] / Dreaming watching the shade from his own soul" (BSM 
XVn,E. 10, p. 82,21-2). 
In Laon and Cvthna the reader is compelled to engage with a fundamental question on the 
nature of creativity: who wields the generative power that will determine futurity? Does 
supremacy reside with God or humanity? Decisively the response to this issue determines the 
individual's control over their destiny. To empower the oppressed Shelley ingeniously 
attempts to deconstruct religion's hegemony in the human mind: "'What dream ye? Your own 
hands have built an home, / Even for yourselves on a beloved shore:" (CP. 3226-7). His assault 
on the bastions of religion directly targets what Shelley's perceives as the source of inequality, 
the misappropriation of divine benevolence to ratify power relations: "For it is said God rules 
both high and low, / And man is made the captive of his brother" (CP. 3309-10). The portrayal 
of a vengeful God is a weapon of oppression which justifies despotism: 'Tyrants, that they 
may rule, with lies thus desolate" (CP. 3270). Humanity's subjugation is secured with 
repressive religious strictures: "The ministers of fraud can scarce dissemble / The lies of their 
own heart" (CP, 1533-4). A quiescent acceptance of servitude is exposed as spiritual bribery to 
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avoid post-mortal suffering, "the hell hereafter'YCP. 3604). Consequently Shelley's poetic 
challenge is "the unveiling of the religious frauds by which they had been deluded into 
submission" (CP. p. 100). Here Wasserman's comments are apposite: in Laon and Cvthna 
"Shelley most explicitly defined theology as a fiction invented to authorize man's tyranny over 
man . . . " (SCR. 90) and furthermore 'To this projected fiction slavish man masochistically 
assigns an imaginary rod to scourge himself into slavery . . ." (SCR, 91). Through Cythna's 
rhetoric Shelley questions the precept of divine control over human life: "Dream ye that God 
thus builds for man in solitude?" (CP. 3234); he reassigns power to the individual: "'Twere as 
if man's own works should feel, and show / The hopes, and fears, and thoughts from which 
they flow, / And he be like to them!" (CP, 3238-40). 
Shelley's emphasis on the dominance of the human will has its psychological antecedents in 
childhood. Piaget shows that the child constructs an anthropocentric paradigm: it is "man 
who is thought to be omniscient and all-powerful, and it is he who has created all things" 
(CCW. 354). Moreover Piaget contends that in accounting for the nature of existence "the 
majority of children only bring in God against their will as it were, and not until they can find 
nothing else to bring forward" (CCW. 353). Therefore in the child's formative years 
theological teaching "often appears as something foreign to the child's natural thought" (CCW. 
353). Clearly Shelley's idea that humanity has an innate power to create reality can partly be 
seen as a psychological residue from childhood. However, for Shelley the power to create is 
not a childish illusion but a principal tenet of his revolutionary creed. The hermit encapsulates 
the poem's celebration of the invincible human spirit: 
from shore to shore 
Doctrines of human power my words have told; 
They have been heard, and men aspire to more 
Than they have ever gained or ever lost of yore. (CP. 1518-21) 
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Laon and Cvthna celebrates its intertextuality, the poetic and philosophical precedences "from 
the lore of bards and sages old" (CP. 1514). Throughout the poem an unquenchable search for 
wisdom is pursued beyond mortal realms: "In converse with the dead, who leave the stamp / Of 
ever-burning thoughts on many a page" (CP. 1478-9). But of even greater textual relevance 
than '"The good and mighty of departed ages" (CP. 3712), is Shelley's appropriation of a 
contemporary source, Peacock's unfinished Ahrimanes.12 There is a thematic affinity between 
Laon and Cvthna and Ahrimanes; both poems denounce the invidious power relations of "The 
lord and serf—the tyrant and the slave" (AHA. I . XXVII). Shelley likewise indicts humanity's 
indoctrination into a quiescent acceptance of their servitude: "and we / Should seek for nought 
on earth but toil and misery— / 'For thus we might avoid the hell hereafter." / So spake the 
hypocrites, who cursed and lied" (CP. 3602- 5). Similarly Peacock had earlier mounted an 
assault on the bastions of religion and denounced its oppressive regimes : 
And Tyranny, with all its engines foul, 
Sceptre and sword—the dungeon and the wheel; 
And Falsehood, muffled close in priestly cowl, 
With Persecution linked, and Fraud's malignant scowl. 
(AHB. I . xn 
At one level these resemblances reflect the contemporary issues of a revolutionary era and 
reveal how the poet "cannot escape from subjection to a common influence which arises out of 
an infinite combination of circumstances belonging to the times in which they live" (CP. p. 
103). However, there is evidence to support a more intimate connection between the texts 
and to show that Shelley borrowed freely from Ahrimanes. Kenneth Cameron surmises that 
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"after he abandoned the poem Peacock turned his manuscripts over to Shelley" (SC iii, 243). 
Peacock was not only "handing on the torch to a younger and more gifted poet" (SC iii, 243), 
but also to a more accomplished philosopher and innovative revolutionary. As interesting as the 
narrative correspondences are, it is Shelley's adaptation of Peacock's ideas into an original 
philosophical theory that is most significant.13 Here Shelley's expression of the "beau ideal" 
is appropriate; he envisaged a revolution "produced by the influence of individual genius, & out 
of general knowledge" (LS I , 564). Shelley's "individual genius" and the radical nature of his 
proposals can be elucidated by an analysis of the dissimilarities between Laon and Cvthna and 
Ahrimanes. 
Locating where the poet situates the source of creative energy is fundamental to 
understanding the poem's philosophical creed and how a revolution in human consciousness 
may be achieved. In Ahrimanes power is devolved through a hierarchical system, the acme of 
which is the feminized force of Necessity. In the second version of Ahrimanes "four principal 
genii: the creating, the preserving, the destroying and the restoring spirits" (AHB, p. 428) enact 
Necessity's laws. These spirits are depicted as gods served by "Unnumbered genii, creatures 
of their will" (AHB, I . n). In Peacock's vision humanity is denied an active role in the 
determination of events because "Necessity governs the world" (AHB. p. 428) and people are 
powerless to influence futurity: 
Parent of being, mistress of the spheres, 
Supreme Necessity o'er all doth reign. 
She guides the course of the revolving years, 
With power no prayers can change, no force restrain: 
Binding all nature in her golden chain. (AHB. 1.1) 1 4 
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Necessity is conceived as an inexorable force in a poem where the dominating philosophical 
outlook is one of predeterminism: "The destined period of El-Oran's reign / Passed by, and 
Oromaze assumed his sway" (AHB. I . rv). In a detailed outline for the two canto version of 
Ahrimanes. Peacock further endorses a fatalistic vision of reality; "destined period" is 
reiterated three times in the opening paragraph (AHB. p. 428). Consequently the narrative 
progresses through alternating epochs of evil and good: destruction happens in the "fated 
hour" (AHB. I . vn), but Ahrimanes' evil empire of "Discord, Wrath, Revenge, and Hate" 
(AHB. I . XI) only endures "till from the ocean-tides / Shall rise the genius, in appointed hour" 
(AHB. I K). 
For Shelley human life and thought have a quasi-divine status, the variables of which are 
immortally preserved in the Temple of the Spirit. In opposition to Plato's immaterial world of 
ideas, Shelley depicts eternal forms of human potential as corporeal structures: "forms on 
every side, / Sculptures like life and thought; immovable, deep-eyed" (CP. 584-5). 
Ahrimanes opens optimistically with interpenetrating cosmic forces likened to "dreams of 
hope" (AHA. 1.1), but both versions of Peacock's poem are despairingly named after the evil 
Ahrimanes rather than the benign deity who is "Oromazes—lord of peace and day—" (AHA. 
I . xvm). Conversely Shelley dedicates his revolutionary narrative to the protagonists: "The 
authors of it are supposed to be my hero & heroine, whose names appear in the title" (LS I , 
564). Even in revision Shelley's "Vision of the Nineteenth Century", The Revolt of Islam, 
focuses on the rebellion against despotism. Shelley contrives to alleviate the effects of 
destruction through the healing power of love: 
I have attempted in the progress of my work to speak to the common & 
elementary emotions of the human heart, so that, tho it is a story of violence & 
revolution, it is relieved by milder pictures of friendship & love & natural 
affections. (LS I , 563) 
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Concepts which are undefined in Ahrimanes are seized upon by Shelley and charged with 
significance. For instance Ahrimanes, the evil god, is bound by "Supreme Necessity" to 
provoke conflict: 'To shake the world with war, and rouse the powers of mind" (AHA. I . 
xvm). Having portrayed an intriguing link between evil and the awakening of consciousness, 
Peacock fails to pursue its revolutionary potential. In Laon and Cythna to "rouse the powers 
of mind" becomes the poem's central weapon for vanquishing evil, and the mind's creative 
capacity forms the foundation of Shelley's theorizing about the nature of existence. Contrary 
to Peacock's reliance on supernatural forces, Shelley, through the role of Cythna, instructs 
both the mariners and the reader that fate is determined by human agency: "Look on your 
mind—it is the book of fate—" (CP, 3372). 
Certainly Peacock intended to mount a philosophical exploration of humanity's subjection 
to tyranny: one of his unexecuted ideas for Canto four is that "The philosopher delivers his 
opinions on the past and future condition of the human race" (AHA, p. 283). Nevertheless 
there is no evidence in the finished stanzas, or the two outlines, to suggest that Peacock 
conceived of any doctrine other than a position of fatalism. Mass human effort is futile to 
overthrow the evil Ahrirnanes: "Under his iron reign we live, anticipating the destined period 
of the restoring power" (AHB. p. 428). However, following the Romantic preference for 
exalting gifted individuals, Peacock envisaged a minority of "favored mortals" who could 
feel "the spirits of good" and are "given an impulse and a power of mind which rises 
triumphant over all the tyranny of Ahrimanes" (AHB. p. 428)-But the poem fails to suggest a 
strategy for overcoming evil or show how victory could be accomplished by human effort. 
Humanity has little choice except to be a patient beacon for the restorative power. 
Such is the picture of the virtuous man struggling with calamity; a picture which 
the preserver contemplates with joy from his southern paradise, which the restorer 
hails with anticipative delight as the omen of his terrestrial reign (AHB. p. 429). 
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Indeed it is only through supernatural causes when the preserving spirit's "genii come forth 
from time to time to mingle with mankind" that regeneration is hastened with "the reign of the 
restorer" (AHB, p. 428). Underpinning Peacock's notion of reality is a Cartesian division of 
subject and object, mind and matter. Consequently even though humanity is guided by 
supernatural phenomena, it nevertheless remains separate from the creative process. 
In Shelley's Temple of the Spirit there is an interpenetration of spiritual realms and 
human accomplishments. Creative transformation emanates from artistic expression which is 
inspiringly channelled through the human spirit: 
And on the jasper walls around, there lay 
Paintings, the poesy of mightiest thought, 
Which did the Spirit's history display; 
A tale of passionate change, divinely taught, 
Which, in their winged dance, unconscious Genii wrought. 
(CP, 599-603) 
The Temple of the Spirit is conceived as a divine form with numinous genii: "It was a 
Temple, such as mortal hand / Has never built" (CP, 559-60). However it is not populated by 
mythical gods but by human spirits: "The Great, who had departed from mankind, / A mighty 
Senate" (CP, 605-6). Moreover Shelley's ideas on equality are evident from his eclectic 
choice of spirits: 
some, whose white hair shone 
Like mountain snow, mild, beautiful, and blind; 
Some, female forms, whose gestures beamed with mind; 
And ardent youths, and children bright and fair. (CP, 606-9) 
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This egalitarian representation in Shelley's "Senate" encompasses all ages and effectively 
provides an alternative paradigm to patriarchal relationships in which Shelley censured fear-
imposed domination: '"But children near their parents tremble now, / Because they must 
obey—one rules another, / For it is said God rules both high and low," (CP, 3307-9). Laon and 
Cythna's revolutionary philosophy resides in the fact that Shelley ascribes divine potential to 
humanity. "The whole poem, with the exception of the first canto & part of the last is a mere 
human story without the smallest intermixture of supernatural interference" (LS I , 563). 
"Mere" could devalue Shelley's "tale of human power" (CP, 648), but it is perhaps more 
appropriately read as an ironic comment on Peacock's preference for the supernatural. 
At times confusion arises as to Peacock's precise theoretical intent; he pointedly censures 
religious conventions and yet Ahrimanes is inescapably subjected to a system of worship. 
During the golden age humanity pay homage to a benign god: "At Oromazes' sylvan shrine 
they knelt: / And mom and eve did choral suppliance flow" (AHA, I . DC). Implicit in this 
ritualistic veneration is an endorsement of the Christian value-system: "at mom to twine / The 
votive wreath round Oromazes' shrine" (AHA, I . xm). Almost unwittingly Peacock preserves 
domination and subordination. Despite constructing a mythological schema which contests 
the biblical account of creation, Peacock invests power in a creative deity that dominates 
humanity. In view of the poem's fatalism humanity are powerless to initiate their regeneration. 
If the future is unaffected by human power then there is little hope or incentive to incite a 
revolution. In the earliest version of Ahrimanes. Darassah is reliant on external forces^ he-is 
not empowered with mental and emotional strength, but by a magical ring which can defeat 
obstacles: '"This gifted ring shall every barrier break" (AHA. I . XV). Darassah is manipulated 
by the creative power, "The monarch of the world hath chosen thee / To spread his name on 
earth, in power and majesty.—"' (AHA. I . xxvm). More disturbingly, Darassah's autonomy 
is overwhelmed; his apprehension of reality is deconstructed as he is held in thrall: 
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The youth received 
The glittering spell, in awe and mute amaze; 
Standing like one almost of sense bereaved, 
That fixes on the vacant air his gaze, 
Where wildered fancy's troubled eye surveys 
Dim-flitting forms, obscure and undefined, 
That doubtful thoughts and shadowy feelings raise, 
Leaving no settled image on the mind. (AHA. I . XXIX) 
Conversely for Shelley the mission to liberate humanity is relayed as a personal quest, 
instigated and empowered by his own compassion: 
' I will be wise, 
And just, and free, and mild, i f in me lies 
Such power, for I grow weary to behold 
The selfish and the strong still tyrannize 
Without reproach or check.' I then controlled 
My tears, my heart grew calm, and I was meek and bold. 
(CP, 31-36) 
Peacock initially depicted a weak-willed protagonist with morals that are easily transgressed: 
"Less pure Darassah's thoughts: ambitions spell / Had touched his soul, and dreams of power 
and fame" (AHA. II . vn). Consequently, in the outline of Canto 10, Darassah descends to evil 
practices. "He builds a temple to Ahrimanes and orders all persons to worship in it" (AHA, p. 
285). In his revised plan Peacock makes a moral volte-face; he asserts that the "two lovers 
Darassah and Kelasris remained incorruptible" (AHB. p. 429). This inconsistency reveals a 
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lack of coherence in Peacock's conceptions and perhaps it is partly in response to Darassah 
that Shelley portrays Laon as unswervingly faithful to his beliefs. 
in 
The communication between sympathetic minds is the defining impetus of Shelley's 
transforming vision: "shall all the kinds / Of evil, catch from our uniting minds / The spark 
which must consume them" (CP. 1075-77). The development since the Alastorian quest is 
evident; Shelley now portrays intense passion as being outwardly inspiriting: 
In me, communion with this purest being 
Kindled intenser zeal, and made me wise 
In knowledge, which, in hers my own mind seeing, 
Left in the human world few mysteries. (CP, 946-9) 
There is a deep-rooted conflict between Shelley's affirmatory poetics where thought has a 
creative impact that will decide futurity and a sceptical uncertainty concerning public 
recognition of his work. Qualms and insecurities permeate the prefatory comments to Laon 
and Cythna as evidenced in the opening statement: "[1] The Poem which I now present to the 
world is an attempt from which I scarcely dare to expect success, and in which a writer of 
established fame might fail without disgrace" (CP, p. 99). Juxtaposed with Shelley's 
enterprise "to awaken public hope, and to enlighten and improve mankind" (CP. p. 100) is an 
expectation of defeat: 
Should the Public judge that my composition is worthless, I shall indeed bow 
before the tribunal from which Milton received his crown of immortality; and shall 
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seek to gather, i f I live, strength from that defeat, which may nerve me to some 
new enterprise of thought which may not be worthless. (CP. p. 105) 
" I f I live" intimates that failure might be fatal. What might "some new enterprise of thought" 
mean? Poetically Shelley muses on his options: 
Is it, that now my inexperienced fingers 
But strike the prelude of a loftier strain? 
Or, must the lyre on which my spirit lingers 
Soon pause in silence, ne'er to sound again. (CP. 82-5) 
Time answered this question by verifying one of Shelley's intuitive thoughts concerning his 
future: Laon and Cvthna is '*the prelude" to a penetrating intellectual pursuit into the impact 
of human consciousness in the recreation of the world. In drafting the above lines, Shelley twice 
considered that the depth of his song emanated from his "soul" (BSM XH1, E . 14, p.20, 6, 8). 
Any renunciation of Shelley's philosophical ideals is inconceivable in view of his zealous 
acquisition of knowledge to out-manoeuvre the world's oppressors "And charm the minds of 
men to Truth's own sway" (CP. 87). In this respect Laon's relentless dedication and 
overwhelming sense of responsibility are unmistakably Shelleyan: "And ever from that hour 
upon me lay / The burden of this hope, and night or day, / In vision or in dream, clove to my-
breast" (CP. 796-8). Laon voices resolute allegiance to the poem's revolutionary goals: 
'It must be so — I will arise and waken 
The multitude, and like a sulphurous hill, 
Which on a sudden from its snows has shaken 
The swoon of ages, it shall burst and fil l 
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The world with cleansing fire: it must, it will— 
It may not be restrained! —And who shall stand 
Amid the rocking earthquake steadfast still, 
But Laon? . . . (CP, 784-91) 
I f Shelley believed that thoughts have such immense power in the determination of events 
why did he seemingly sabotage his efforts for publication with negative doubts? The possibility 
of failure is clearly anticipated: " I f there must be no response to my cry— / If men must rise 
and stamp with fury blind / On his pure name who loves them,—" (CP. 119-21). Perhaps 
Shelley's wavering uncertainty about success emanates from the experimental nature of a 
work that might engage only a limited audience "the enlightened and refined" (CP. p. 99). 
Although this conjecture is of some relevance there is a more fundamental problem: Shelley's 
divisive attitude towards the appropriation of personal power. Inscribed into the poetics of 
Laon and Cythna is an impulse towards an annihilation of the self and a disdain of personal 
fulfilment: "How I braved death for liberty and truth, / And spumed at peace, and power, and 
fame—" (CP, 519-20). Moreover, although Laon's and Cythna's "steadfast will has bought / 
A calm inheritance" (CP. 3727-8), their deaths are necessary to initiate the Earth's 
regeneration: "Behold! Spring comes, though we must pass, who made / The promise of its 
birth,—" (CP. 3688-9). By voicing these misgivings Shelley is counteracting the poem's 
"struggle to relume / The lamp of Hope o'er man's bewildered lot"" (CP. 1472-3). 
Paradoxically Shelley is calling for a collective transformation in consciousness that has not 
yet been fully assimilated into his own psyche. Repeatedly he stresses the necessity to envision 
a resounding victory: "And earth's immense and trampled multitude / In hope on their own 
powers began to look" (CP. 403-4). 
In relation to public appeal it is appropriate to contrast a classical antecedent similarly 
concerned with transformations, Ovid's Metamorphoses which similarly opens with a myth of 
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creation and was read by Shelley during April 1815. In his Metamorphoses Ovid's concluding 
words resonate with a defiant challenge to divine wrath and anticipate undying acclaim for 
his composition: 
My work is complete. . . . I shall soar, undying, far above the stars, and my name 
will be imperishable. Wherever Roman power extends over the lands Rome has 
subdued, people will read my verse. I f there be any truth in poets' prophecies, I 
shall live to all eternity, immortalized by fame.15 
This self-congratulatory prophecy has an egocentricity that Shelley would certainly have 
abhorred; nevertheless Ovid powerfully expresses an overwhelming belief in the consequence 
of his work. Shelley's dubiety towards fame can be elucidated by his consideration of 
"Benevolence" in "A Speculation on Morals." Here Shelley altruistically encourages "pursuing 
good for its own sake" (Julian VII, 77) and advocates "disinterestedness, which we feel to 
constitute the majesty of our nature" (Julian VII, 76). Even though he examines positive 
reasons for aspiring to fame, ultimately Shelley cannot find intellectual justification for such 
an endeavour and maintains a position of self-renunciation: 
But there is a great error in the world with respect to the selfishness of fame. It is 
certainly possible that a person should seek distinction as a medium of personal 
gratification. But love of fame is frequently no more than a desire that the feelings 
of others should confirm, illustrate, and sympathise with, our own. In this respect 
it is allied with all that draws us out of ourselves. It is the 'last infirmity of noble 
minds.' Chivalry was likewise founded on the theory of self-sacrifice. 
(Julian VII, 76) 
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The consequences of eschewing fame and a policy of "self-sacrifice" are not conducive to the 
widespread communication of the poem's revolutionary objectives. The wise hermit is unable 
to instigate the revolution because he is "both unknown and old" (CP. 1558). Conversely 
Laon's renown renders him a victorious leader. 
But Laon's name to the tumultuous throng 
Were like the star whose beams the waves compel 
And tempests, and his soul-subduing tongue 
Were as a lance to quell the mailed crest of wrong. (CP, 1563-6) 
In the poem's intellectual system, where human thought and expression has a divine 
creative potential, because "great is the strength / Of words" (CP. 1569-70), circumspection is 
paramount: "Much must remain unthought, and more untold, / In the dark Future's ever-
flowing urn:" (CP. 344-5). Embedded in this cryptic message is a warning that emotive 
thoughts may have an impact on the field of being. The way in which the future unfolds is 
explored through Shelley's understanding of necessity; a concept that is more acutely defined 
in Laon and Cythna than in Queen Mab: 
'In their own hearts the earnest of the hope 
Which made them great, the good will ever find; 
And though some envious shades may interlope 
Between the effect and it, One comes behind, 
Who aye the future to the past will bind— 
Necessity, whose sightless strength for ever 
Evil with evil, good with good must wind 
In bands of union, which no power may sever: 
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They must bring forth their kind, and be divided never! 
(CP, 3703-11) 
Significantly although other events may intervene between "hope" and its realization, the 
process is inexorable, "working with disquieting impartiality."16 In his interpretation Kenneth 
Cameron appropriately comments that necessity is a pliable force "like a flowing river, which 
human power cannot do away with but can divert, one way or the other" (SGY, 332). It is the 
nature of human power, and the underlying causes necessary to create a diversion in 
necessity's force, that are pivotal to Shelley's vision of regeneration. My extended reading of 
Laon and Cythna has explored philosophical questions that the epic poetically raises in 
relation to freedom, creation, and even the very structure and nature of reality; questions that 
receive deeper investigation in Chapter Six on Prometheus Unbound. 
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' Richard Crenin's interpretation suggests that "An unstable relationship between the literal 
and the metaphoric is, in the terms of Shelley's poem, a badge of mental strength. The poem is 
designed to drive together the world of public event and of private imagining, to represent the 
one as the product of the other", Cronin, 103. 
2 G. Wilson Knight, The Starlit Dome: Studies in the Poetry of Vision (London: Methuen, 
1959), 189; hereafter referred to as Knight, Starlit Dome. 
3 For the most cogent portrayal of Shelley's ideas concerning creativity, see my discussion of 
Hellas. Chapter Seven. 
4 In his analysis of "Physics and Perception", David Bohm gives a brief summary of Piaget's 
psychological research into various stages of perception and the way in which intelligence 
develops in children. His discussion ranges from the initial stage of the child "experiencing an 
almost undifferentiated totality" (187) of existence, to the way in which the child first "seems 
to regard causality as if it were a kind of 'sympathetic' magic" (190). Bohm likens the differing 
apprehensions of reality, from holism to dualism, to the notions inherent in "relativistic" and 
"prerelativistic" physics, The Special Theory of Relativity (1965; London: Routledge, 1996), 
187-96. 
5 In an earlier work Piaget stated that "'ego-centric' is to be taken in an intellectual, not in an 
ethical sense" and this "intellectual" idea certainly seems to be the most valid interpretation 
here, Jean Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child, trans. Marjorie Gabain (1926; 
London: Routledge, 1959), 10. 
6 A major philosophical consideration in my decision to reinterpret Shelley's poetry in the 
light of Heidegger's ideas is his holistic conception of existence. In his study of existentialist 
philosophy, David Cooper examines the existentialist's dissolution of certain dualisms, 
namely: "Subject versus Object"; "Mind versus Body"; "Reason versus Passion"; "Fact 
versus Value", Existentialism. Chapter Five, 79-94. 
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7 William Wordsworth, Poetical Works, ed. Thomas Hutchinson, rev. Ernest De Selincourt 
(1904; Oxford: Oxford UP, 1936), 66-70, 75-6. 
8 Tokoo cites "magiac", but a close inspection of the text suggests that this spelling may be an 
editorial mistake and should read "magic." 
9 Nancy Moore Goslee, "Shelley at Play: A Study of Sketch and Text in his Prometheus 
Notebooks", The Huntington Library Quarterly. 48, 1, 1985, 211; hereafter referred to as 
Goslee. 
1 0 Goslee, 250. 
" P.M.S. Dawson, "A Sort of Natural Magic", KSR 1, 1986, 18; hereafter referred to as 
Dawson. 
1 2 There are two distinct versions of Ahrimanes. Citing textual evidence, and what he perceives 
to be "psychological grounds", Kenneth Cameron convincingly argues that the longer version 
of Ahrimanes is the earliest draft: "it is more likely that a poet would begin with an ambitious 
plan for a twelve canto poem and then retreat to a two canto one", SC iii, 230. The order of 
composition is not of great relevance to my discussion, except to point out certain 
inconsistencies in Peacock's thought and minor refinements in the poem's philosophical 
outlook. As citations will be freely included from both drafts the texts will be distinguished as 
follows: AHA, followed by canto and stanza, or page reference, denotes the projected twelve 
canto version and outline. AHB. followed by stanza reference, or page number, denotes 
"Ahrimanes: The Shorter Verse Fragment and the Longer Prose Outline." All references to 
Ahrimanes are from The Halliford Edition of The Works of Thomas Love Peacock vol.7, ed. 
H. F. B. Brett-Smith and C. E. Jones (London: Constable, 1931). 
1 3 Kenneth Cameron outlines the narrative similarities between Laon and Cvthna and 
Ahrimanes. SC iii, 242-3. 
1 4 Ahrimanes. AHB. 1.1. See my discussion on Shelley's conception of necessity, 139-140. 
1 5 Ovid, 357. 
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1 6 Michael O'Neill, "A More Hazardous Exercise: Shelley's Revolutionary Imaginings", The 
Yearbook of English Studies. 19, 1989, 262. 
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Chapter 5 
"Love Sometimes Leads Astray to Misery": Julian and Maddalo's Darker 
Vision of Being. 
/ could lie down like a tired child 
And weep away the life of care 
Which I have bome and yet must bear 
Till Death like Sleep might steal on me.' 
I 
Laon and Cythna's epic vision of freedom is prefaced by Shelley's dedication to the ideals of 
love, truth and hope in the face of what appears unyielding tyranny: " I would fain / Reply in 
hope — but I am worn away, / And Death and Love are yet contending for their prey."2 This 
portrayal of being sacrificially torn between the forces of "Death and Love" surfaces 
frequently in Shelley's poetry and operates at two interconnected levels: universally with the 
lack of artistic .recognition, and on a personal level with the failure to unite with, or find 
sympathy from, his feminine ideal.3 Poetic vision outsoars these themes, but their tacit presence 
fosters an atmosphere conducive to lyrical expression. Often in Shelley's vision "Our sweetest 
songs are those that tell of saddest thought."4 And in this vein, as a prelude to my discussion on 
Julian and Maddalo. I have chosen one of Shelley's "most despairing lyrics" (PP. 127 n. 1) in 
which "Death" has a permeating presence. 
"Stanzas written in Dejection—December 1818, Near Naples" imparts its message of 
despair with a finely wrought eloquence. For all its implicit melancholia, there is a seductive 
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beauty in Shelley's lyricism, as seen in the lines: " I see the waves upon the shore / Like light 
dissolved in star-showers, thrown" (12-13). Moreover in his solitude the poet creates a vision 
of desired presence: "How sweet! did any heart now share in my emotion" (18).5 In a series of 
negations, commencing "Alas, I have nor hope nor health" (19), Shelley wistfully lists those 
Life-enhancing elements whereby his situation becomes pointedly juxtaposed with Byron's 
success:6 
Nor fame nor power nor love nor leisure— 
Others I see whom these surround, 
Smiling they live and call life pleasure: 
To me that cup has been dealt in another measure. (24-7) 
"They live" registers his depth of desolation. But as Shelley acknowledges, the "despair itself 
is mild" (28). With a "lost heart, too soon grown old" (39) there is no anguished resistance to 
this mood, just a quiescent acceptance in which Shelley prophetically envisages the scenario 
of his own death: "And I might feel in the warm air / My cheek grow cold, and hear the Sea / 
Breathe o'er my dying brain its last monotony" (34-6). A self-pitying tone impinges on the 
artistic restraint with Shelley's surmise that he is "one / Whom men love not" (41-2). In 
relation to the nature of creativity the poem's wistful enticement of death places it as one of 
the-many possible futures, emotively imagined and-perhaps to be. 
Julian and Maddalo re-visits the theme of suffering through unrelenting adherence to one's 
principles with the Maniac's resolution, " I am ever still the same / In creed as in resolve" (358-
9). But whereas "Stanzas written in Dejection" focused on the negation of benign ideals, such 
as "love", "hope" and "feme", the Maniac's articulations are a succession of negative images: 
Nor dream that I will join the vulgar cry, 
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Or with my silence sanction tyranny, 
Or seek a moment's shelter from my pain 
In any madness which the world calls gain, 
Ambition or revenge or thoughts as stern 
As those which make me what I am, or turn 
To avarice or misanthropy or lus t . . . . 
Heap on me soon, o grave, thy welcome dust! (362-9) 
Here the desired destination of the grave is the same as "Stanzas written in Dejection", but in 
comparison there is less dignity in these vociferations. What they do convey is a psychological 
perspicuity into the inmost depths of despair that suggests lived experience.7 In Heideggerian 
terms ''Being-towards-death is an existential ideal of being which encourages, amongst other 
attributes, "resoluteness" and "authenticity." It does not signify willfully conjuring our demise: 
"Manifestly Being-towards-death,. . . cannot have the character of concemfully Being out to 
get itself actualized" (BT, 305). Increasingly in Shelley's vision death is sought as the 
preferred destination, especially in relation to the alternative of sacrificing one's ideals to "any 
madness which the world calls gain" (365). In his examination of the evidence for dating 
Shelley's composition of the Maniac's monologue, Donald Reiman suggests, amongst others, 
the following influences: "Shelley's conversations with Byron in Venice and his continuing 
interest in Tasso as the-type-of sensitive, poetic soul driven to madness-by-unrequited love and 
an unfeeling world."8 h is certainly plausible that the above cited lines and Julian's concluding 
comment register a degree of bitterness about Shelley relaying the depth of his poetic vision to 
an unlistening "cold world" (617). 
Julian and Maddalo entices the reader to engage in an evaluative encounter between its 
philosophical ideals "Concerning God, free-will and destiny" (42) and their relevance to 
human existence. These tensions between ways of knowing and life experiences enrich 
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Shelley's narration of the Maniac's tragic predicament, giving it a universal appeal: "the 
unconnected exclamations of his agony" solicit a compassionate response from "the text of 
every heart" (PP. 113). This emotional intensity in Shelley's "text" induces the reader to 
engage with the Maniac's "sad history" (231). The challenge of this dialectical interplay is to 
resist imposing an unsubstantiated theoretical position; one that is in Maddalo's words merely 
"refutation-tight / As far as words go" (194-5). Reading Shelley's poetic "text" is a 
hermeneutical endeavour where experience becomes a prime factor in the construction of 
meaning. This demands a subtle negotiation between reader, text and theory because 'the 
reading process is selective, and the potential text is infinitely richer than any of its individual 
realizations."9 My interpretation of Julian and Maddalo focuses on the poem's anxieties of 
communication: especially the conflict between Shelley's reticence about, and his compulsion 
to articulate, the depths of wretchedness. This equivocality about articulation heightens the 
Maniac's anguish where he laments "And not to speak my grief—o not to dare / To give a 
human voice to my despair" (304-5). In voicing despondency Shelley registers an awareness 
of its power to "infect" others with the Maniac's comments, " I am subdued—that the full 
Hell / Within me would infect the untainted breast / Of sacred nature with its own unrest" (351-
3). Given this dichotomy, Shelley skillfully exonerates the Maniac from tainting others; Julian 
and Maddalo witness his deranged utterances as uninvited voyeurs: 'Sve stood behind / Stealing 
his accents from the envious wind / Unseen" (296-8). 
Shelley aptly designates Julian and Maddalo as among his "saddest verses" (L-S-H-. 246). 
which "would not harmonize" (LS I I , 196) with Prometheus Unbound. In his distinction 
Shelley pointedly alludes to the manner of presentation: Julian and Maddalo is "a sermo 
pedestris way of treating human nature quite opposed to the idealism of that drama" (LS I I , 
196). Shelley's vision of "human nature" in Prometheus Unbound is voiced by the Spirit of 
the Hour who defines the perfected human state as one of self-autonomy; where man 
would become "the King / Over himself; just, gentle, wise—but man: / Passionless? no —yet 
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free from guilt or pain" (III. iv. 196-8). Paradoxically passion literally suggests suffering, and 
although it is designated as the creative energy in Shelley's vision of transformation, he 
sometimes envisages that it contravenes happiness and security. In "Lines written among the 
Euganean Hills" Shelley seeks a haven of respite: "Where for me, and those I love, / May a 
windless bower be built, / Far from passion, pain, and guilt" (343-45). No respite is found in 
Julian and Maddalo: passion oozes from the Maniac's monologue with his desperate analysis 
of his own degradation. Although a sense of victimization is evident in his question, "What 
Power delights to torture us?" (320), he does accept partial responsibility for his predicament: 
" I know / That to myself I do not wholly owe / What now I suffer, though in part I may" (320-
2). Interestingly the Maniac's continued confinement is a deliberate choice as Maddalo 
explains, "Some fancy took him and he would not bear / Removal" (251-2). 
Vincent Newey's reading foregrounds Shelley's emphasis on feeling with his suggestion 
that the poem calls for '*the rejection of ideas in favour of sympathetic insight into 'being', 
philosophic speculation and views in favour of the imaginative embrace of experience."10 But 
the philosophical disquisition, although ultimately discarded by Julian and Maddalo, "our 
argument was quite forgot" (520), has a central role. Their opposing views on existence are 
cleverly placed so that the ensuing scene at the madhouse is structured through the opening 
debate about humanity's capacity to overcome mental restrictions. Can Shelley's readers 
simply disregard that which has hitherto conditioned their perceptions? Moreover had Shelley 
not intended to give greater cogency to mis disquisition about the nature of existence, it would 
not have been so thoughtfully rendered in a debate regarding 
all that earth has been or yet may be, 
All that vain men imagine or believe, 
Or hope can paint or suffering may atchieve. (43-5) 
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The exhilaration of the opening scene stems from Julian's limitless experience of existence, 
"where we taste / The pleasure of believing what we see / Is boundless, as we wish our souls 
to be" (15-7). Given this interconnection there is a rapturous lightness, an "aerial merriment" 
(27), where communication between Julian and Maddalo is conveyed rapidly with empathetic 
delight: 
So, as we rode, we talked; and the swift thought, 
Winging itself with laughter, lingered not, 
But flew from brain to brain,—such glee was ours— 
Charged with light memories of remembered hours. (28-31) 
Unable to sustain this effortless spontaneity a sombre mood intervenes with "till we came / 
Homeward, which always makes the spirit tame" (32-3). Noticeably it is when travelling 
"Homeward" that Julian and Maddalo ponder philosophical questions as if their debate had 
relevance to their destination. "Our talk grew somewhat serious" (36) denotes a natural 
generative progression of thought in which intellectual depth is evoked with the antithesis 
"'twas forlorn / Yet pleasing" (39-40). 
The Virgilian epigraph places the Maniac's plight within a classical context, universalizing 
his suffering from "some deadly change in love / Of one vowed deeply" (527-8) as an integral 
part of human experience. "Eclogue X" is an apposite choice in view of Virgil's concluding 
statement concerning Gallus' unrequited love: "Love conquers all: we must also submit to 
Love" ("omnia uincit Amor: et nos cedamus Amori").11 There is a distinct parallel between 
Gallus' surrender to "demented love" ("insanus amor")12 and the Maniac's rejected love and 
sense of estrangement which sunders his sanity: " I am mad, I fear, / My fancy is o'erwrought. 
. . thou art not here . . ." (394-5). The Virgilian frame of reference serves as an acute contrast, 
a pointed exemplification of how "frustrated ideals can lapse into a psychological 
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antipastoral."13 In Julian and Maddalo the Maniac is mentally and physically incarcerated in 
the locus of despair; the madhouse is depicted as "A windowless, deformed and dreary pile" 
(101), the antithesis of a verdurous Arcadian landscape. Shelley's portrayal is nightmarishly 
gothic, conjured from the darkest recesses of human suffering where the continuation of life is 
deemed a tortuous mockery: " I live to shew / How much men bear and die not!" (459-60). 
The prefatory comments to Julian and Maddalo offer a tentative and detached 
understatement of the Maniac's self-destruction: "He seems by his own account to have been 
disappointed in love" (PP. 113). This opening conjecture is revised into a unanimous 
agreement that his "dreadful i l l " (525) was "Wrought on him boldly, yet unspeakable / By a 
dear friend" (526-7). Why "Love sometimes leads astray to misery" (349), in Shelley's poetic 
vision, becomes apparent by juxtaposing the Maniac's experience with Shelley's belief that 
love is the fundamental life-giving energy, the sine qua non of being. "So soon as this want or 
power is dead, man becomes the living sepulchre of himself, and what yet survives is the mere 
husk of what once he was.— " (PP, 474). To restrict one's deepest energies sabotages the life 
force and precipitates mental and physical decline. The Maniac's emotions are focused 
inwards; his supposed suppression of "All human passions" (502), particularly intense grief, 
fuels his self-consumption. His concluding utterances desolately image death: 
Here I cast away 
All human passions, all revenge, all pride; 
I think, speak, act no ill ; I do but hide 
Under these words like embers, every spark 
Of that which has consumed me— quick and dark 
The grave is yawning . . . as its roof shall cover 
My limbs with dust and worms under and over 
So let Oblivion hide this grief... the air 
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Closes upon my accents, as despair 
Upon my heart — let death upon despair!" (501-10) 
The stated negation of "passions" is an overt contradiction in a passage fuelled by intense 
negativity. "Grief' and "despair" are deep emotions which create an atmosphere of dispiriting 
gloom, the consequences of which will be addressed later in the chapter. 
The Preface, like the poem, is dominated by the focused attention on passion, the principle 
which motivates the three protagonists, albeit in differing ways. Maddalo's pessimism is self-
inflicted; he is at the mercy of "the concentered and impatient feelings which consume him" 
(PP. 113), his emotions, like those of the Maniac, are introvertedly destructive: "it is on his 
own hopes and affections only that he seems to trample" (PP. 113). Shelley's prefatory 
comment about Julian's belief in 'the power of man over his own mind" (PP. 113) is not 
outlined with intellectual detachment, but with emotive force; he is "passionately attached to 
those philosophical notions" (PP, 113). The Maniac's broken heart dominates his perceptions 
and sunders his being by overthrowing his "right senses" (PP. 113). Interpretation must 
arbitrate between these diverse emotive perspectives as Shelley's portrayal evades moral 
disclosure. The avoidance of didacticism is not a means of escaping issues, but an intentional 
feature of Shelley's poetic creed, outlined later in A Defence of Poetry: "A Poet therefore 
would do ill to embody his own conceptions of right and wrong, which are usually those of time 
and place" (PP. 488). Whatever temporal adversities exist, the most inspired poets are able to 
transcend such concerns: the "bold neglect of a direct moral purpose is the most decisive proof 
of the supremacy of Milton's genius" (PP. 498). However, Shelley deemed that Tasso often 
yielded to moral considerations: 
Those in whom the poetical faculty, though great, is less intense, as Euripides, 
Lucan, Tasso, Spenser, have frequently affected a moral aim, and the effect of 
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their poetry is diminished in exact proportion to the degree in which they compel 
us to advert to this purpose. (PP, 488) 
Possibly this may suggest why Shelley never finished his planned drama on Tasso.14 
Nevertheless Tasso is cited as one of the "great writers" to "have celebrated the dominion of 
love" (PP, 497). And as Shelley claims that "The great secret of morals is Love" (PP, 487), 
then perhaps love is one of the prime principles by which to evaluate the Maniac's experiences 
in Julian and Maddalo. 
n 
Shelley's essay "On Love" appears in The "Julian and Maddalo" Draft Notebook and its 
composition "probably dates from July 20-25 1818" (JMN, p. xiv). Shelley focused intensely 
on the subject of love in the productively creative but "restless period between the summer of 
1818 and the spring of 1819" (JMN, xiii). Amongst other compositions he translated the 
Symposium and wrote the introductory composition, "A Discourse on the Manners of the 
Antient Greeks Relative to the Subject of Love." Consequently the depths and variety of 
emotive feelings, generated by the power of love, were deeply embedded at both an intellectual 
and imaginative level of Shelley's consciousness. Love is defined in the "Discourse" as a most 
"profound and complicated sentiment" (PS. 408) and has an essential place in Shelley's view 
of existence. A cancelled phrase from the draft of "On Love" declares that love "is the swoct 
chalice of life whose / dregs aro bitterer than wormwood" (JMN. E . 11, p. 2, 11-12). 
Accordingly the attainment of love, "the sweet chalice", is conceived in quasi-mythical terms 
as the earthly attainment of a symbolical grail-like quest.15 
One of the many obvious features of courtly love is the impossible attainment of its ideals; 
the worship of a superior, often married, lady for whom the questor undertakes great feats with 
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little physical reward. In Julian and Maddalo the anonymous "imperious" (600) beloved is 
suggested by Tasso's "The Lady Leonora" (JMN, E . 11, p. 165, 5 rev). Another deleted 
passage in "On Love" allows the reader to detect an undercurrent of possessiveness in 
Shelley's vision of love: "and the—[?] imagination clings seeks / the likeness of that which is 
most / beautiful within itself . . ." (JMN. E . 11, p. 3, 1-3). Indeed the very fact that Shelley 
considered "clings", even though the word is replaced by "seeks" in the published version, 
indicates a psychological contradiction of his early affirmation of freedom outlined in a note 
to Queen Mab: "Love withers under constraint: its very essence is liberty: it is compatible 
neither with obedience, jealousy, or fear" (PW. 806). The notion of binding attachment is 
antithetical to Shelley's insistence on the mutual reciprocity and sharing of freely flowing 
energy, which should be conferred voluntarily in human relationships. Shelley is effusive, but 
precise on this point, where he incorporates the notion of inconstancy as an inherent feature in 
both love and philosophical beliefs: "Love is free: to promise forever to love the same woman is 
not less absurd than to promise to believe the same creed" (PW. 807). In Epipsvchidion (1821), 
these sentiments are poetically encapsulated: 
Narrow 
The heart that loves, the brain that contemplates, 
The life that wears, the spirit that creates 
One object, and one form, and builds thereby 
A sepulchre for its eternity. . . . (169-73) 
These speculations on love, which seem consistent throughout Shelley's work, raise questions 
as to the precise emotion experienced by the Maniac whose constancy, far from appearing as a 
virtue, can be interpreted as an act of reification; he becomes irretrievably locked into a specific 
moment in time: 
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for since thy lip 
Met mine first, years long past, since thine eye kindled 
With soft fire under mine, 1 have not dwindled 
Nor changed in mind or body. . . . (467-70) 
A prose fragment in The "Julian and Maddalo" Draft Notebook, entitled "In the . . . human 
world . . .", underlines that sensual expression is central to Shelleyan love: "In the h» human 
world; lovo is one / of the commonest expressions of love is / sexual intercourse . . ." (JMN. E . 
11, p. 52, 1-3). Physical intimacy expresses the spiritual, imaginative and emotional bonds and 
establishes a deeper degree of inter-involvement. In his experience of love the Maniac appears 
to have lost his individual integrity and the ensuing disunion leads to a sense of physical and 
psychic fragmentation. He perceives that her feelings are those of revulsion in which she rejects 
him, "The deep pollution of my loathed embrace—" (422). What follows is a passage of 
disturbingly violent eroticism with a graphic image of self-castration: 
That, like some maniac monk, I had torn out 
The nerves of manhood by their bleeding root 
With mine own quivering fingers, so that ne'er 
Our hearts had for a moment mingled there 
To disunite in horror—...(424-8). 
This physical vehemence arises from the intensity of feeling: "The nerves of manhood" 
penetrates to the source the Maniac's masculinity, seeking to eradicate the anguish from the 
depths of his being. However, the overt sexual repugnance is only one level of reading. 
Implicit in "disunite" is also the notion of an emasculated self, where life experiences have a 
sullying influence by obliterating the Maniac's youthful ideals: "when a boy / I did devote to 
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justice and to love / My nature, worthless now!" (380-2). The Maniac has lost his 
interrelatedness with the world, and this sense of division is highlighted when contrasted with 
Julian's holistic transcendence of boundaries where "the Earth and Sea had been / Dissolved 
into one lake of fire" (80-1). This yields an elevated experience: "The inmost purple spirit of 
light" (84). Moreover, before witnessing Maddalo's darker perspective, centred on the 
madhouse, Julian's vision is uplifting: 
I leaned, and saw the City, and could mark 
How from their many isles, in evening's gleam, 
Its temples and its palaces did seem 
Like fabrics of enchantment piled to Heaven. (89-92) 
When seeking explanations for the source of the Maniac's madness as a sense of fragmentation 
or disillusionment of youthful ideals, perhaps the reader should question whether Maddalo had 
any influence.16 Certainly Maddalo's admission to Julian that the Maniac's sanity was intact 
before their discussion may have some relevance: " I knew one like you / . . . With whom I 
argued in this sort, and he / Is now gone mad" (195,197-8). 
Danah Zohar and Ian Marshall's The Quantum Society synergizes physics, philosophy 
and psychology to provide a lucidly rewarding interpretation of the energy patterns inherent in 
human relationships-Most intriguing, and relevant to Julian and Maddalo. is their exploration -
of the dichotomy between freedom and possession in interpersonal relationships, which they 
metaphorically relate to the differing manifested states of the coexisting wave / particle duality 
in modem physics: 
With our particle aspect we stand apart and experience life from our own point of 
view; with our wave aspect we are literally taken up by, woven into, the being of 
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others and of all that surrounds us. It is this duality that allows us to 'contain and 
be contained by others without our personal truth ever being wholly isolated or 
exhausted.' (OSO. 82) 
But i f either the "wave aspect", which allows physical and psychic inter-involvement in 
relationships, or the "particle aspect" of individuality which defines boundaries, predominates, 
then there is a lack of balance: the "wave aspect" results in a lack of commitment; the "particle 
aspect" with its objectifying tendency, can lead to a single-minded obsessiveness.17 In relation 
to the Maniac, his love appears to be fixated and based upon a relationship of doubts and 
fears. The following passage suggests a lack of communication, as evidenced by the divergent 
perceptions between himself and the beloved: 
'You kiss me not 
Ever, I fear you do not love me now*— 
In truth I loved even to my overthrow 
Her, who would fain forget these words: but they 
Cling to her mind, and cannot pass away. (403-7) 
Here "they / Cling to her mind" inversely projects the Maniac's own attachment to his lost 
love. 
The erotic violence of the maniac's soliloquy suggests that it was written under intense 
anguish. For Shelley deep passions generate poetic expression by inducing a creative state of 
being in which "passion exceeding a certain limit touches the boundaries of that which is ideal" 
(LS I I , 108). However, the Preface appeals to a dispassionate, "pious reader" (PP. 113) to 
confer a value-judgment on Julian's character and such an invitation can only be interpreted as 
decidedly ironic. Sanctimonious moralizing blinkers perception, "Religion made men blind" 
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(189), and is antipathetic to the poem's demands for an emotive response. Shelley's sympathies 
appear to be with the iconoclastic views of Julian, "a complete infidel, and a scoffer at all 
things reputed holy" (PP, 113). Julian believes in the amelioration of humanity through creating 
a positive vision of futurity, whilst simultaneously retaining a realistic awareness of the current 
deprivations in society: "Without concealing the evil in the world, he is forever speculating how 
good may be made superior" (PP. 113). The poem stimulates a reading which eschews moral 
judgments yet still requires the reader to appraise its exploration of feelings. Julian's 
philosophical ideals of "love, beauty and truth" (174) provide a valid code of ethics. His 
speech is carefully structured to suggest that these principles are not external virtues, imposed 
upon humanity, but an intrinsic part of existence: 
— we might be all 
We dream of happy, high, majestical. 
Where is the love, beauty and truth we seek 
But in our mind? (172-75) 
The repetition of'Sve" and the rhetorical question persuades the reader to agree with Julian's 
affirmative vision. The use of "dream" could be seen to undermine Julian's philosophical 
assertion by dismissing it, like Maddalo does, as one of Utopian idealism. But when 
juxtaposed with the "Speculations on Metaphysics", ''dream" takes on a greater significance: 
Shelley eradicates any distinction between ''thoughts, which are called real or external 
objects", and those which "are usually more obscure and indistinct, such as hallucinations, 
dreams, and the ideas of madness" (Julian VII. 59). The only meaningful differentiation that 
can be made is with regard to their potency or "force" and whether they enhance or detract 
from a fulfilled life. Viewed in this light, both Julian's ideals of perfection, gleaned through 
"dreams", and the Maniac's fragmented soliloquy share equal authenticity as ways of 
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structuring and understanding their experiences of reality. That thoughts and dreams may 
convey a similar inflection in Shelley's consciousness is suggested in a cancellation in The 
"Julian and Maddalo" Draft Notebook; the final choice of "dream" was initially drafted as 
''think": "We might be otherwise, . but we might be all / That wo can think high / We dream 
of happy - , high , majestical" (JMN, E . 11, p. 84, 4-6). 
The transgression of spiritual ideals through negative "despondency" (48) and "pride" 
(48) renders Maddalo's "eagle spirit blind" (51). "Spirit" recurs throughout Shelley's writing, 
frequently adopted as a linguistic sign when the highest ideals of human thought creatively 
merge with a supernatural essence, as in "Hymn to Intellectual Beauty": "Spirit of BEAUTY, 
that dost consecrate / With thine own hues all thou dost shine upon / Of human thought or 
form" (13-15).IS Julian refuses to allow Maddalo to "cast / A darkness on my spirit" (159-60); 
he envisions conquering self-imposed mental restrictions on the spirit, rather than succumbing 
to pessimism: 
How strong the chains are which our spirit bind; 
Brittle perchance as straw . . . We are assured 
Much may be conquered, much may be endured 
Of what degrades and crushes us. We know 
That we have power over ourselves to do 
And suffer—what, we know not till we try; 
But something nobler than to live and die— . (181-87) 
Conversely the Maniac, having lost his "spirit's mate" (337), is spiritually, mentally and 
emotionally crushed; his "lip is tortured by the wrongs which break / The spirit it expresses" 
(409-10). It is the violation of the principle of truth which causes him greatest suffering: 
"Alas, no scorn or pain or hate could be / So heavy as that falsehood is to me—" (310-11). 
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Julian's philosophical union of the human mind with spiritual ideals has a consonance 
with Zohar's quantum paradigm of consciousness in which she posits a process of continual 
interaction that is one of mutual redefinition: 
1 am by nature a creature which is stuff of the same substance with love, truth 
and beauty. Not because I create them, but because the nature of my 
consciousness is synonymous with the nature of their meaning. Through my own 
being I have the capacity to act as midwife to their expression in this world, and 
they in turn mould and make the self that I am. (OS, 146) 
But in Julian and Maddalo the highest ideals of "love, truth and beauty" compete against their 
inverse aspects, "hate, scorn, remorse, despair" (441) which pollute existence by creating "the 
mind's hell" (441). The narrative presents an unresolved contention between these forces 
through the Maniac's "living death of agonies!" (415). Wasserman's account in "Skepticism 
and the Poetry of Reality" concludes that "the poem is the honest presentation of a skeptical 
incertitude, not a solution" (SCR. 75). But the most penetrating insights into how the Maniac's 
dementia may be cured arise with Julian's ideals; he envisions a strategy of reclamation 
through seeking "a 'soul of goodness' in things i l l " (204). Julian's scheme is carefully 
configured: 
But I imagined that i f day by day 
I watched him, and but seldom went away, 
And studied all the beatings of his heart 
With zeal, as men study some stubborn art 
For their own good, and could by patience find 
An entrance to the caverns of his mind, 
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I might reclaim him from his dark estate. (568-74) 
Although Julian's aspirations, resembling those of a cognitive therapist, remain at a theoretical 
level, they do provide a foundation from which Shelley's belief in regeneration is furthered. The 
seemingly flippant allusion to this scheme, prefaced as "perhaps an idle thought" (567), 
easily encourages a reading which undervalues Julian's creed as a temporary aberration of 
idealistic impulses: "such dreams of baseless good / Oft come and go in crowds or solitude / 
And leave no trace" (578-80).19 Nevertheless, closer examination of this passage finds that 
Julian's combination of imagination, "zeal" and emotional insight, to penetrate to the Maniac's 
innermost thought processes is well conceived. Finding "An entrance to the caverns of his 
mind" (573) by studying "all the beatings of his heart" (570), reveals a psychological 
perspicacity that can be seen as an extension of Shelley's "aspiring theories" (201) about the 
creative capacity of thought and emotion to overcome tyranny or adversity. Shelley's 
development of such ideas gains in sophistication in Prometheus Unbound and culminates in 
Ahasuerus' transformational metaphysics in Hellas. In the latter composition Shelley declares 
that not only are emotive states the basis of all being, but that the power for transformation 
exists in the present moment: 
The future and the past are idle shadows 
Of thought's eternal flight—they have no being. 
Nought is but that which feels itself to be. (783-5) 
The "skeptical incertitude" that Wasserman discerns in Julian and Maddalo does not arise 
from Shelley's doubt about the validity of Julian's convictions, but from the divorce of 
knowledge from its practical implementation. Julian and Maddalo's vision deals with the 
darkest recesses of the human psyche and in his treatment of this theme Shelley shows the 
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irresolvable tension emanating from the lack of an experiential theory about the nature of 
existence. 
Wasserman's condemnation of Julian's impractical theorizing is absolute: "Julian has 
learned nothing"; moreover his departure from Italy is read as an act of acquiescence in the 
"passive, self-indulging purpose of dispelling his gloomy thoughts o f the Maniac (SCR, 80). 
It is one of the many critical accounts eagerly "pouncing on Julian's ineffectuality . . . in a 
more accusatory spirit than the poem will allow" (HMI, 53). Perhaps it is possible to redress 
the balance of this criticism, shown elsewhere in Hogle's view of "Julian's impotent 
hopefulness" (SPR, 126), by delving into the motives behind his withdrawal and testing 
whether Julian's action is consistent with his "true theory" (203). 
Julian and Maddalo is dominated by an excess of emotive feelings and extreme 
sensitivity which psychically expose the Maniac "as a nerve o'er which do creep / The else 
unfeh oppressions of this earth" (449-50). His empathetic capacity to "moan / For woes which 
others hear not" (444-5), and reconstruct such devastating visions, by invoking "The absent 
with the glance of phantasy" (446), is a debilitating engagement in pessimism. Unlike Julian's 
optimistically uplifting rhetoric, "and I (for ever still / Is it not wise to make the best of ill?) / 
Argued against despondency" (46-8), the Maniac willingly participates in scenes of destruction 
even metaphorically "Following the captive to his dungeon deep" (448). Herein lies a more 
penetrating insight into his "sad history" (231) than the prefatorial gloss discloses. Perhaps it is 
no mere coincidence that the Maniac, partly modelled on~Torquato Tasso, shares the same fate 
of mental and physical incarceration that he has so intensely envisioned and empathized with 
previously. In this way he becomes an unwitting sacrificial victim of his own creation. 
Romanticism invests ultimate power in the imagination, but it can equally be a tool of 
liberation or tyranny. The Romantic pre-disposition towards consciously re-conjuring past 
suffering is exemplified by Mary Wollstonecraft's correspondence with William Godwin. 
Emotional wounds from her relationship with Gilbert Imlay recreate a current state of anxiety 
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when she is "haunted by old sorrows that seemed to come forward with new force to sharpen 
the present anguish."20 Perceptively Mary Wollstonecraft outlines her inherent proclivity to 
despair: 
Yet, struggling as I have been a long time to attain peace of mind (or apathy) I am 
afraid to trace emotions to their source, which border on agony. . . . My 
imagination is for ever betraying me into fresh misery, and I perceive that I shall 
be a child to the end of the chapter.21 
Yet even with recognition of her complicity, Mary Wollstonecraft still struggles with these 
destructive patterns. In Shelley's vision of existence, where emotion has a creative impact, the 
process of continually tracing "emotions to their source, which border on agony" results in 
physical consequences. In this respect Julian and Maddalo can be read as a consciousness-
raising warning against the destructive misuse of energy, which fetters rather than liberates 
mankind. Maddalo, who is endowed with an "extraordinary mind", embodies the potentiality 
"of becoming the redeemer of his degraded country" (PP. 112) by envisioning the regeneration 
of humanity. For Shelley it is a spiritual transgression to accede to despondent futility by 
finding "an intense apprehension of the nothingness of human life" (PP. 113). Yet Maddalo is 
also an admirable character. "He is cheerful, frank, and witty. His more serious conversation 
is a sort ofintoxication; men are held by it as by a spell" (PP. 113). Even so, Shelley's artistic 
rendering of Maddalo is partly animated by his impression of Byron's gloomy vision of 
existence as expressed in Childe Harold's Pilgrimage IV. Here Shelley praises Byron as "a 
great poet", but denounces his pessimism: "The spirit in which it is written is, i f insane, the 
most wicked & mischievous insanity that was ever given forth. It is a kind of obstinate & self-
willed folly in which he hardens himself (LS I I , 58). What really matters to Shelley is that 
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the poetic spirit should be channelled to inspire humanity. His further censure of Byron makes 
this point evident: 
He is not yet an Italian & is heartily & deeply discontented with himself, & 
contemplating in the distorted mirror of his own thoughts, the nature & the destiny 
of man, what can he behold but objects of contempt & despair? (LS, I I , 58) 
Julian simplistically, but effectively, contrasts the "sick thoughts" (169) which overshadow 
Maddalo with the pure thoughts of his child, who is untainted by preconceived notions and 
is "blithe, innocent and free" (167).22 Shelley made several revisions to this passage; he twice 
contemplated ' W , and then evil thoughts" "before the final choice of "sick thoughts" (JMN, E . 
11, p. 83, 15-17). Possibly the decision may have been influenced by a consideration of 
metrical stresses. Nevertheless this studied deliberation also makes apparent Shelley's careful 
analysis of the detrimental effects caused by enveloping pessimism, which impinge upon 
Julian's consciousness, culminating with his desire to escape; he readily "sought relief / From 
the deep tenderness that maniac wrought / Within" (565-7) him. Julian's reluctance to engage 
with the Maniac's agonies could emanate from an element of self-recognition and identification; 
his own inner conflict being mirrored in the Maniac: "never saw I one whom I would call / 
More willingly my friend" (576-7). His capacity for compassion psychically embroils Julian in 
the Maniac's despair. It is the extreme violent passion in his soliloquy which pollutes the 
surrounding atmosphere and renders Julian's embroilment a possibility. In Shelley's vision, 
once passionately excited, negative thoughts carry a destructive potential that can influence the 
whole interconnected field of consciousness, as seen with the furies in Prometheus Unbound. 
This destructive potentiality is a valid reason for Julian not conveying the emotive "force" of 
Maddalo's pessimism: "1 recall / The sense of what he said, although I mar / The force of his 
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expressions" (130-2). The suppression of deep-seated grief is explored in detail with the 
Maniac. 
Of greatest significance in the Maniac's deranged rhetoric are the "secret groans" (341) of 
his "incommunicable woe" (343), carefully concealed to protect his "spirit's mate" (337) by a 
"mask of falsehood" (308). This concealment of his tragic situation is extended to his 
immediate circle: 
"Ye few by whom my nature has been weighed 
In friendship, let me not that name degrade 
By placing on your hearts the secret load 
Which crushes mine to dust. . . . (344-7) 
It is the "secret load" (346) of grief, privately borne, which destroys the Maniac. Ironically he 
needs "a medicine for the mind" and his recognition that "scorn" and "hate" (355) are 
perversions of spiritual ideals shows an awareness of the influence of negative thoughts and 
emotions on the nature of consciousness. However, the Maniac's mind is still replaying 
destructive scenarios and his condition remains dire. 
Shelley's letters during this period mtermingle literary and personal consciousness, 
enticing the reader to foreground biographical evidence and draw significant parallels between 
hispoetry and life. For instance, Shelley sent Leigh-Hunt Julian and Maddalo "to give to Ollier 
for publication" anonymously, whilst hinting that personal, distressing circumstances may have 
been integral to his literary fervour: "Though surrounded by suffering and disquietude, and, 
latterly, almost overcome by our strange misfortune I have not been idle" (LS II , 108). Where 
I focus on biographical concerns my purpose is not to delve into specific events, but to provide 
a keener insight into the creative reciprocity between art and life. The literary work becomes 
so entangled in the poet's psyche that creativity is a more involved process than a sequential, 
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one-way transmutation of life experiences. The notion that poetic expression is interwoven 
with the poet's personal agonies is found in an analysis of Maddalo's premise that 
"Most wretched men 
Are cradled into poetry by wrong, 
They leam in suffering what they teach in song." (544-6). 
Michael O'Neill's interpretation of these lines posits that "Poetry for Maddalo has its origins 
in some initial 'wrong'; 'song' requires 'suffering.'"23 An investigation of The "Julian and 
Maddalo" Draft Notebook reveals the depths and extent of this agony envisaged by Shelley. 
The aesthetic distance achieved in the published poem originates from a quasi-prosaic, yet 
rewarding insight into the subjective interaction between the poet's life and his poetic 
expression. Shelley writes "It is because they act the parts themselves / And learn through 
suffering what they speak in song" (JMN. E . 11, p. 156, 9-10 rev). Here acting conveys a 
conscious deliberation to become emotively involved in agonized experiences for the purpose 
of creation. Another attempt at these lines verifies the interpretation that "suffering" is 
portrayed, from Maddalo's perspective, as an elevating experience that shapes and ennobles 
the psyche: 
[ ? ] What wonder minds-arc mode sublime 
Their minds are made sublime & keen [by] wrong 
Theylearn [thro]. (JMN, E . 11, p. 116, 18-20) 
But although "suffering" yields artistic excellence "where minds are made sublime", the 
personal consequences can be devastating. Earl Wasserman remarks on Shelley's censure of 
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mis-creation by inter-linking Rousseau and Maddalo's pessimistic visions: "poetry is vicious 
which records only misanthropy and despair and wails that the world is wrong."24 
In my interpretation of Julian and Maddalo I have suggested a positive reassessment of the 
creative potential in Julian's meliorism and accounted for its centrality to Shelley's 
philosophical beliefs. Retaining "a 'soul of goodness' in all things ill" (204) is central to the 
Promethean quest for regeneration and explored at deeper levels of being in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Reading "His Written Sour': Shelley's Promethean Engagement with Being 
Dreams and the light imaginings of men 
And all that faith creates, or love desires. 
(I. 200-1) 
My soul is an enchanted Boat 
V/hich, like a sleeping swan, doth float 
Upon the silver waves of thy sweet singing, 
And thine doth like an Angel sit 
Beside the helm conducting it 
Whilst all the winds with melody are ringing. 
(II. v. 72-7) 
I 
Prometheus Unbound is assuredly "of a higher character than" (LS I I , 116) Shelley's previous 
compositions, a cosmic drama culminating in an ecstatic celebration of existence. Demogorgon 
defines this perfected state as "Good, great and joyous, beautiful and free; / This is alone Life, 
Joy, Empire and Victory" (TV. 577-8). Victorious conquest is the destination of a vision in 
which Shelley forcefully denounces Aeschylus' inferred resolution of propitiation; he is "averse 
from a catastrophe so feeble as that of reconciling the Champion with the Oppressor of 
mankind" CPP. 133). Written under the sway of Shelley's "passion for reforming the world" 
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(PP, 135), the drama embarks on a metaphysical quest to release "Love from its awful 
throne of patient power / In the wise heart" (IV. 557-8). 
The present chapter's reading of Prometheus Unbound contends that Shelley presents a 
Promethean engagement with the nature of being, an experiential enactment of suffering and 
redemption, in a work defined by him as a literary innovation, "a drama, with characters & 
mechanism of a kind yet unattempted" (LS I I , 94). Shelley's originality is apparent in the way 
that the spiritual, imaginative, emotional and sensuous levels of existence intermesh in a 
cosmic dance of being. Here emotion is the principal element that precedes and more often 
determines perception, as evidenced when the freed Prometheus anticipates the Spirit of the 
Hour's account of rebirth: "We feel what thou hast heard and seen — yet speak" (JR. iv. 97). 
In contradistinction to both Plato and Dante, Shelley's vision depicts the sensible realm as 
conveying the deepest, most truthful apprehension of existence. Moreover in A Philosophical 
View of Reform he defines poetry as "an intense and impassioned power of communicating 
intense and impassioned impressions respecting man and nature" (Julian VII, 19). "Intense and 
impassioned impressions" are foremost in Prometheus Unbound: affective states are granted 
an ontological status and when powerfully expressed can actualize form. Indeed in the drama's 
concluding affirmation of renewal Demogorgon motivates the dramatis personae and reader, 
not to accept resignedly the existent reality of evil, but 'To defy Power which seems 
Omnipotent" (TV. 572). Against what seem unyielding circumstances, Demogorgon declares 
that optimistic desire can materialize a regenerated world: 'To love, and bear; to hope, "till 
Hope creates / From its own wreck the thing it contemplates" (TV. 573-4). In this metaphysical 
universe spirits are propelled by human emotion and their progress is enhanced through love 
and impeded by despair: retrospectively the spirits recount how "Through blood and tears, / 
And a thick hell of hatreds and hopes and fears, / We waded and flew" (TV. 118-20). Given this 
fluidity of existence, the annihilation of evil is primarily accomplished on the mental and 
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emotional planes of being, when "the mind / Of human kind" (93-4) creates "an Ocean / Of 
clear emotion, / A Heaven of serene and mighty motion" (96-8). 
Claiming the sanction of heaven, Prometheus accepts divine responsibility for the destiny 
of humanity, his "beloved race" (1- 386). Shelley equivocates in his meaning of heaven 
depending on whose power presides on earth: "Heaven's fell King" (140) Jove, or an empyrean 
of Prometheus' beneficence. The opening of the "Ode to Heaven" (included in the 1820 
volume) suggests why this vacillation occurs; heaven is not conceived in Christian terms, as 
the dwelling place of the blessed, but as the mutable sphere under which futurity unfolds: 
"Ever-canopying Dome / Of acts and ages yet to come!" (8-9). Heaven is venerated as the 
mirror of humanity's destiny: "Heaven! for thou art the abode / Of that Power which is the 
glass / Wherein man his nature sees;—" (20-2). In Shelley's lyrical drama, Mercury specifies 
that Prometheus is the only living being with the knowledge "Which may transfer the sceptre of 
wide Heaven" (I. 373). Consequently Prometheus' awesome challenge, whilst experiencing 
psychological and physical torture, is to retain his own nature and express "the glory of that 
form / Which lives unchanged within" (II. i . 64-5). 
The dramatic conflict opens with Jupiter's despotism imperiously inscribed in the blank 
verse with its account of "toil, and hecatombs of broken hearts, / With fear and self contempt 
and barren hope" (I. 7-8). Repeatedly "and" ladens and protracts torment. Thrown into this 
plight, Prometheus encounters a state of barbarity; he declares that "torture and solitude, / 
Scorn and despair,—-these aremine empire:—" (14-15). Shelley's Promethean universe is not 
only intimately interrelated but also sentiently conscious.1 In his agony Prometheus solicits a 
cosmic responsiveness: " I ask the Earth, have not the mountains felt?" (I. 25); " I ask yon 
Heaven—the all- beholding Sun, / Has it not seen?" (26-7); "The Sea . . . Have its deaf waves 
not heard my agony?" (27, 29). These questions, seemingly designed to establish a philosophy 
of existence where matter is vitally conscious, simultaneously denote the collapse of this 
animated communion: "Nature is fallen and fragmented, man is fallen from himself, experience 
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rules, relationship is nowhere to be seen."2 Prometheus is devoid of any sustaining sympathy 
from nature, chained to a barren precipice on an inaccessible "eagle-baffling mountain, / 
Black, wintry, dead, unmeasured; without herb, / Insect, or beast, or shape or sound of life" 
(20-2). But Bloom's ideas about the absence of relationship3 need qualification since, although 
the sacred wholeness of a thou relationship with nature is wanting, Prometheus is embroiled 
with Jupiter in an enduring interaction bonded by hate: "mine own misery and thy vain 
revenge.— / Three thousand years of sleep-unsheltered hours" (11-12). Jupiter's corruption 
has a pervasive presence extending beyond any notion of individual autonomy. His permeating 
influence is explained when the Phantasm of Jupiter reiterates Prometheus' curse: an 
imprecation originally declaimed from Prometheus' complicit position in Jupiter's despotic 
power relations: 
But thou who art the God and Lord—O thou 
Who fillest with thy soul this world of woe, 
To whom all things of Earth and Heaven do bow 
In fear and worship—all-prevailing foe! (282-5) 
In the Promethean universe metaphysical laws prevail; thought and emotion construct and 
compel form into being.4 Jupiter's "antique empire" rests on an immaterial basis, being "built / 
On eldest faith, and Hell's coeval, fear^ ( IHTI. 9-10). Yet awareness of this extreme mutability-
does not present an easy challenge. The tension between Prometheus' future vision of a 
regenerated world and the current realism of Jupiter's tyranny is precariously balanced. As 
Michael O'Neill suggests, Shelley's writing demonstrates an acute understanding of the 
temptation towards despondency: "A continual strength of Shelley's poetry is its vigilant 
empathy with states of despair beyond which he seeks to move."5 Significantly the battle 
between Prometheus and "the all-miscreative brain of Jove" (I. 448) is enacted on the 
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threshold of creation, wavering at the point where the elements of thought and emotion are 
hypostatized into temporary forms. Hence the Furies, "ministers of pain and fear" (452) which 
torture Prometheus, are imaginatively invoked as evil projections, Jove's "thought-executing 
ministers" (387); their lack of autonomy is apparent as they appear as shadowy visitations 
apprehended by Prometheus as "Phantasms so foul through monster-teeming Hell" (447).6 
Prometheus is a participator in his anguish, perhaps unwittingly so, as the Furies are conjured 
in an act of co-creation in which the evil thoughts of Jove unite with the emotive hatred in 
Prometheus' curse. Accordingly the second Fury explains, "So from our victim's destined 
agony / The shade which is our form invests us round, / Else are we shapeless as our Mother 
Night" (I. 470-2). These interconnections are not always apparent as there is a time delay 
between that which is imaginatively and emotively created and its sequential manifestation. 
Towards the end of Act III the Spirit of the Hour illustrates the interval between internal 
changes and external events: 
I wandering went 
Among the haunts and dwellings of mankind 
And first was disappointed not to see 
Such mighty change as I had felt within ' 
Expressed in outward things; but soon I looked, 
And behold! thrones were kingless. . . . (HI. iv. 126-31) 
Danah Zohar analyzes the metaphysical consequences of malevolent thoughts and 
postulates that there is a pervasive influence extending to all being: 
If I injure my consciousness — fill it with malicious or selfish or evil thoughts — 
I injure the whole non-locally connected 'field' of consciousness. Each of us, 
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because of our integral relationship with others, with Nature, and with the world 
of values, has the capacity to beatify or to taint the waters of eternity. Each of us 
therefore carries, as a result of our quantum nature, an awesome moral 
responsibility. (QS. 151) 
This supposition that "evil thoughts" have injurious ontological consequences is a cogent 
deduction from a "quantum world-view [which] stresses dynamic relationship as the basis of 
all that is" (QS. 220). Shelley's poetic exploration of the interactive nature of consciousness is 
central to his philosophy of transformation; amelioration arises at the metaphysical level with 
Prometheus' articulation of his cerebral and emotional transcendence of enmity: "It doth repent 
me: words are quick and vain; / Grief for awhile is blind, and so was mine. / I wish no living 
thing to suffer pain" (I. 303-5). But there is a relentless pull towards being overwhelmed by 
depravity because "Evil minds / Change good to their own nature" (380-1). Initially 
Mercury's arrival with a pack of salivating Furies to exact 'torture, unreprieved" (423) does 
not faze Prometheus "within whose mind sits peace serene / As light in the sun, throned" 
(430-1). When exposed to the Furies' pervasive evil Prometheus faces an arduous challenge in 
which he is almost overpowered: "Whilst I behold such execrable shapes, / Methinks I grow 
like what I contemplate" (449-50). Significantly, with "grow" Shelley intimates an organic 
metamorphosis that is both psychological and physiognomic: thinking literally determines 
being.7 Shelley consistently portrays form as protean; in the regenerated world the Moon's 
lyrics similarly impart how mere perception physically affects the nature of being: "As a lover 
or chameleon / Grows like what it looks upon," (TV. 483-4). Herein lies a crucial issue in 
Prometheus Unbound: in a universe with fluid boundaries of relationship how does one 
interact with other beings and yet remain firmly rooted in self-identity? Supreme inner 
strength of a heroic quality is necessary to retain autonomy and vanquish evil as Prometheus 
asserts: "Yet am I king over myself, and rule / The torturing and conflicting throngs within" (I. 
176 
492-3). But Jove is an accomplished antagonist, a "subtle Tyrant!" (638), who is 
metaphysically adept and employs a psychological stratagem combining "dread thought" 
(488) and "foul desire" (489) for "tearing up the heart / Of the good Titan" (579-80). 
The figure of Prometheus inspirited the Romantic imagination and the creative 
appropriation of the myth has produced diverse interpretations which deserve comparison with 
Shelley's vision. Byron's brief version of the Titan's suffering, entitled "Prometheus", aptly 
registers the quest to alleviate adversity and empower humanity: 'To render with thy precepts 
less / The sum of human wretchedness, / And strengthen Man with his own mind" (BP IV, 36-
8). In relation to the power of the mind, Coleridge suggested that this was the Promethean 
gift to humanity: "The fire that Prometheus bought was symbolic of the Nous."8 Certainly 
Shelley's drama celebrates self-empire attained through mental supremacy: "Thought's 
crowned Powers" (TV. 103). But Byron's vision fails to accomplish amelioration through 
mental empowerment; his "Prometheus" focuses on torment and uninspiringly concludes by 
"making Death a Victory" (BP IV, 59) for the tortured. Conversely Goethe's short 
"Prometheus" imparts an optimistic spirit that has a correspondence with Shelley's 
regenerative vision. With titanic defiance Prometheus fashions human beings to experience 
the spectrum of emotions: " I sit here, make men in my image, . . . to suffer, to weep, to enjoy 
and be glad. . . ."9 Goethe denounces the abhorrent conduct of the Gods who enforce 
supplication: "You feed your majesty scantily on sacrificed tribute and the breath of prayer."10 
Likewise Shelley's Jupiter tyrannizes over "this Earth / Made multitudinous with thy slaves, 
whom thou / Requitest for knee-worship, prayer and praise," (I. 4-6). Goethe's protagonist 
relies on his emotional resilience to adversity: "Holy glowing heart, did you not achieve all this 
yourself?"11 Here Shelley's plot deviates significantly from Goethe and the original Greek 
myth: his Prometheus depends on feminine figures to sustain his endurance: "Fair sister 
nymphs, who made long years of pain / Sweet to remember through your love and care:" (III. 
iii. 8-9). 
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Shelley's unrelenting focus on the mental and emotional levels of being is in contrast to 
Aeschylus' graphic physical depiction.12 Jupiter's evil "works" infiltrate levels of Prometheus' 
being and derange his mental state into a 'Svoe-illumed mind" (I. 637). Whereas "illumed" 
undercuts the extent of despair, nevertheless with this internal discord Prometheus' psyche 
currently lacks the balanced integration necessary to become humanity's saviour: "Man, one 
harmonious Soul of many a soul / Whose nature is its own divine controul" (TV. 400-1). Yet at 
the innermost level of being Prometheus' strength is unvanquished: "The sights with which 
thou torturest gird my soul / With new endurance" (I 643-4). Even though agonizingly 
depicted, Prometheus' patient resistance is paradoxically ennobling; it yields "such mixed joy 
/ As pain and Virtue give" (656-7). Whereas "Peace is in the grave—" (638), Prometheus 
courageously accepts his immortality rather than seeking a defeatist escapism. 
Shelley's Promethean drama subtly suggests a metaphysical flaw in the redeeming power 
of Christ's crucifixion to gain humanity's redemption. The equation of blood for salvation is 
indefensible to Shelley. Violence has no place in Shelley's millennial vision and Jupiter's 
"overthrow is effectively understated, the only sound and fury being Jupiter's unavailing 
melodramatics."13 Redemption does not occur during Prometheus' torture, when "Drops of 
bloody agony flow / From his white and quivering brow" (564-5). As Panthea witnesses 
Prometheus' suffering, his anguish permeates the field of consciousness and opens further 
vistas of destruction: "The Heaven around, the Earth below / Was peopled with thick shapes of 
human death, / All horrible," (586^8). Shelley's dictum is clear; to focus on despair 
magnetically attracts visions of greater adversity: "Let us not tempt worse fear / By looking 
forth —those groans are grief enough" (592-3).Yet Prometheus' suffering is pivotal; it confers 
a sense of realism on the dramatic action and his agony evokes and engages the reader's 
deepest sympathies. Moreover, as Susan Brisman shows, Shelley's Prometheus necessarily 
revitalizes the role of redeemer because Christ, the "wounded sufferer for mankind has 
become so much the object of human pity that men cannot see his compassion as a power."14 
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Unlike Christ, Prometheus is never a passive victim of Jove's malevolence, but experiences a 
reality wittingly created through his own invitation: 
Let thy malignant spirit move 
Its darkness over those I love: 
On me and mine I imprecate 
The utmost torture of thy hate. (276-9) 
Heidegger's existential concept of "our mood, our Being-attuned" (BT, 172) is of relevance 
to the import of Prometheus' encounter with Jupiter's evil regime. Just as in Bohm and Zohar's 
quantum understanding, in Heidegger's view relationship to both the world and others is a 
fundamental existential principle, inextricably bound up with individual existence. In his 
analysis Heidegger asserts that "ontologically mood is a primordial kind of Being . . . prior to 
all cognition and volition, and beyond their range of disclosure" (BT, 175). Moreover because 
of this primal origin, "A mood assails us. It comes neither from 'outside' nor from 'inside', but 
arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being" (BT, 176). Consequently moods 
operate at an ontological level; in his dealings with Jupiter and his hellish world Prometheus 
confronts the bounds of his self-determination. Prometheus is compelled to consciously inhabit 
the fragmented manifest world of Jupiter: external reality dominates his perceptions and the 
visionary realm of holistic consciousness, experienced in dream states, is denied to him. 
Prometheus and Jupiter have different experiences of reality, not surprisingly perhaps, as 
they have unequal powers. Jupiter's omnipotence is fatally incomplete as his Phantasm is 
compelled to restate with Prometheus' curse, "O'er all things but thyself I gave thee power, / 
And my own will" (I. 273-4). Whether this avowal has validity in relation to the former 
factor, autonomy, is questionable. I f so, Jupiter has been denied a fundamental principle of 
being, expressed by Asia as "Self-empire" (II i V 42). In Shelley's vision impassioned 
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perceptions act upon the state of being and the veracity of such apprehensions depends on 
the emotion felt: a malediction uttered with hate has not the perspicacity of a vision conceived 
with love. In the regenerated world the Spirit of the Hour elucidates how love infuses all being 
and yields greater insight into the nature of existence: 
There was a change . . . the impalpable thin air 
And the all-circling sunlight were transformed 
As if the sense of love dissolved in them 
Had folded itself round the sphered world. 
My vision then grew clear and I could see 
Into the mysteries of the Universe. (III. iv. 100-5) 
The denouement of Act I heralds change. With a glimmering iridescence originating from 
'^ the dim caves of human thought" (I. 659) "subtle and fair spirits" (658) appear to uplift 
Prometheus; their appearance has a radiance that is barely perceptible, "Like fountain-
vapours" (667). Arriving to revivify Prometheus, the chorus of Spirits "breathe, and sicken not, 
/ The atmosphere of human thought" (675-6). The third and fourth Spirits lyrically impart 
how philosophy and poetry coexist in symbiotic relationship in Shelley's psyche. The third 
Spirit "sate beside a sage's bed . . . Near the book where he had fed" (723, 725). Following the 
sage's intellectual pursuit, "a Dream with plumes of flame / To his pillow hovering-came," 
(726-7). Whilst the third Spirit appears in close proximity to the sage, the fourth Spirit relates 
an intimate interaction: "On a Poet's lips I slept / Dreaming like a love-adept / In the sound his 
breathing kept" (737-9).Why a "sage's" "pillow" and yet a "poet's hps?" The former connotes 
the suspension of rationally induced wisdom: the latter rhythmically gifts inspiration, lovingly 
bestowed through "aerial kisses" (741). The fourth Spirit's song has an affinity with the 
drama's overall vision which releases a regenerative force intermingled with "Love, 
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Thought, and Breath, / The powers that quell Death" (TV. 150-1). To become poetically 
inspired 
He will watch from dawn to gloom 
The lake-reflected sun illume 
The yellow bees i ' the ivy-bloom 
Nor heed nor see, what things they be; 
But from these create he can 
Forms more real than living man, 
Nurslings of immortality!— (743-9). 
Here the golden atmosphere suggestively "drenches the spirits even to intoxication" (PP, 133) 
inducing a quasi-hypnotic trance in which poetic vision is animated by, yet ultimately 
transcends, the natural world. Just as the poet platonically refrains from "mortal blisses" (740) 
he disregards the intrinsic nature of existing forms. The reversal of syntax in "create he can" 
accentuates generation by merging the creative act with the creator. There is, as Notopoulos 
notices, "a remarkable similarity between the spirit of these lines and Agathon's speech in the 
Symposium" (PS, 244). Shelley's translation (1818) and poetic refiguration of Plato's 
dialogue are animated in Prometheus Unbound to a point where "Agathon and Diotima seemed 
/ From death and dark fbrgetfulness released."15 In a convivial tone Agathon appraises-his 
musings on love as "partly composed . . . of thoughtless and playful fancies, and partly of such 
serious ones . . . " (PS, 437). Essentially Agathon determines that "Love is a great poet" and 
his skill as a rhetorician is evident in the way he elicits consent for his supposition: "And who 
will deny that the divine poetry, by which all living things are produced upon the earth, is not 
harmonized by the wisdom of Love?" (PS. 436). Harmonizing love sweeps through "all living 
things" in the millenniaUy awakened universe of Prometheus Unbound, and its communication 
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is ingeniously presented both at a cosmic level and through the interactions of the mythological 
personae. 
Panthea's erotic dream vision of Prometheus' sensual arousal and their intimate 
commingling of being on the imaginative, emotional and sensuous planes of existence 
transpires when 
the overpowering light 
Of that immortal shape was shadowed o'er 
By love; which, from his soft and flowing limbs 
And passion-parted lips, and keen faint eyes 
Steam'd forth like vaporous fire; an atmosphere 
Which wrapt me in its all-dissolving power 
As the warm ether of the morning sun 
Wraps ere it drinks some cloud of wandering dew. 
I saw not —heard not—moved not— only felt 
His presence flow and mingle through my blood 
Till it became his life and his grew mine 
And I was thus absorbed—. . . . (II . i. 71-82) 
"Only felt / His presence" signals the interpenetration of being in a union that culminates 
with orgasmic release. Not surprisingly recollection of this dream leaves Panthea "faint / With 
the delight" ( II . i. 35-6). But to be "faint" in a conscious state suggests an indelible impression 
akin to that created by physical occurrence. The past tense of "felt", coupled with generative 
connotations in "life and "grew", enhances the sense of actual experience. Earl Wasserman 
views Panthea's dream as a "spiritual communion" and a "spiritual absorption."16 But his 
emphasis on the "spiritual" is a partial account which denies the eroticism and sunders rather 
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than reconciles being. In a psychological explanation of the potency of feelings and dream 
experience, Montague Ullman defines their significance thus: 
Our dreams arise out of recent and remote feeling residues. That part of us which 
is linked to others through feeling is more real, more enduring and more significant 
than other dimensions of our existence. It compels belief. It dissolves distance, 
creates unity and links us to the real world. This is the stuff of reality.17 
This passage conveys a distinct consonance with Shelley's intuition that feelings and passions 
have fundamental impact on the nature of being. Furthermore for Shelley dreams have an 
ontological status, literally rendering them ''the stuff of reality."18 In his analysis Ullman 
states that "As metaphorical expositions" dream "images reflect the core of our being and the 
place we have made for ourselves in the world."19 And this primal sense of human experience 
which plunges the depths of existence is dramatically evoked in Prometheus Unbound. 
Communication is quintessential in the Promethean world and the deepest experiences of 
being are relayed pictorially, recounted through the retrieval of dream symbolism: 
Thou speakest, but thy words 
Are as the air. I feel them no t . . . . oh, lift 
Thine eyes that I may read his written soul! (II. i . 108-10) 
Here Asia desires sentient communication with the depths of Prometheus' being; to read those 
inexpressible passions that are indelibly etched upon his soul. A cancelled passage in The 
"Prometheus Unbound" Notebooks (struck through with a single vertical line) shows that 
Shelley originally drafted this interchange in fervent images of Promethean fire whose erotic 
energy is combustible on transmission: "Lift up thine oyos Panthca—-—thoy pierce—ftey 
183 
bum!" (PN. E . 2, F . 26v, 11). Panthea is virtually devoured by this intensity: "Alas I am 
consumed- - 1 melt away / The fire is in my heart - -" (PN. E . 2, F . 26V, 13-14). Similarly when 
Asia encounters a vision of Prometheus' spirit, relayed through Panthea's eyes, her being is 
subsumed: "my life / Is ebbing fast - - I cannot speak - -" (PN. E . 2, F . 26v, 23-4). It is at the 
moment of communication that Prometheus' inspiriting fire ignites meeting Asia who 
symbolizes "passionate creative love."20 This level of potency was obviously untenable; 
Panthea and Asia's demise would have truncated the dramatic plot. Yet after such energetic, 
albeit quasi-melodramatic, vociferations Shelley's final choice seems surprisingly understated: 
" I lift them, though they droop beneath the load / Of that they would express" (II. i . 111-12). 
He replaces images of intense brilliance with endless shadowy labyrinths; eyes that are "— 
dark, far, measureless, — / Orb within orb, and line through line inwoven.— " (II. i . 117-8). 
These lines imply that there is no easy access to the enigmatic complexities of the soul21 and 
Shelley's revision to images of darkness is also consistent with the interplanetary interaction in 
the final act: 
The Moon 
As in the soft & sweet eclipse 
meets 
When soul darkens22 soul on lovers lip 
High hearts are calm & brightest eyes are dull 
So when thy shadow falls on me 
Then am I mute & still, - - by thee 
Covered; of thy love, Orb most beautiful, 
Full, oh too full! --. 
(PN, E . 1, F . 25R, 9-17) 
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Although "darkens" is changed to "meets" the outcome of this assignation undeniably obscures 
radiance, accentuated with a succession of images, "eclipse", "dull" "shadow" and finally 
"Covered." 
n 
Personal volition seems crucial to Prometheus' mission. Yet the dichotomy between exercising 
free-will and being sucked into necessity's unrelenting stream is an issue which continually 
surfaces. Aeschylus' Prometheus voices the Greek view of an ineluctable destiny apportioned 
to the Gods and humanity: "My appointed fate I must endure as best I can, / Knowing the 
power of Necessity is irresistible."23 Shelley's portrayal of fate is Greek in his conception of 
interconnected moral and physical laws, but his position between determinism and free-will is 
complicatedly presented. Interspersed throughout the drama are declarations of what appear 
to be a predestinarian philosophy: Prometheus awaits the "retributive hour" (I. 406); he is 
depicted by Asia as "Withering in destined pain" (II. iv. 100). In relation to Prometheus' 
release, Asia phrases her question to Demogorgon in the language of determinism: "When shall 
the destined hour arrive?" (128). Prometheus defines his own ordeal equivocally, as a willing 
choice of a pre-ordained Christ-like fate, which carries collective responsibility, " I would fain / 
Be what it is my destiny to be, / The saviour and the strength of suffering man" (I. 815-7). To 
unravel the philosophical perplexities in the drama's "wise and lovely songs / Of fate and 
chance and God, and Chaos old" (II. i i . 91-2) demands an examination of Shelley's conception 
of destiny and the elements which determine its fulfillment. 
Shelley's vision of redemption in Prometheus Unbound is alert to the pitfalls created by 
non- experiential theories that are in Maddalo's understanding merely "refutation^tight / As 
far as words go", and in Julian's words insubstantial "dreams of baseless good" (Julian and 
Maddalo. 194-5, 578). Mary Shelley comments that "Shelley develops, more particularly in 
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the lyrics of this drama, his abstruse and imaginative theories with regard to the Creation" 
(PW, 272). However she states that his "mystic meanings" are so complexly interwoven that 
"It requires a mind as subtle and penetrating as his own" (PW. 272) to decipher their 
significance. This is particularly evident in the drama's main philosophical explorations 
between Asia and Demogorgon, which delve into the origins of existence. In her reflections, 
Mary Shelley perfectly registers the subtle ethereality, yet cogent presentation, of Shelley's 
ideas, "They elude the ordinary reader by their abstraction and delicacy of distinction, but they 
are far from vague" (PW, 272). 
For Shelley the prevailing way of encountering "Demogorgon's mighty law" (II. i i . 43) is 
through emotional cognition; Panthea senses Demogorgon's being, "we feel it is / A living 
Spirit" (II. iv. 6-7). Furthermore Asia's verification of Demogorgon's utterances is through an 
emotional apprehension: "So much I asked before, and my heart gave / The response thou hast 
given; and of such truths / Each to itself must be the oracle.—" (II. iv. 121-3). If, as Jerrold 
Hogle suggests, Demorgorgon is "the possibility of all the thought-connections that construct 
(or could reconstruct) observed existence" (SPR, 188), then this is the decisive point where 
feeling meets the potentiality of thought and becomes vitally creative in Shelley's vision. 
Geoffrey Matthews views Asia's interchange with Demogorgon as an "exasperating 
'dialogue'", yet he perceptively discerns that Asia is really questioning and articulating her 
deepest intuitions: "She is made to interrogate her own soul."24 Through her questions to 
Demogorgon Asia seeks to ascertain the origins of creation: "Who made the living world?" 
(9). Having established a divine cause, Asia focuses on the totality of existence: "Who made all 
/ That it contains—thought, passion, reason, will, / Imagination?" (9-11). Whether these lines 
should be interpreted "as a useful myth rather than a declaration of Shelley's beliefs about 
reality"25 is questionable and of significance to his vision of regeneration. Matthews aptly sees 
Asia's "moment of supreme prophetic consciousness"26 as emanating from the inhalation of 
volcanic vapour. Here Asia's vision of existence bears a striking resemblance to Humphry 
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Davy's whirling exclamations about the structure of reality, which he experienced under an 
altered state of consciousness induced by nitrous oxide: "Nothing exists but thoughts! — the 
universe is composed of impressions, ideas, pleasures and pains!"27 Shelley certainly had Davy 
in mind whilst composing the Triumph of Life: he wrote "S rum fre de v i / Sir Humphrey 
Davy / Davi" sideways along the left hand margin finishing just below the lines "Of Throned in 
the thoughts of men, and still had / The Jealous keys of truths eternal doors" (BSM I , f. 32v, 
17-18). Whether Shelley thought that Davy possessed "The Jealous keys of truths eternal 
doors" is open to conjecture, but certainly his transcendental speculations are of relevance to 
Shelley's Promethean vision. 
Philosophically and psychologically an immaterial universe, created from a complex nexus 
of thoughts and emotions, is the level of existence at which the drama is enacted: thought "is 
the measure of the Universe" (II. iv. 73); heart-felt emotion is the activating principle which 
equally propels good or evil ideas into physical actuality. With the essential nature of creation 
and destruction operating from a metaphysical basis, Panthea related earlier that "human 
death" 0- 587) is not solely "wrought by human hands" (588) but "some appeared the work of 
human hearts, / For men were slowly killed by frowns and smiles" (589-90). 
Like the anonymous Woman in Laon and Cvthna who presents a myth of creation, Asia 
explores the historical antecedents to Jupiter's reign. Her speech opens with a created 
universe in a state of paradisal bliss: "There was the Heaven and Earth at first / And Light and 
Love" (II. iv. 32-3). In her account of Saturn's denial of basic human attributes, Asia 
designates a quasi-magus like ability, in which humanity can utilize elemental power: 
The birthright of their being, knowledge, power, 
The skill which wields the elements,28 the thought 
Which pierces this dim Universe like light, 
Self-empire and the majesty of love. (39-42) 
187 
Noticeably, Jupiter's fell becomes irrevocable once he senses that he is powerless to command 
natural forces, "The elements obey me not . . . I sink . . . / Dizzily down—ever, forever, 
down—" OH i- 80-1). 
Tellingly, what really matters in the Promethean world is to have an empowering theory 
about the structure of reality, insight into "The skill which wields the elements" (II . iv. 40). 2 9 
Stuart Curran points out that Jupiter is impeded and eventually destroyed by "his passive 
subservience to a deterministic conception and he is overwhelmed and destroyed by his own 
mind" (SAM. 105). He concisely epitomizes any apparent ambiguities in Shelley's 
philosophical ideas as one of mere perception: "Determinism, however, exists only i f it is 
conceived to exist" (SAM. 105). Ontologically determinism has no legitimacy in the 
Promethean universe, yet it surfaces at every juncture, accompanied, tacitly and obliquely at 
times, by its counterpart free will . For instance, the resonating echoes of "follow" suggestively 
entice Asia to her encounter with Demogorgon, "While our music, wild and sweet, / Mocks thy 
gently-felling feet, / Child of Ocean!" (II. i . 185-7). Here sub-conscious processes are so 
interconnected with the material universe that the visual content of Panthea's dream, where 
"on each leaf was stamped" (139) "O follow, follow!" (141), is audible in a waking state. The 
trance-inducing recurrence of "follow" and the way in which it is subliminally impregnated 
through both Panthea and Asia's dreams evoke a sense of compelled inevitability.30 At this 
point in the drama, Shelley seemingly assigns free choice to Asia, as shown in her question to 
Panthea, "Shall we pursue the sound?" (188). Yet even this conscious decision is subsequently 
underscored by an uninvited, seductive mellifluence: 
And first there comes a gentle sound 
To those in talk or slumber bound, 
And wakes the destined — soft emotion 
Attracts, impels them . . . . (II . i i . 48-51) 
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Even i f Asia and Panthea are initially able to evade the allure of "those inchanted eddies" 
(41), their course is motivated by the irresistible magnetism of the tempestuous crescendos 
of "The storm of sound" (59), drawing them to Demogorgon's "fetal mountain" (62). Shelley 
intricately manoeuvres his vision through the idiom of determinism to denote a collective 
vision of co-creation; free choice must be faithfully submitted to the cosmic forces that will 
bring about its enactment. Like the Poet of Alastor. who is "Obedient to the light / That 
shone within his soul" (492-3) and compelled by both external and internal energies, Asia's 
journey, to yield a transformation of her being, emanates from the dictates of her inner nature 
aligned to cosmic powers.31 Asia embarks on this grail-like quest because her "desolated 
heart" has restlessly not "learnt repose" (II . i . 4-5). The Echoes temptingly offer Asia the 
promise of re-uniting with Prometheus: "On the day when He and thou / Parted — to 
commingle now" (204). Constantly a sense of personal fulfillment is interwoven with universal 
goals. In the fourth act Love is celebrated by the Earth as the aim of Shelley's philosophic 
vision: "This true fair world of things— a Sea reflecting Love" (TV. 384). Yet even though "all 
love is sweet, / Given or returned" (II v. 39-40), in a drama where affective states are pre-
eminent and determine both perception and being, Asia reveals that the deepest experience of 
love is sought: 
They who inspire it most are fortunate 
As I am now; but those who feel it most 
Are happier still, after long sufferings 
As I shall soon become. (II . v. 44-7) 
Along this voyage, in a lyricism inspired by Panthea's musicality, Asia's spirit soars: "My 
soul is an enchanted Boat / Which, like a sleeping swan, doth float / Upon the silver waves of 
thy sweet singing" (72-4). Absolute trust is invested in the implicit power which conducts this 
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symphonic sonance: the Oceanides travel "Without a course — without a star — / But by 
the instinct of sweet Music driven" (89-90). In a hauntingly beautiful metaphor of Asia's 
voyaging soul, searching "desire" is subliminally steered: "The boat of my desire is guided — 
Realms where the air we breathe is Love" (94-5). Asia's destination, to re-unite with 
Prometheus, is achieved: conversely in the denouement of Alastor, the poet willing accepts 
death after failing to find a physical embodiment of his feminine ideal. 
Shelley's previous exploration of freedom, Laon and Cythna. fruitfully reveals 
correspondences and developments in his philosophical insights. Significantly both poems 
present heroic attempts of liberation where humanity's emancipation is envisioned as 
emanating from the internalized psychological processes of re-birth experienced by their 
protagonists: Laon and Cythna; Prometheus and Asia. In these quests Shelleyan women play a 
leading role and are invested with exemplary accomplishments: they are adventurously 
courageous, philosophically adept and embody Shelley's complex vision of love. In Prometheus 
Unbound the Spirit of the Hour defines this perfection: 
And women too, frank, beautiful and kind 
As the free Heaven which rains fresh light and dew 
On the wide earth, past: gentle, radiant forms, 
From custom's evil taint exempt and pure; 
Speaking the wisdom once they could not think, 
Looking emotions once they feared to feel 
And changed to all which once they dared not be, 
Yet being now, made Earth like Heaven—. . . . 
OH. iv. 153-60) 
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The final line registers a transformation of existence, evoking a sense of, but ultimately 
resisting, unison; the "wide earth, past" is drawn closer to "the free Heaven" through 
capitalization and simile. Here Shelley is defining fundamental changes to the state of being 
and these lines anticipate his conception of love in A Defence of Poetry: "The freedom of 
women produced the poetry of sexual love. Love became a religion . . . . The familiar 
appearance and proceedings of life became wonderful and heavenly; and a paradise was created 
as out of the wrecks of Eden" (PP, 496-7). 
Shelley praised Dante's Paradise as "a perpetual hymn of everlasting love" (PP. 497) and 
the overwhelming radiance of the Italian poet's Beatrice is implicitly woven into Shelley's 
heroines; the following adoration is equally applicable to Asia: 
Then Beatrice looked at me, her eyes 
sparkling with love and burning so divine, 
my strength of sight surrendered to her power — 
with eyes cast down, I was about to faint. 3 2 
Mark Musa cogently points out in his introduction that "Beatrice's beauty in the Paradise is 
in her words. It reveals itself through her arguments."33 Beatrice expresses Dante's divine 
vision apprehended through poetic intellection. Similarly, Asia's philosophical disquisition 
precedes and precipitates her transformation; appositely a disembodied Spirit voice hymns her 
intellectual beauty: "Life of Life! thy lips enkindle / With their love the breath between them" 
(II. v. 48-9). To reach this stage of enkindling love, Asia has confronted the bounds of 
knowledge and the depths of being. The climactic point in her search to ascertain the creative 
power that brings futurity into being occurs in the previous scene with Demogorgon's 
rhetorical address: 
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— I f the Abysm 
Could vomit forth its secrets: — but a voice 
Is wanting, the deep truth is imageless; 
For what would it avail to bid thee gaze 
On the revolving world? what to bid speak 
Fate, Time, Occasion, Chance and Change? To these 
All things are subject but eternal Love. (II . iv. 114-120) 
Frustratingly, although '*the destined hour" (128) seems certain, as it has hitherto carefully 
been constructed through Prometheus' will and compassion combined with Asia's desiring 
love, it is still lingering in the quantum realm of possible futures; its late arrival is welcomed 
by Prometheus as "long desired / And long delayed" (II I . i i i . 5-6). I f "the deep truth" refers to 
the forthcoming reality, it is "imageless" simply because it is, at this point, un-created, 
implicitly inherent yet not explicitly manifested.34 "Fate, Time, Occasion, Chance and Change" 
are philosophical concepts which gesture towards, but do not yield insight into, the very fabric 
of existence. Their failure lies in the fact that human perceptions and emotions are the catalysts 
necessary for generation with supreme value bestowed on "eternal Love." Mary Shelley 
misreads the intricacies in Shelley's creative vision with her summation that "Shelley believed 
that mankind had only to will that there should be no evil, and there would be none" (PW, 271). 
Willing against evil further energizes those negative, base emotions, and does not create a 
perfected vision of love. Whereas Shelley recognized that his "perpetual Orphic song" (TV. 
415) must realistically portray evil, he transcended its influence by envisioning and creating a 
world of love. "Eternal Love" is personified in Asia, Shelley's "Child of Light!" (II . v. 54), 3 5 
and her role in the dramatic action is pivotal: "Asia thus initiates the revolutionary crisis as she 
grasps her own agency in its processes."36 Panthea delights in Asia's transfiguration which 
she depicts as radiating from her innermost being and permeating all existence: "love, like the 
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atmosphere / Of the sun's fire filling the living world, / Burst from thee, and iUurnined Earth 
and Heaven" (26-28). From his atemporal perspective, enshrined in love, Prometheus gleans 
spiritual prescience of the future's great works of art, their forms as yet unconceived, 
And lovely apparitions dim at first 
Then radiant—as the mind, arising bright 
From the embrace of beauty (whence the forms 
Of which these are the phantoms) casts on them 
The gathered rays which are reality— 
Shall visit us, the progeny immortal 
Of Painting, Sculpture and rapt Poesy 
And arts, though unimagined, yet to be. 
GIL ii i . 49-56) 
Demogorgon has been interpreted from its Platonic connection to the "Demiourgos of the 
Timaeus" which evokes the role of creator.37 Etymologically Douka Kabitoglou sees 
Demogorgon as a "linguistic concoction for the concretization of that 'awful power' that haunts 
the Shelleyan mind — and text," and which paradoxically denotes both the divine and the 
demonic.38 In relation to creativity, Shelley's portrayal of Demogorgon as "a mighty Darkness 
/ . . .Ungazed upon and shapeless—neither limb / Nor form—nor outline" (II . iv. 2, 5=6), can 
be elucidated by Jung's understanding of the artist's visionary experience. Panthea and 
Asia's cascading descent to his volcano signifies the labyrinthine depths of unconsciousness: 
"In the depth of the Deep, / Down, down!" (II . i i i . 81-2). From a Jungian perspective 
Demogorgon's inchoate mass evokes the unstructured chaos from which art is generated: 
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the primordial experience is the source of his creativeness, but it so dark and 
amorphous that it requires the related mythological imagery to give it form. In 
itself it is wordless and imageless, for it is a vision seen "as in a glass, darkly." It 
is nothing but a tremendous intuition striving for expression. It is like a whirlwind 
that seizes everything within reach and assumes visible form as it swirls upward. 
(SMA. 96-T) 
A psychological perspective is germane in view of Shelley's poetic technique: "The imagery 
which I have employed will be found in many instances to have been drawn from the 
operations of the human mind" (PP. 133). But Shelley's awareness of his creativity is more 
inclusively defined as a dual process, combined with '^ those external actions by which they 
are expressed" (PP. 133). In this vein "Poets . . . are in one sense the creators and in another 
the creations of their age" (PP. 135). A pre-publication review in The London Magazine (June, 
1820) aptly registers the drama's socio-political contemporaneity: 
This poem is more completely the child of the Time than almost any other modem 
production: it seems immediately sprung from the throes of the great intellectual, 
political, and moral labour o f nations. Like the Time, its parent, too, it is 
unsettled, irregular, but magnificent.39 
The examination of specific historical events is not a central issue in this thesis: the main 
focus is on the latent energies of thoughts and emotions which precede and precipitate 
revolutionary changes.40 Shelley focuses on awakening the origins of transformation, "the 
legioned hopes / Which sleep within folded Elysian flowers" (II . iv. 59-60). Michael O'Neill's 
contextualist reading of Shelley's artistic life justly identifies the complex dynamics in his 
creativity. He sees Shelley as "highly sensitised to underlying social and political forces at 
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work in his culture," with this awareness resulting in greater "emphasis on the imagination 
as a means of transforming consciousness" (LL, 7). It is the later consideration that is central 
to my interpretation, especially in relation to Shelley's suggestion of a material transfiguration, 
enacted through the "Dreams and the light imaginings of men / And all that faith creates, or 
love desires" (I . 200-1). In accord with the drama's humanism the Promethean world is 
geocentric. Asia's apostrophe exalts the beauty of the physical world: "Fit throne for such a 
Power! Magnificent! / How glorious art thou, Earth!" (U. i l l . 11-12). Throughout Prometheus 
Unbound the Earth is appositely the physical dimension which grounds imaginative visions by 
bringing them into being. 
The Aeschylean precedent, Prometheus Bound is influential in advocating the primacy 
of thought to Shelley: Aeschylus's Prometheus is depicted as a "god of mountainous 
thoughts"41 whose physical anguish partly emanates from emotional turmoil: 4<thought and 
anger gnaw my heart, / To see myself so outraged."42 However Shelley is not attempting a 
restoration of "the lost drama of iEschylus" but a vision that encompasses "the highest 
perfection of moral and intellectual nature, impelled by the purest and truest motives to the best 
and noblest ends" (PP. 133). To accomplish this ideal Shelley develops a metaphysics in which 
the most emotively driven vision, conceived with the utmost clarity of thought, determines 
reality. Yeats' remark that he has "re-read Prometheus Unbound . . . as a sacred book" which 
deserves inclusion "among the sacred books of the world" 4 3 recognizes in Shelley's poetics a 
divine vision. And perhaps what Shelley considered his, as yet, unfulfilled ambition of "a great 
work, embodying the discoveries of all ages, & harmonizing the contending creeds by which 
mankind have been ruled", (LS I I , 71) is achieved in Prometheus Unbound: 
As thought by thought is piled, t i l l some great truth 
Is loosened, and the nations echo round 
Shaken to their roots: as do the mountains now. (II . i i i . 40-2) 
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Freedom depends on the cumulative effect of thoughts and Shelley's 1820 volume scatters 
multiple images of their generation in an attempt to disseminate his vision. In the "Ode to the 
West Wind" Shelley impels the elements: "Drive my dead thoughts over the universe / Like 
withered leaves to quicken a new birth!" (63-4). An embryonic development is suggested in the 
"Ode to Liberty" where Shelley wonders whether "power in thought be as the tree within the 
seed?"(248). In her "Note on Prometheus Unbound". Mary Shelley encapsulates the profound 
basis of Shelley's poetic vision: "He considered these philosophical views of Mind and Nature 
instinct with the intensest spirit of poetry" (PW. 272). 
Reading "his written soul" ostensibly refers to Asia's communication from Prometheus, yet 
it has equal relevance to Shelley's ideas on creativity, where great writers exhibit 'the 
uncommunicated lightning of their own mind" (PP, 134). In a Defence of Poetry Shelley 
conceded that poets are "compelled to serve, the Power which is seated upon the throne of their 
own soul" (PP. 508). A slight variation of this conception appears earlier in A Philosophical 
View of Reform (1819).4 4 What depth of understanding is Shelley demanding from his 
readers? Encapsulated in a prefatory comment is the Promethean goal for self-regeneration: 
until the mind can love, and admire, and trust, and hope, and endure, reasoned 
principles of moral conduct are seeds cast upon the highway of life which the 
unconscious passenger tramples into dust, although they would bear the harvest of 
his happiness. (PP. 135) 
To be a conscious "passenger" is to have an epiphanic realization that the mythic drama places 
the reader in a self-relationship with Shelley's regenerative principles. Accordingly a "highly 
refined imagination" (PP. 135) is quintessential, one that has capacious responsiveness to 
engage with the ultimate ideals of "Wisdom, Justice, Love and Peace," 0 796). It is in this 
sense that Prometheus Unbound "is written only for the elect" (LS I I , 200), those readers who 
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choose to enter into creative dialogue with the drama. Sir William Drummond, who visited the 
Shelleys in Italy in 1819 (SP, 486) and whose Academical Questions influenced Shelley's 
thought, conceived that the imagination was the channel which influenced the inner spiritual 
life: "it is the faculty of imagination, which carries our thoughts beyond the limits of existence, 
which pleases the soul with phantastic visions, or which affrights it with ideal terrors" (AQ, 3-
4). In A Defence of Poetry Shelley cogently defines an intense empathetic engagement, so 
vividly apprehended that it is woven into the reader's own psyche: "A man, to be greatly 
good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively . . . the pains and pleasures of his species 
must become his own" (PP. 487-8). With this degree of mental and emotional impregnation 
fundamental changes occur in the nature of perception: "Every man's mind is . . . modified by 
all the objects of nature and art, by every word and every suggestion which he ever admitted to 
act upon his consciousness; it is the mirror upon which all forms are reflected, and in which 
they compose one form" (PP. 135). What distinguishes Shelley's vision is the view that 
interiority determines external experiences in the world. Prometheus's curse of Jupiter conveys 
this inevitability: "let the hour / Come, when thou must appear to be / That which thou art 
internally" (I . 297-9). 
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Freedom precipitates a cosmic realignment and the drama registers atmospheric changes in 
anticipation of an emotional deluge from "The clouds that are heavy with Love's sweet rain" 
(TV. 179). Act IV gives a resounding affirmation to Shelley's ultimate question in his "Ode to 
the West Wind": " I f Winter comes, can Spring be far behind?" (70). Once regeneration has 
occurred on the metaphysical level it has cosmic reverberations with an "unexpected birth" (TV. 
360) as in the Moon's joy: "The snow upon my lifeless mountains / Is loosened into living 
fountains" (TV. 356-7). To date, both Heideggerian and quantum concepts of holism have 
197 
been discussed to illustrate the depth and consequences of Shelley's vision. However the 
monistic philosophy of Spinoza had a specific influence in shaping Shelley's views on the 
nature of existence and merits consideration in regard to his ideas on love.43 
Shelley expressed his admiration for Spinoza in A Philosophical View of Reform, citing 
him with Lord Bacon, and Montaigne as among the "great luminaries of the preceding epoch" 
(Julian VJJ, 9). In a note to Queen Mab Shelley denies that there is any evidence to support the 
Christian concept of a personal God: "an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent being" (PW. 814). 
His theory of the divine is an impersonal, permeating force, "a generative power" (PW. 814). 
The note opens with the controversial assertion that: 
There is no God. 
This negation must be understood solely to affect a creative Deity. The hypothesis 
of a pervading Spirit coeternal with the universe remains unshaken. (PW. 812) 
A "pervading Spirit coeternal with the universe" perfectly encapsulates Spinoza's pantheist 
vision where he proclaims the centrality of God as inherent in all creation: "since nothing can 
be or be conceived without God, it is certain that all things in nature involve and express the 
concept of God, in proportion to their essence and perfection."46 There appears to be a 
fundamental distinction between Spinoza's all-pervasive insistence on God and Shelley's total 
rejection of God. However, this is more a question of terminology than a conceptual difference. 
One of Shelley's pencilled annotations to Spinoza identifies the divine as synonymous with the 
cosmos: "God & Nature / the Same."47 One of the most significant parallels between Spinoza 
and Shelley, which originates from the concept of a divine permeating presence, is the far 
reaching claims made for the human mind. Although it is probable, but not certain, that Shelley 
was familiar with The Ethics.48 it is interesting to compare their accounts of the divinity of the 
human mind. Spinoza's axiomatic pursuit of truth posits the corollary: "that the human mind is 
part of the infinite intellect of God 4 9 Whereas Spinoza exalts the concept of God, depicting 
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human thought as a revelation of the divine "intellect of God", Shelley's humanist vision 
bestows divine attributes on humanity. A Refutation of Deism argues that: 
There is no attribute of God which is not either borrowed from the passions and 
powers of the human mind, or which is not a negation. Omniscience, 
Omnipotence, Omnipresence, Infinity, Immutability, Incomprehensibility, and 
Immateriality, are all words which designate properties and powers peculiar to 
organized beings. (PWS, 120) 
A distillation of Shelley's expression of an interpenetration of life and world is captured in 
the trochaic rhythms of "Love's Philosophy", a lyric written for Sophia Stacey: 
The fountains mingle with the river 
And the rivers with the Ocean, 
The winds of Heaven mix for ever 
With a sweet emotion; 
Nothing in the world is single; 
All things by a law divine 
In one spirit meet and mingle. 
Why not I with thine?— (PW, 1-8) 
Compositionally the poem is a hybrid; it combines elements of the metaphysical erotic lyric 
with a pantheist philosophy that is lucidly expressed. An all-embracing notion of wholeness is 
achieved by suffusing elements in the natural world with the human attribute of "sweet 
emotion." The eroticism in Shelley's "law divine" is diametrically opposed to Spinoza's 
spiritual aspiration which excludes sensual love. Like Plato, Spinoza elevates love beyond the 
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world of sense, "toward the eternal and infinite",50 he depicts sexual enjoyment as a distraction 
which "thoroughly confuses and dulls the mind."" This divisive sundering of the spiritual and 
sensual planes of existence is antipathetic to Shelleyan love which desires to interconnect the 
totality of being: 5 2 love is "the universal thirst for a communion not merely of the senses, but of 
our whole nature, intellectual, imaginative and sensitive" (PS, 408). Having philosophically 
established a cosmic scene of magnetic attraction, Shelley cleverly solicits an amorous 
embrace: 
See the mountains kiss high Heaven 
And the waves clasp one another; 
No sister-flower would be forgiven 
If it disdained its brother; 
And the sunlight clasps the earth 
And the moonbeams kiss the sea: 
What is all this sweet work worth 
If thou kiss not me? (PW, 9-16) 
Lyrically the poem moves towards a question persuasively formulated, yet delicately 
proffered. Shelley culminates with a note that intimates a coy, tantalizing resistance. 
Resistance is untenable in Prometheus' regenerated universe where a holistic vision of 
existence interpenetrates the Promethean "new world of man" (IV. 157): 
But now —oh weave the mystic measure 
Of music and dance and shapes of light, 
Let the Hours, and the Spirits of might and pleasure 
Like the clouds and sunbeams unite. (77-80) 
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"Unite" resonates as Shelley poetically establishes a level of cosmic inter-involvement that is 
best apprehended through metaphorical analogy. In accord with drama's mythical spirit, 
Heidegger's aesthetic thinking yields a deeper understanding of cosmic consanguinity. For 
Heidegger, being intermeshes in an "appropriating mirror-play of the simple onefold of earth 
and sky, divinities and mortals, we call the world" (PVT. 179).53 These elements, designated as 
'*the fourfold", are indivisible and therefore "strangled in their essential nature when we think 
of them only as separate realities" (PUT. 180). To encapsulate a unifying presence Heidegger 
moves beyond the compound hyphenated expressions that dominated Being and Time, to a 
more poetic emphasis which, at times, suggests an implicit eroticism; "the four" are 
"betrothed, each to the other in simple oneness" (PUT. 180). Poetically Shelley "often uses 
intersense analogies as though they partook of an ultimate unity or harmony",54 as in the stage 
direction when Prometheus kisses the earth and his cosmic embrace inspirits regeneration: 
I hear—I feel— 
Thy lips are on me, and their touch runs down 
Even to the adamantine central gloom 
Along these marble nerves—'tis life, 'tis joy. 
(IH. i i i . 84-7) 
Unity in Shelley's vision is created and sustained through love as seen with the Moon's 
ecstatic rejoicing, '"Tis Love, all Love!" (IV. 369). The Earth is reinvigorated as love suffuses 
every particle of existence:55 
It interpenetrates my granite mass, 
Through tangled roots and trodden clay doth pass 
Into the utmost leaves and delicatest flowers; 
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Upon the winds, among the clouds 'tis spread. (IV. 370-3) 
This chapter has explored Shelley's ideas on love and creativity and the philosophical 
implications that they raise concerning the nature of existence. I have read Prometheus 
Unbound as a multi-dimensional drama that operates on all planes of being: spiritual, 
imaginative, intellectual, emotional, and sensuous. It is by means of achieving this level of 
communication and depth of experience, that Shelley's drama seeks to infiltrate and engage the 
reader's emotions in a universal empathy: 'Till the world is wrought / To sympathy with hopes 
and fears it heeded not" ('To a Sky-Lark", 39-40). 
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Chapter 7 
Unveiling the "Unborn Hour": Shelley's Creative Vision of Futurity in Hellas 
How wonderful! that even 
The passions, prejudices, interests. 
That sway the meanest being, the weak touch 
That moves the finest nerve. 
And in one human brain 
Causes the faintest thought, becomes a link 
In the great chain of nature. 
(Queen Mab II, J 02-8) 
Hopes of high talk with the departed dead. 
("Hymn to Intellectual Beauty", 52) 
I 
Hellas is a dynamic adventure in consciousness "which pierces / The present, and the past, and 
the to-come" (147-8). The drama emerges as a climactic statement of Shelley's ideas about the 
impact of thought on the state of being and offers a conception of existence which confronts 
the limits of comprehension. In a similar way to Ahasuerus' profound effect on the Turkish 
tyrant, Mahmud, Shelley's "words stream like a tempest / Of dazzling mist within" (786-7) the 
reader's mind. Greece's struggle for liberation evokes "intense sympathy" (PP, 408) in Shelley 
which he effectively channels into an artistic vision that is "insusceptible of being treated 
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otherwise than lyrically" (PP. 408). Like Prometheus Unbound, with its Aeschylean precedent 
Hellas is also a generic hybrid, initially influenced by "The Persae of ^ischylus" (PP. 408). 
The "Preface" to Hellas celebrates the pervasive cultural inheritance from classical 
Greece: "We are all Greeks — our laws, our literature, our religion, our arts have their root in 
Greece" (PP. 409). Undoubtedly the most significant legacy from Greece, outlined in Shelley's 
"Prologue to Hellas", is the ever-living presence of "Plato's sacred light" (PW. 94). Hellas is 
the artistic culmination of an intense period of translation and re-reading of Plato, whose 
metaphysical concepts became deeply assimilated within Shelley's poetic vision. Indeed when 
Hellas was nearing completion Shelley attributed his inspiration to two major sources: " I read 
the Greek dramatists & Plato forever" (LS IT, 364). However, it is not the similarity with 
Plato's ideas that I wish to address, but a significant deviation: Shelley's idea that thoughts, 
when empowered by intense emotion, can enact a transformation in the world. In their 
introduction to The "Hellas" Notebook Donald Reiman and Michael Neth comment that "a 
strong case can be made that in fact the drama is a carefully structured, profound meditation on 
the nature of human perception and the mind's power to affect physical reality" (HN. p. 
xxxiv). This chapter examines the extent of this "strong case" of "the mind's power to affect 
physical reality" and suggests that Shelley's philosophical views have a remarkable prescience 
in relation to David Bohm's theories about the participatory nature of thought and its implicit 
function in the structure of reality. 
Shelley's insights on the creative power of thought are appropriately elicited in Platonic 
style; a dialogical pursuit to ascertain the nature of existence. As protagonist and antagonist, 
Shelley chose two powerful adversaries: Ahasuerus, whose supremacy emanates from his 
command of thought, and Mahmud who wields political power. Their dialectic is portrayed as a 
monumental interchange in a meeting which conveys an intimation of fatalism since it occurs 
"When the omnipotent hour to which are yoked / He, I , and all things shall compel" (189-90). 
Shelley's choice of "omnipotent hour" emerged from studied consideration; the cancellations in 
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drafting, one of which is illegible, suggest that it was a difficult passage to achieve artistically. 
The rejection of "stormy hour" and most possibly "[?whirlwind]", (HN. E . 7, p. 88, 20, 19) 
shows Shelley searching for a more portentous expression. In the intercourse between 
Ahasuerus and Mahmud the reader's sympathies are manipulated by Shelley's overt value-
judgments: Ahasuerus' ingenuity, suggested by a "dazzling mist" (787), elicits approval, 
whilst the "sulphurous mist" (829) of Mahmud's clouded perceptions evokes censure. That 
Shelley intended to portray Ahasuerus' conceptions as brilliant is substantiated by his first 
contemplation "Of radiant mist" (HN. E . 7, p. 115, 18). 
Ahasuerus is presented as a mystical figure with arcane wisdom, his "spirit is a chronicle / 
Of strange and secret and forgotten things" (133-4). Unlike Mahmud he is not bounded by the 
concept of time: "from his eye looks forth / A life of unconsumed thought which pierces / The 
present, and the past, and the to-come" (146-8). Here Ahasuerus upholds Shelley's 
"presumption that eternity is the inheritance of every thinking being" (PW, 479). Ahasuerus 
appears virtually as unbounded consciousness which is implicit in the scheme of creation. In a 
succession of elemental images Shelley confronts the notion of human autonomy: 
The hoary mountains and the wrinkled ocean 
Seem younger still than he—his hair and beard 
Are whiter than the tempest-sifted snow. 
His cold pale limbs and pulseless arteries 
Are like the fibres of a cloud instinct 
With light, and to the soul that quickens them 
Are as the atoms of the mountain-drift 
To the winter wind—. . . . (139-46) 
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The linguistic construction of this passage draws attention to its patterned style: the 
syntactical repetition of similes, enjambment and minimal punctuation all contrive to effect an 
integration which signifies Ahasuerus's indivisibility from the world. The incorporeal imagery 
collapses any distinction between nature and consciousness. Shelley's confluence of the 
atmospheric and spiritual, combined with his interest in atomization, shows a microcosmic 
delving into the nature of creation. It is as i f Shelley accounts for, and sees the relevance of, 
every particle of existence; even the smallest life forms are important elements of an 
interrelated whole. Ahasuerus tells Mahmud that "The Fathomless has care for meaner things / 
Than thou canst dream" (763-4). In a letter to Hogg, 3 January 1811, Shelley had 
enthusiastically advanced a similar theory: 
I may not be able to adduce proofs, but I think that the leaf of a tree, the meanest 
insect on wh. we trample are in themselves more conclusive than any which can be 
adduced that some vast intellect animates Infinity—If we disbelieve this, the 
strongest argument in support of the existence of a future state instantly becomes 
annihilated. (LS. I , 35) 
Ahasuerus fuses many branches of knowledge in his apprehension of existence; one of which is 
that of a quasi- mathematical and scientific analysis. Mahmud praises this erudition: 
Thou art an adept in the difficult lore 
Of Greek and Frank philosophy; thou numberest 
The flowers, and thou measurest the stars; 
Thou severest element from element. (741-44) 
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Ahasuerus is the dynamic enactment of Shelley's philosophical ideas, personifying limitless 
potentiality. The plurality of identities etched upon Ahasuerus' consciousness endorses 
Shelley's belief that individuality of a single consciousness is not a meaningful explication of 
human existence. Indeed Ahasuerus's character is that of a multi-dimensional being, possessed 
of an inner wisdom and power. The following passage invites speculation concerning 
Ahasuerus' origins: 
Some say that this is he whom the great prophet 
Jesus, the Son of Joseph, for his mockery 
Mocked with the curse of immortality.— 
Some feign that he is Enoch —others dream 
He was preadamite and has survived 
Cycles of generation and of ruin. (149-54) 
This mysterious portrayal provokes questions as to Ahasuerus's literary antecedents, and 
indicates how he is a composite delineation of ideas that had been fermenting in Shelley's 
consciousness since his earliest writings. In the previously cited letter to Hogg, 3 January 1811, 
Shelley declares: " I confess that I think Pope's 'all are but parts of one tremendous whole' 
something more than Poetry, it has ever been my favourite theory" (LS I , 35). Noticeably 
Shelley's citation does not include the second line of this couplet, almost certainly because of 
the word "God", which the young radical felt "has been [and] will continue to be the source of 
numberless errors until it is erased from the nomenclature of Philosophy" (LS I , 35). But a 
close examination of Alexander Pope's dictum in An Essay on Man suggests that an 
interpretation could be reached of a divine implicit power that is consonant with Shelley's 
belief in a universal soul. Pope rhymes his precept thus: "All are but parts of one stupendous 
whole, / Whose body Nature is, and God the soul."1 The first Epistle of Pope's An Essay on 
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Man, entitled "Of the Nature and State of Man with respect to the UNIVERSE", addresses one 
of Shelley's lifelong concerns, humanity's indivisible place in the scheme of creation.2 The 
following wittily constructed couplet has a philosophical base that would have been attractive 
to Shelley, and is in accord with Ahasuerus' visionary experience. "He, who through vast 
immensity can pierce, / See worlds on worlds compose one universe."3 However, although Pope 
and Shelley are both concerned with humanity's place in the scheme of creation, Shelley 
conceives of a dynamically creative role for humanity, whereas Pope vindicates God's justice. 
The dissolution of boundaries between Ahasuerus' characteristics and the natural world 
exemplifies Shelley's idea of "reverie" in On Life. With this experience people "feel as i f 
their nature were dissolved into the surrounding universe, or as i f the surrounding universe 
were absorbed into their being" (PP. 477). The synthesis of self and world is a metaphorical 
expression that appears physically plausible in Bohm's quantum view of existence where he 
posits "a new notion of unbroken wholeness, in which consciousness is no longer to be 
fundamentally separated from matter" (WIO. 197). For Shelley a union of what are commonly 
perceived as subjective and objective states of being, provides a credible basis to develop 
Ahasuerus' quasi-mystical powers. With such an affinity to nature, Ahasuerus can 
communicate through, and even control, the elements. Questing applicants, who desire an 
audience with Ahasuerus, must look for signs in nature: 
I f his prayer 
Be granted, a faint meteor will arise 
Lighting him over Marmora, and a wind 
Will rush out of the sighing pine forest 
And with the wind a storm of harmony 
Unutterably sweet, and pilot him 
Through the soft twilight to the Bosphorus: 
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Thence at the hour and place and circumstance 
Fit for the matter of their conference 
The Jew appears (175-84) 
Here, Ahasuerus' Prospero-like powers are quasi-divine, and in fundamental conflict with 
Mahmud's Islamic view of creation which avows that "It is God who drives the winds that stir 
the clouds" and "has power over all things."4 A penetrating study into '*the relationship between 
matter and consciousness," discussed in earlier chapters and of relevance to Hellas, is Danah 
Zohar's quantum perspective "which promises to bring us back into partnership with the 
universe" (OS. 1). Zohar's following contention has a specific relevance to Shelley's idea of a 
continuum between being and world as expressed in Hellas: 
We are, in our essential being, made of the same stuff and held together by the 
same dynamics as those which account for everything else in the universe. And 
equally, which brings out the enormity of this realization, the universe is made of 
the same stuff and held together by the same dynamics as those which account for 
us. (QS, 83) 
This realization that the human beings are chemically equivalent with the world, and 
interconnected "by the same dynamics", appears to be implicitly woven into the depiction of 
Ahasuerus and, perhaps, provides the key to Shelley's suggestion of thought transference. 
Thoughts can be communicated telepathically to Ahasuerus, as Hassan informs Mahmud: 
Thy will is even now 
Made known to him, where he dwells in a sea cavern 
Mid the Demonesi, less accessible 
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Than thou or God! . . . (162-4) 
Ahasuerus is ethereally presented and barely personified. Yet, his depiction in Hellas is 
complex and also paradoxically affirms his humanity as Mahmud's assertion shows, "Thou 
art a man" (738). Ahasuerus, the wandering Jew, figured in Shelley's literary consciousness 
from his earliest writings. In Queen Mab (1813) Shelley's portrayal of Ahasuerus was 
virtually incorporeal: "a wondrous phantom" whose "inessential figure cast no shade / Upon 
the golden floor" (VII. 64, 71-2). In the much later composition the depiction of Ahasuerus is 
far more sophisticated. One of Shelley's notes to Hellas reveals the subtlety with which he 
sought to portray him: 
I could easily have made the Jew a regular conjuror, and the Phantom an ordinary 
ghost. I have preferred to represent the Jew as disclaiming all pretension, or even 
belief, in supernatural agency, and as tempting Mahmud to that state of mind in 
which ideas may be supposed to assume the force of sensations through the 
confusion of thought with the objects of thought, and the excess of passion 
animating the creations of imagination. (PW, 479 n. 6) 
Shelley's disavowal of a "supernatural agency" suggests that Ahasuerus' powers are somehow 
within the possibility of human potential. Here, in '*the confusion of thought with the objects of 
thought," Shelley dissolves the boundaries of subjective and objective reality, and offers a 
resolution to the Cartesian schism between mind and matter. "Confusion" is appropriately 
employed in its rarer meaning of intermixing, or coalescence.5 David Bohm's understanding of 
the impact of thought on the whole state of being cogently exemplifies the underlying dynamics 
in Shelley's suggestion that "ideas may be supposed to assume the force of sensations." For 
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Bohm 'bought is never just thought, it's also the bodily state, the feeling, the nerves. Whatever 
is going on in the intellectual part connects with everything else."6 
Although Shelley advanced the notion of unity between self and world in On Life, he 
asserted that the mind had limited potential: it "cannot create, it can only perceive" (PP. 478). 
But his note to Hellas beguilingly proposes that thought is vitally creative when empowered 
by emotive feelings, with "the excess of passion animating the creations of imagination." This 
creative vision is also evident in Prometheus Unbound where Shelley validates an ontological 
consequence for emotional cognition with the hypostatization of the Furies.7 
Pivotal to Plato's hierarchical philosophy of reality is the pre-eminence accorded to the 
intellectual realm of ideas. Hellas also privileges eternal ideas over current forms by 
celebrating the "chrystalline sea / Of thought and its eternity" (698-9). However, Shelley's 
poetic vision is a creative appropriation of Platonic philosophy; the world depicted in Hellas is 
not an immutable "realm of the pure and everlasting and immortal and changeless,"8 but 
created moment by moment through successive energy cycles of destruction and renewal: 
Worlds on worlds are rolling ever 
From creation to decay, 
Like the bubbles on a river 
Sparkling, bursting, borne away. 
But they are still immortal 
Who through Birth's orient portal 
And Death's dark chasm hurrying to and fro, 
Clothe their unceasing flight 
In the brief dust and light 
Gathered around their chariots as they go; 
New shapes they still may weave, 
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New Gods, new Laws receive, 
Bright or dim are they as the robes they last 
On Death's bare ribs had cast. (197-210) 
Shelley explains his philosophical ideas in this stanza as one of contrast between "the 
immortality of the living thinking beings which . . . clothe themselves in matter, with the 
transience of the noblest manifestations of the external world" (PP. 416 n. 4). What 
distinguishes Shelley's thought is the presentation of immortality in continual activity: 
"Sparkling, bursting, borne away. / But they are still immortal." A valid approximation to 
Shelley's concept can be found in Bohm's "implicate" and "explicate" paradigms of reality, 
outlined in Chapter One. These interrelated orders have a dynamic relationship of ceaseless 
manifestation and dissolution, and form a totality which Bohm terms "Undivided Wholeness in 
Flowing Movement" (WIO. 11). 
Plato's account of creation in the Timaeus devalued human emotion as an inevitable part 
of mortality where "terrible and necessary feelings" give rise to '*two foolish counsellors, 
obstinate passion and credulous hope."9 Conversely in Shelley's metaphysics "hope" is 
quintessential for the regeneration of Greece: "Through the sunset of Hope / Like the shapes 
of a dream / What Paradise islands of glory gleam!" (1050-2). Moreover "passion" does not 
obscure reality, but is the generative power which facilitates its enactment. Whereas Platonism 
aspires to transcend the world-of sense, Shelley elevates human emotion to a quasi-divine level. 
A significant Romantic precedent is found in Blake's A Vision of The Last Judgment (1810): 
Men are admitted into Heaven not because they have curbed & govern'd their 
Passions or have No Passions, but because they have Cultivated their 
Understandings. The Treasures of Heaven are not the Negations of Passion, but 
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Realities of Intellect, from which all the Passions Emanate Uncurbed in their 
Eternal Glory.10 
In Hellas Ahasuerus likewise explains an intricately dynamic relationship between thought and 
emotion, the combination of which unfolds the world's destiny: 
Thought 
Alone, and its quick elements, Will, Passion, 
Reason, Imagination, cannot die; 
They are, what that which they regard, appears, 
The stuff whence mutability can weave 
All that it hath dominion o'er, worlds, worms, 
Empires and superstitions . . . (795-801) 
To make "Thought" the principal determinant of futurity is a far reaching claim and suggests 
a mutable world in a state of continual recreation.This creative process is delineated to 
encompass all levels of existence, both physical and mental: "worlds, worms, / Empires and 
superstitions." In the heavily cancelled drafting of this lines, Shelley frequently revised the 
linguistic organization and on three occasions tried to incorporate "Passion" immediately 
following "Thought": 
thought alone 
Passion, art,-
And—its [?inform1 [pel 
Passion and will 
And its [? im-me] 
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P assion & will & roason 
And its quick elements , sense, passion will. 
( W U . 7, p. 116, 1-7) 
This persistent rearrangement further supports the prominence of "Passion" in Shelley's 
conception of the "animating principle" outlined above. Comparing Shelley's expression of a 
creative involvement between "thought," "passion" and the material world with Bohm's ideas 
shows a demonstrable correspondence concerning an interpenetration of being and world. 
Bohm cogently expresses his notion of the totality of existence as an interconnected field: 
in some sense, consciousness (which we take to include thought, feeling, desire, 
will, etc.) is to be comprehended in terms of the implicate order, along with reality 
as a whole. That is to say, we are suggesting that the implicate order applies both 
to matter (living and non-living) and to consciousness, and that it can therefore 
make possible a general relationship of these two, from which we may be able to 
come to some notion of a common ground of both . . . (WIO. 196) 
William Drummond's Academical Questions has been shown to influence Shelley's 
conceptions and what is most insistent in his vision is that mind is at the mercy of deep 
emotions because "There is no power, by which men can create, or destroy their feelings" (AO, 
21). Similarly, Shelley declares that we cannot consciously determine whether to feel emotion 
because "Thoughts and feelings arise, with or without our will" (PP. 475). The central 
importance of emotion in Shelley's philosophical view was evident in his earliest speculations. 
Queen Mab provides a remarkable metaphysical and quasi-scientific analysis of existence. 
Shelley's vision probes deeply into the origins of creation and accredits a degree of sentient 
consciousness to every atom in the universe: 
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Throughout this varied and eternal world 
Soul is the only element; the block 
That for uncounted ages has remained 
The moveless pillar of a mountain's weight 
Is active, living spirit. Every grain 
Is sentient both in unity and part. 
And the minuest atom comprehends 
A world of loves and hatreds; these beget 
Evil and good: hence truth and falsehood spring; 
Hence will and thought and action, all the germs 
Of pain and pleasure, sympathy of hate, 
That variegate the eternal universe. (IV. 139-50) 
(emphasis added) 
When read in the light of Bohm's theories the underlined section comes into sharper focus. 
One of Bohm's most radically contentious perceptions about the structure of reality, discussed 
in Chapter One, "A Poetics of Being", is his teleological view that "meaning is the essence of 
reality" (01. 441)." Bohm's conception ranges from the upper echelons of evolved human 
consciousness down to the smallest cosmic particles.12 As Weber suggests, Bohm's view of 
reality, where life is implicitly meaningful, is "a beautiful and poetic metaphor" (QI. 443). Yet 
this teleological account is simultaneously his considered philosophic evaluation and the 
significance to this thesis lies in the way his view of reality illuminates Shelley's speculation 
that "Every grain / Is sentient both in unity and part." Both Shelley's microscopic analysis and 
Bohm's subatomic investigations seek to uncover deeper levels of reality, and the universal 
motivation, or in Shelleyan terms "animating" (PW. 479) principle that determines the way in 
which life unfolds. Greater relevance to these theoretical insights occurs by analyzing the way 
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in which Shelley's poetic conception, "Nought is but that which feels itself to be" (785), 
operates in Hellas. 
In Shelley's portrayal of Mahmud there is a development in his character towards a more 
sentient level of being. Initially Mahmud's suggests that he would be willing to change his 
fundamental nature to mirror Ahasuerus, but considers this an impossible act: " I honour thee, 
and would be what thou art / Were I not what I am" (751-2). The invocation of "thou" and 
"thee" in Mahmud's address suggests a sense of veneration, but also creates distance and 
highlights the chasm between the two men. From Bohm's theoretical understanding of being, 
it can be deduced that Mahmud "doesn't choose his meanings; he is his meanings" (QI. 439). 
Consequently Mahmud acts with fundamental Islamic values; values which have been 
continually rewoven into his experience and conditioned his perceptions of the world. As Bohm 
states: "What is the culture but a whole set of meanings? I f you change the meaning, you have 
changed the culture. I f you change the meaning of life to the individual, he is different" (QI, 
438). Central to Ahasuerus's manipulation of events in Hellas is the way in which he exploits 
thoughts and emotive feelings to undermine Mahmud's perception of events and "change the 
meaning of life" to him. Shelley defines Ahasuerus' power thus: 
It is a sort of natural magic, susceptible of being exercised in a degree by any one 
who should have made himself master of the secret associations of another's 
thoughts. (PW, 479 n. 6) 
How should Ahasuerus' role in the drama be interpreted? Certainly he is pivotal. 
Although, as the Third Messenger relates, omens besiege Mahmud, "Ominous signs / Are 
blazoned broadly on the noonday sky" (601-2), Mahmud is in a state of mental impasse 
without Ahasuerus' guidance. Indeed, even the grave is yielding the dead to show Mahmud that 
his fate is one of "oblivion" (451), sealed by "The tempest of the Omnipotence of God / Which 
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sweeps all things to their appointed doom" (449-50). Mahmud realizes that he rules a "sinking 
Empire" (459), yet he is still nescient of the complex web of existence. Herein lies Ahasuerus' 
dramatic function. He is a metaphysician, or supreme spiritual teacher, who is aware of the 
universal laws emanating from the interrelatedness of all existence. 
Ahasuerus' dialogue with Mahmud is a psychological battle through which he exacts a 
cataclysmic deconstruction of Mahmud's fundamental assumptions about the nature of the 
world and creates "Doubt, insecurity, astonishment" (791). Significantly Ahasuerus' 
revelations not only "shake / The earth on which" (787-8) Mahmud stands, they also undermine 
the actual solidity of the universe and expose the fragility of existing structures, "This 
firmament pavilioned upon chaos" (772). In the "Prologue to Hellas" the sovereign power of 
"Hierarchs and kings" is likewise precariously balanced, being "Pavilioned on the radiance or 
the gloom / Of mortal thought" (PW. 7, 10-11). This chaotic creation of destiny is 
encapsulated by Semichorous I I , preceding Ahasuerus and Mamud's dramatic encounter: 
The world's eyeless charioteer, 
Destiny, is hurrying by! 
What faith is crushed, what empire bleeds 
Beneath her earthquake-footed steeds? 
What eagle winged victory sits 
At her right hand? what shadow flits 
Before? what splendour rolls behind? 
Ruin and Renovation cry 
"Who but we?" (711-19) 
Here Shelley portrays an unpredictable randomness about events as "Destiny" is carelessly 
driven by an "eyeless charioteer"; hence uncertainty prevails as to whether the future will be 
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one of "Ruin" or "Renovation." The element of chance as the major determinant in creation 
is in direct contrast to Mahmud's view where destiny is controlled by divine power when 
"God brings the Creation into being."13 Shelley's innovative vision of an "eyeless charioteer" 
can be further illuminated by distinguishing between the competing world views of the old 
and new physics: the classical Newtonian laws have predictability and a mechanistic 
determination; some quantum theories (contrary to Bohm's ideas outlined earlier), such as 
"the Bohr-Heisenberg view of indeterminacy," offer no certainties as they suggest that '*the 
foundation of reality itself is an unfixed, indeterminate maze of probabilities" (QS. 12). In 
Hellas Shelley negotiates between these conceptual paradigms of causal predictability and 
complete indeterminacy by assigning potential to the human mind for transforming reality and 
disestablishing tyranny. Hence the "charioteer" is "eyeless" because he drives a "Destiny" that 
unfolds from the coagulation of competing thoughts and emotive visions, the strongest of which 
manifests. 
In a psychological strategy, carefully wrought by Ahasuerus, Mahmud succumbs to his 
supremacy of thought with his admission that "Thy words / Have power on me! —1 see—" 
(811-12). Mahmud experiences an anguished acquiescence; he is "Vexed by the wise mad talk 
of the old Jew" (919). In Hellas true power is not invested in destructive tyrannies where 
"Blood is the seed of gold" (248). Indeed, however seemingly apparent is Mahmud's success, 
he is led to realize the inevitability of "How what was born in blood must die—" (811). 
Ahasuerus' lesson is explicit: 
Thou may'st now learn how the full tide of power 
Ebbs to its depths.— Inheritor of glory, 
Conceived in darkness, born in blood, and nourished 
With tears and toil, thou see'st the mortal throes 
Of that whose birth was but the same. The Past 
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Now stands before thee like an Incarnation 
Of the To-come (848-54) 
That which is ill-begotten, "Conceived in darkness," is inevitably doomed; hence the cry of 
"Victory! Victory!" is a temporary aberration: "Weak lightning before darkness! poor faint 
smile / Of dying Islam" (914-16). It is an immutable law of the creative cycle that empires 
arising from death and destruction have unstable foundations and are ultimately vanquished: 
For 
Revenge and wrong bring forth their kind, 
The foul cubs like their parents are, 
Their den is in the guilty mind 
And Conscience feeds them with despair.— (728-32) 
Mary Shelley's "Note on Hellas" endorses this understanding; her comment on these lines 
praises Shelley's vision as "philosophical truth felicitously imaged forth" (PW, 482). 
Ahasuerus exposes "the guilty mind" of Mahmud when he raises "the sulphurous mist" (830) 
that has hitherto obscured his perceptions of reality. Consequently, in his final speech, Mahmud 
is left despondently echoing Ahasuerus' prophecy : 
Come what may, 
The Future must become the Past, and I 
As they were to whom once this present hour, 
This gloomy crag of Time to which I cling 
Seemed an Elysian isle of peace and joy 
Never to be attained. I must rebuke 
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This drunkenness of triumph ere it die 
And dying, bring despair. Victory? poor slaves! (923-30) 
Ahasuerus has firmly planted the idea of inevitable defeat in Mahmud's mind, thus ensuring 
Greek liberation and Turkish defeat.14 A seeming paradox arises in Shelley's creative theory; 
he stress the significance of "Passion" (796) as a central feature of his creative vision and yet 
Ahasuerus, in true Socratic style, relies solely upon mental powers as he has virtually 
transcended the world of sense. However, even though Ahasuerus appears devoid of emotion 
himself, he acts like a catalyst by invoking an intense emotional response in Mahmud which 
impairs logical thought and reaches his innermost being: "Wild —wilder thoughts convulse / 
My Spirit" (806-7). Consequently Mahmud experiences mental confusion; he is uncertain 
whether he has been deceived by Ahasuerus into creating a vision of his deepest fears: 
Were there such things or may the unquiet brain, 
Vexed by the wise mad talk of the old Jew, 
Have shaped itself these shadows of its fear? (918-20) 
Wilson Knight rightly attributes a benign outcome to Ahasuerus's teachings as he is 
"gradually demoralizing, or rather regenerating, Mahmoud the Tyrant."13 Permanent 
regeneration is central to Shelley's poetic vision for humanity to-escape-from the habitual 
recurrence of destruction: 
0 cease! must hate and death return? 
Cease! must men kill and die? 
Cease! drain not to its dregs the urn 
Of bitter prophecy. (1096-99) 
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In these lines Shelley presents a disheartening vision of the future: the "dregs of the urn" 
and "bitter prophecy" are in direct contrast to Laon and Cvthna which is infused with 
optimism overflowing "from Hope's immortal urn" (CP. 647). In Shelley's earlier lyrical 
drama, Prometheus Unbound. Prometheus's redemption occurs through heart-felt compassion, 
experienced even under intense anguish. Mahmud's regeneration occurs through an epiphanic 
realization that his perceptions about the structure of reality are totally flawed.16 Ahasuerus 
comments on this regeneration: "the sulphurous mist is raised thou see'st—" (830). Perhaps 
the greatest hope for the amelioration of humanity is that Mahmud, who personifies tyranny, 
experiences a radical change in consciousness; he experientially grasps Ahasuerus's spiritual 
lessons at a deep level with the insight that "nought we see or dream, / Possess or lose or 
grasp at can be worth / More than it gives or teaches" (921-3). 
An examination of The "Hellas" Notebook elucidates that during his composition of the 
drama, Shelley's foremost concern was to exhibit the manifold connections between the 
intellectual realm of thought and the supremacy of political power. Mary Shelley's "Note on 
Hellas" confirms that Shelley concentrated on '*the assertion of the intellectual empire" which 
she attributed to his "peculiar style"; her justified admiration of Hellas as "among the most 
beautiful" (PW. p. 481) of Shelley's compositions indicates that "peculiar" should be 
interpreted here as distinctive. Yet in the published poem there is a less inclusive declaration 
"of the intellectual empire" than in the draft. Twice Shelley pondered over incorporating the 
following lines-before striking them out: "Sultan thy power thy is built on thought, / Thy 
Sultan thv power is built on thought" (HN. E . 7, p. 116, 20-1). Why Shelley decided to 
withhold an explicit declaration that thought is the metaphysical principle inherent in 
Mahmud's sovereignty is unclear. In the finalized drama, immediately following where these 
deletions would have appeared, Ahasuerus beguilingly offers Mahmud precognition: 
"Would'st thou behold the future?— ask and have! / Knock and it shall be opened—look and 
lo!" (803-4). These lines are ingeniously contextualized within a biblical framework, so that 
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extraordinary proposal of prescience is not instantly dismissed by the reader, like Mahmud as 
"Wild — wilder thoughts" (806), because it conveys a distinct sense of familiarity. But 
prescience is an "art" that has so far eluded Mahmud, because he doubts its credibility even 
with Ahasuerus' powers: '*thou art no interpreter of dreams; / Thou dost not own that art" 
(757-8). Ahasuerus opens Mahmud's consciousness to the possibility of psychic power, 
facilitating the recall of his dream with the hypostatization of Mahomet D. 
What thou see'st 
Is but the ghost of thy forgotten dream. 
A dream itself, yet, less, perhaps, than that 
Thou callest reality. Thou mayest behold 
How cities, on which empire sleeps enthroned, 
Bow their tower'd crests to Mutability. (841-6) 
The heavily punctuated line (843) commencing with "A dream" forces the reader to pause 
to elicit the precise relation between "dream" and "reality." The "Hellas" Notebook reveals the 
significance that Shelley himself attributed to dreams: "A dream itself, as all things" (HN, E . 
7, p. 214, 5). Again in drafting Shelley considers making an overt statement of the 
interrelationship between thought and power, struggling over the following lines: "Sultan - thy 
power, and that thy father wielded / Is—theught- / Is-but-ono thought-tomporod with many." 
(HN. E . 7, p. 116, 30-2). "One thought tempered with many" vitally discloses the most salient 
feature of Shelley's creative theories; all thoughts, good and evil, compete as metaphysical 
energies for physical manifestation. Shelley states that the factor which determines whose 
thoughts will unveil the future is "Passion" (796) in the poem, and '^ the excess of passion" in 
his note to Hellas (PW. 479 n. 6). "Passion" is designated as the primary activating agent and 
it is the strength of the emotive force that materializes a particular thought, or group of thought 
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forms. An effective example occurs with the conflicting collective visions of the Greeks and 
the Turks which compete in "The mingled battle cry" (828). Whilst drafting Hellas. Shelley 
encapsulated this dynamic battle in a metaphysical metaphor: "legions of swift thought" (HN. 
E . 7, p. 114). The Greeks are firmly focused on their impending success with their shout '"Ev 
TOOT© V I K T | — "' (829) translated by Reiman and Powers as '"In this [sign], Victory"' (PP. 
433 n. 2); the Turkish war cry, '" Allah-Ilia, Allah!'" (829), fixates on God and invokes a 
power, the consequences of which, are not fully understood by anyone except Ahasuerus: 
Thou would'st ask that giant spirit 
The written fortunes of thy house and faith— 
Thou would'st cite one out of the grave to tell 
How what was born in blood must die—. (808-11) 
Ahasuerus, who is "Mocked with the curse of immortality" (151) participates in the realm 
of eternity and from this omniscient perspective realizes that Mahmud's supremacy is coming 
to an end. With the hypostatization of The Phantom of Mahomet the Second, Shelley indulges 
his youthful fascination with "Hopes of high talk with the departed dead."17 "The imperial 
shade" warns Mahmud of his impending doom: " I come / Thence whither thou must go! the 
grave is fitter / To take the living than give up the dead" (861-3). "The written fortunes" (809) 
of Islam, enshrined in The Koran, reveal an historical precedent where God sided with the 
Greeks and promised them victory, after they were defeated by the Persians in A.D. 615.18 
n 
The centrality of Shelley's "own sensations" and fervent imagination as the origination of 
reality is epitomized in a letter to Peacock written on the 6 November 1818: "—You know I 
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always seek in what I see the manifestation of something beyond the present & tangible object" 
(LS II , 47). This statement has been misinterpreted as an idealistic avoidance of physical 
reality. But here "manifestation" crucially underlines Shelley's engagement with the world and 
his suggestion of a dynamic role for human consciousness in the formation of reality. As such 
Shelley's declaration could be celebrated as a creative dictum, rather than censured as a 
technique of displacement." The "Preface" to Hellas shows that Shelley was aware of the 
contemporary milieu and it has been credited as "one of the most active political statements on 
the struggle for liberty which Shelley ever framed . . . " (SP. 678). Furthermore, Mary Shelley 
remarks how Shelley avidly followed the current political struggles: "The interest he took in the 
progress of affairs was intense" (PW, 481). Shelley's concern in Hellas is in revealing the 
intricate metaphysical principles which combine to create futurity. As in Prometheus Unbound. 
Shelley is consistent in his recognition that the mimetic representation of death and destruction 
has not the creative potential to transform the Greek cause into victory. The visionary nature 
of Shelley's conceptions concerning the primacy of thought that pervade his work are now 
receiving credence through the emergent theories about the structure of reality, following the 
advent of modern physics.20 Yuri Orlov examines states of consciousness in relation to true or 
false assertions about the nature of reality and deduces that: 
the appearance of statements "known to be false" (from the viewpoint of a 
classical observer),. . . gives a key to the understanding of creative thinlring -^when 
a person states or depicts "what in fact does not exist." According to our 
approach, the person potentially "sees" several versions simultaneously without 
completely realizing any of them, and then one version "pops up" (materializes) as 
the result of a free choice.21 
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Orlov suggests that this nebulous stage of creative perception could be termed "'wave 
thinking'",22 a designation that can be metaphorically appropriated to define the creative 
principle in Shelley's coalescence of thought and emotion. Indeed this concept of '"wave 
thinking'" perfectly explains the dynamics of the visualization technique where Shelley sees "a 
manifestation of something beyond the present & tangible object." Creative perception is 
significant to the Hellenic spirit of freedom that presides over the drama.23 In view of the 
poem's affirmation that "words / Have power" (811-12), it is reasonable to conjecture that 
Shelley's anxiety to have the drama published quickly may partly be attributed to his belief that 
Hellas could exert a decisive effect on the "final triumph of the Greek cause as a portion of the 
cause of civilization and social improvement" (PP, 408). In this way Hellas would influence 
"the curtain of futurity which falls upon the unfinished scene" (PP. 408). Shelley wrote to his 
publisher, Charles Oilier, on 11 November 1821: 
I send you the Drama of Hellas . . .—What little interest this Poem may ever 
excite, depends upon its immediate publication; I entreat you therefore to have the 
goodness to send the Ms. instantly to a Printer, & the moment you get a proof, 
dispatch it to me by the Post. (LS I I , 365) 
Certainly Shelley took care to eliminate any impediment that might delay publication by giving 
Oilier editorial discretion over the notes, with-the "liberty to suppress" (LS n, 365) any 
suggestion that could be construed as subversive in the notes. 
Noticeably next to "Passion" in the draft to Hellas. Shelley initially considered and then 
crossed out i%rt22 (HN. E . 7, p. 116, 2) as one of the "quick elements" (796) which combine to 
unfold futurity. Accordingly Shelley's artistic rendering of Greek victory and his prophecy that 
"Islam must fall" (887), generated under the inspiration of "a moment of enthusiasm" (PW. 
481), could in themselves be instrumental in affecting the Greek cause. Indeed earlier, in A 
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Defence of Poetry. Shelley makes the creative avowal that poetry precipitates regeneration, 
poetry "creates anew the universe after it has been annihilated in our minds by the recurrence 
of impressions blunted by reiteration" (PP. 505-6). Shelley annihilates the idea of Turkish 
victory. In his second note to Hellas Shelley states that: 
it is the province of the poet to attach himself to those ideas which exalt and 
ennoble humanity, let him be permitted to have conjectured the condition of that 
futurity towards which we are all impelled by an inextinguishable thirst for 
immortality. (PW, 478) 
Shelley's insistent vision of Greek victory against seemingly certain defeat is a conjecturing of 
futurity which exemplifies Orlov's theoretical exposition of "wave thinking." Indeed Shelley 
frequently reiterates the crucial factor of focused human consciousness upon the determination 
of events. Mary Shelley's note to Hellas reveals Shelley's strong adherence to a vision of 
success: "Almost against reason, as it appeared to him, he resolved to believe that Greece 
would prove triumphant" (PW. 481). Mary Shelley also draws attention to other poetic 
precedents of Shelley "prophesying" victory: "Shelley had hymned the dawn of liberty in Spain 
and Naples, in two odes dictated-by-the warmest enthusiasm" (PW. 481). 
In relation to the creation of futurity, Mahmud effectively formulates the drama's most 
imperativequestion: 
but the unborn hour, 
Cradled in fear and hope, conflicting storms, 
Who shall unveil? (752-4) 
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These lines are cleverly contrived to encapsulate the underlying chaos, "storms" of opposing 
emotions, "fear and hope," from which the future will emerge. Surprisingly, this deep 
metaphysical understanding of creation, which elicits Ahasuerus's conceptions about the 
nature of existence is spoken by Mahmud, before the "sulphurous mist is raised" (830) from 
his ideologically distorted vision. However, although Mahmud realises that the fundamental 
issue is who or what determines destiny, his rhetoric expounds a pre-determined fatalism which 
is disempowering: he affirms that "device, or God, / Can make the future present—let it come!" 
(758-9). Mahmud's perception of reality is conditioned by the Islamic world-view which 
demands submission to God's supremacy: "God has sovereignty over the heavens and the 
earth and all that they contain. He has power over all things."24 Humanity is perceived as 
being separate from creation and plays a non-participatory role. Consequently Mahmud tells 
Ahasuerus that "Nor thou, nor I , nor any / Mighty or wise" (754-5) can reveal the future. Here 
Mahmud is propounding a divine determinism which was prevalent in antiquity and central to 
Aeschylus' The Persians. Parallels between Mahmud's philosophy in Hellas and the 
Aeschylean drama are evident in relation to the prophetic importance of dreams and the concept 
of divine intervention controlling events whose outcome is beyond mortal reach. The Persians 
opens with the Chorus of Elders doubting whether humanity has the power to escape divine 
will: 
Yet, while Heaven with tortuous plan 
Works its will, what mortal man 
Can elude immortal guile?25 
Similarly in The Koran "Men cannot forestall their doom, nor can they retard it ." 2 6 The 
primacy of "immortal guile" is consistent throughout The Persians with the Ghost of Darius 
likewise declaring that "heaven takes part, for good or ill, with man's own zeal."27 Accordingly, 
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humanity has no option but '*to trust / Divine Prophecy, which shall be fulfilled / To the last 
jot."2 8 Hence Queen Atossa realizes that prescience can be attained simply by reaching a 
correct interpretation of dreams: 
O vivid dream that lit the darkness of my sleep, 
How clearly you forewarned me of calamity! 
And, Councillors, how lightly you interpreted!29 
There is a crucial difference between Atossa's dream and Mahmud's: Atossa has a clear 
recollection of her vision; Mahmud's repeated nightmare leaves a strong residue of fear making 
him "strangely moved" (124), but he is unable to decipher the content: the dream leaves "no 
figure upon memory's glass" (131). However, even though Mahmud has no conscious recall of 
his dream, the psychological consequences are immense, virtually sundering his being: 
Thrice has a gloomy vision hunted me 
As thus from sleep into the troubled day; 
It shakes me as the tempest shakes the sea. (128-30) 
That Shelley intended to portray Mahmud as deeply disturbed is supported by the 
following cancelled lines from The "Hellas" Notebook: "And—B ewild ors mo & darkens 
mo, & fills / My d ay with 9 hodow" (HN. E . 7, p. 61, 10-11). Additionally the replacement 
of "haunted" in the draft (HN. E 7, p. 61, 21) with "hunted" in the drama intensifies the terror. 
Such a devastating impact of fear and confusion on Mahmud's consciousness is crucial to the 
mental action in Hellas. Indeed this emotional turmoil can be seen as the decisive point from 
which Turkish power begins to decline. Jung's psychoanalytical investigations confer a validity 
on dreams equal to that of physical experiences; he places "dreams on a plane with 
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physiological fact."30 Moreover, in Jung's view, dreams are unanticipated and reveal a degree 
of knowledge that the dreamer may be unwilling to concede in a rational waking state: dreams 
are "the expression of an involuntary psychic process not controlled by the conscious outlook. 
It presents the subjective state as it really is."31 Here it would be germane to conjecture that a 
vision of Greek victory appears in Mahmud's dream, but he is reluctant to concede this 
possibility. An examination of The "Hellas" Notebook together with Hellas demonstrates the 
precise attention that Shelley gave to the inherent spiritual and metaphysical principles 
underlying the political events of the time. Evidence to substantiate the significance of dreams 
is found in the Chorus of Greek Captive Women: 
Breathe low, low! 
The spell of the mighty mistress now 
When Conscience lulls her sated snake 
And Tyrants sleep, let Freedom wake. 
Breathe! Low —low 
The words which like secret fire shall flow 
Through the veins of the frozen earth—low, low! (27-33) 
Here the onomatopoeic diction artfully entices drowsiness, but it is an unnatural drug-
induced slumber, strewn with "opiate flowers" (1). Unsurprisingly, Mahmud offers some 
resistance by tossing on his "restless pillow" (2). The Indian slave's lyrics, interspersed with 
the opening chorus, present a challenge in interpretation. Edward Larrissy conveys little 
discernment regarding Shelley's abhorrence of slavery and deems that "The Indian slave is 
devoted to the Sultan," and " I f Mahmud is capable of inspiring such devotion, perhaps he is not 
all bad."32 The sincerity of the slave's loyalty is questionable; subservience to tyranny is an 
anathema to Shelley's political views, especially in a poem which reverberates with a call for 
235 
liberation and condemnation of bondage: "0 Slavery! thou frost of the world's prime" (676). 
"Hell, Sin, and Slavery" (218) are the triad of evils which destroyed the paradisal "golden 
years" (238). Nevertheless the Indian's tenderness cannot be overlooked and is evident in the 
lines " I touch thy temples pale / I breathe my soul on thee!" (21-2). But perhaps there is an 
ironic intent to this tenderness; it is when 'Tyrants sleep" that "Freedom" awakes (30). 
Mahmud's exploitation and destruction of humanity result in his alienation from creation, 
similar to Jupiter's estrangement prior to his dispossession in Prometheus Unbound. Hassan 
informs Mahmud that "Nature from all her boundaries is moved / Against" him and that "the 
Earth rebels" (441-2, 443). 
The gender of the Indian slave is not revealed in the published poem, but an earlier draft 
shows that Shelley initially attributed the first two stanzas of the slave's lyrics to a female 
named "F atima" (HN, E . 7, p. 63, 1-18). A discarded lyrical fragment, written concurrently 
with Hellas. "Judith loved not her enslaver" (HN. E . 7. p. 92). reveals Shelley's interest in the 
intense negative feelings originating from enforced servitude. A pointed similarity between the 
two compositions is that both slaves share the same cultural inheritance: Judith is also Asian, 
depicted as "Soft Indian" (HN. E . 7, p. 92, 10). The repeated deletions in the draft shows 
Shelley's detestation of captivity: "enslaver", "fee", "oppressor" and 'tyrant" all reinforce 
this condemnation (HN, E . 7, p. 92,1, 2, 13). The lyric affirms one of the most insistent themes 
in Shelley's's writing; love is only possible with total sexual and political equality: 
Yet Love him, - no love can be 
him 
Holy between thee & thee 
Loves live only with the free . . 
(HN. E . 7, p. 92, 24-8) 
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There are distinct echoes from Laon and Cvthna where Shelley composes a vision of freedom 
reliant on sexual equality. Life is corrupted in its foundations i f "Woman as the bond-slave 
dwells / Of man a slave" (CP. 3314-5). The subservience of women is enshrined in the Koranic 
revelations: "Men have authority over women because God has made the one superior to the 
other . . ,"3 3 In Hellas. Mahmud is the personification of patriarchal authority in its most 
tyrannical form; he endorses the violation of human life with the destruction of women and 
children when he asks Daood, 
Are there no Grecian virgins 
Whose shrieks and spasms and tears they may enjoy? 
No infidel children to impale on spears? (242-4) 
Shelley took every opportunity to denounce the invidious gender relations of domination and 
subordination; the opening of Hellas with its chorus of Greek captive women and Indian slave 
reiterates this passionate censure. Shelley's portrayal of the slave's seeming devotion has 
undertones of ironic cunning. One of the many erased phrases in "The Hellas Notebook" 
indicates that Shelley considered the slave's betrayal: "One kiss false slave" (HN. E . 7, p. 59, 
13). But this suggestion of betrayal appears counteracted a few lines later in a confused 
passage: " I soo true no false / All false like Greeks . . thou here true Fatima / One kiss_ ge 
drown thy self . . . " (HN, E . 7, pp. 59-60, 33-4, 1). As these Jines_precede Mahmud's 
awakening, it is possibly his perception of events that is becoming obscured. This mental 
confusion helps to expedite Ahasuerus' mission to challenge and transform Mahmud's 
perception of reality. Certainly in the finished poem there appears to be collusion between the 
Indian and the Chorus to lure Mahmud into a restful state where he "might' st win one hour of 
quiet sleep" (26). The Indian's lyric evokes the notion of death: "Soft as love, and calm as 
death, / Sweet as a summer night without a breath" (12-13). This suggestion is echoed by the 
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Chorus, "That calm sleep / Whence none may wake, where none shall weep" (19-20). The 
reiteration of rhymes such as "sleep" "deep" and "weep", between the Chorus and the Indian's 
lyrics, provides a linguistic connection that conveys a sense of conspiracy. Certainly 
Mahmud's sleep is essential as his dream precipitates the sequential dialogue with Ahasuerus. 
This interpretation of complicity ratifies Mahmud's intuitive fear of defeat and desire to avert 
looming disaster: 'To stem the torrent of descending time" (350). 
m 
Dreams operate as complex structures of perception in Hellas and exemplify Shelley's 
philosophical concept of unity. Montague Uliman's exposition of dream experience draws on 
David Bohm's "implicate order" of reality to suggest that "while dreaming, we seem able to 
transcend individual boundaries to move toward our place in a larger whole."34 It is during a 
conscious waking state that our sense of disconnection to the world occurs: "Awake, we are 
mired in our own discreteness."35 In the psychoanalytic tradition, Jung's ideas about artistic 
creativity suggest a penetration into deeper levels of being with the artist's "re-immersion in the 
state of participation mystique": 
He has plunged into the healing and redeeming depths of the collective psyche, 
where man is not lost in the isolation of consciousness and its errors and 
sufferings, but where all men are caught in a common rhythm which allows the 
individual to communicate his feelings and strivings to mankind as a whole. 
(SMA. 105) 
Ullman's research suggests that dreams are crucial to our existence, as they are primarily and 
collectively "concerned with the survival of the species."36 Ullman and Jung's theories 
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illuminate the way in which Shelley utilizes dreams to promote the concept of a unified field of 
consciousness in Hellas. Shelley's vision is assuredly "participation mystique"; he searches for 
the origins of creation to recreate imaginatively a paradisal age for humanity whilst 
simultaneously lamenting the absence of this state: 
Swift as the radiant shapes of sleep 
From one whose dreams are Paradise 
Fly, when the fond wretch wakes to weep, 
And Day peers forth with her blank eyes; 
So fleet, so faint, so fair, 
The Powers of the earth and air 
Fled from the folding star of Bethlehem; 
Apollo, Pan, and Love, 
And even Olympian Jove 
Grew weak, for killing Truth had glared on them; 
Our hills and seas and streams, 
Dispeopled of their dreams, 
Their waters turn to blood, their dew to tears, 
Wailed for the golden years. (225-38) 
In this choral lyric, "dreams are Paradise" and waking precipitates loss. Once the world is 
"Dispeopled of their dreams" the golden age is lost and death and destruction ensue. But 
because existence is cyclical in Hellas the tone of regret, "Wailed for the golden years" (238), 
turns full circle towards the end of the poem with an optimistic affirmation of renewal: 
The world's great age begins anew, 
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The golden years return, 
The earth doth like a snake renew 
Her winter weeds outworn; 
Heaven smiles, and faiths and empires gleam 
Like wrecks of a dissolving dream. (1060-5) 
The "Prologue to Hellas" equates the perfection in the golden age with the origin and purity of 
thought, which provided a cerebral prototype for Greece's glory: 
Within the circuit of this pendent orb 
There lies an antique region, on which fell 
The dews of thought in the world's golden dawn, 
Earliest and most benign, and from it sprung 
Temples and cities and immortal forms 
And harmonies of wisdom and of song, 
And thoughts, and deeds worthy of thoughts so fair. 
(PW. 31-7) 
Shelley celebrates prophets and poets who have the visionary capacity to transcend the 
temporal socio-historical concerns. They are, like Isaiah and Virgil, "ardent spirits overleaping 
the actual reign of evil which we endure and bewail" because they can mentally create a society 
of harmony and perfection "in which the 'lion shall lie down with the lamb'" (PW, pp. 479-80). 
Dream is employed in Hellas to signify awareness beyond ordinary human parameters. 
For instance Ahasuerus' obscure origins are not within the consensus of factual knowledge: 
"others dream / He was a preadamite" (152-3). "Preadamite" takes the reader out of historical 
time with "dream" serving as the gateway to the mythical past. Dreams are privileged states of 
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awareness imparting wisdom and prophecy, and allow access to deeper levels of being. 
Mahmud acknowledges this significance with his comment that "'tis said his tribe / Dream, 
and are wise interpreters of dreams" (135-6). Shelley's preference for "tribe" rather than 
"nation" suggests a remoteness and rarity to this visionary mode of apprehending. But this 
directly contrasts with the universal claim that Ahasuerus' "natural magic" is "susceptible of 
being exercised in a degree by any one" (PW p. 479). Here lies one of the irresolvable 
paradoxes in Shelley's work; ideas that are universally applicable and intended to benefit 
humanity are expressed so profoundly that they are realizable by a minority elite. In Hellas 
Shelley suggests that ultimately power is not political, but invested in the individual's 
development and mastery of their mind. Ahasuerus convincingly demonstrates his supremacy, 
accomplished by: 
Deep contemplation, and unwearied study 
In years outstretched beyond the date of man, 
May have attained to sovereignty and science 
Over those strong and secret things and thoughts 
Which others fear and know not. (157-61) 
Such a degree of intellectual mastery is, in part, a Shelleyan self-portrait, but it is also 
reminiscent of Socrates' wisdom. Ahasuerus willingly submits to extreme deprivation, 
"dreadful abstinence / And conquering penance of the mutinous flesh" (155-6). Similarly, 
'^ there were none who could sustain hunger like Socrates", he endured "incredible hardships" 
and even "walked barefoot upon the ice" (PS, 457). But it is the art of composition that 
Shelley most effectively appropriates from his study of Plato. Ahasuerus' skill in tempting 
Mahmud to reassess his views on the nature of existence resembles the adept manceuverings of 
a Platonic Dialogue. 
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Ontologically dreams appear to construct a view of reality in which subconscious realms 
have dominion over the phenomenal world.37 In relation to the significance accorded to dreams 
as the primary mode of apprehension in Shelley's poetry, Hellas is a notable precursor to The 
Triumph of Life in which vision unfurls from a "trance of wondrous thought" (41) 
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Chapter 8 
Shelley's "Enchanted Heart": Love Lyrics to Jane Williams 
Still, still to hear her tender-taken breath, 
And so live ever or else swoon to death.' 
(Keats) 
'Tis to create, and in creating live 
A being more intense, that we endow 
With form our fancy, gaining as we give 
The life we image, even as I do now.2 
(Byron) 
I 
This chapter focuses on the imaginative and psychological processes at work in Shelley's lyrics 
to Jane Williams. To interpret the undercurrent of emotional intrigue, where Shelley insinuates 
himself between Jane and Edward, my analysis develops a metaphorical model of quantum 
holism. Communication in this quantum paradigm focuses on the free-flowing movement of 
thoughts and feelings and their subtle, yet permeating, influences on Shelley's immediate 
circle. Chapter One, "A Poetics of Being", outlined an all-embracing quantum view of 
existence where mind and matter intermesh in an indivisible way. Quantum holism was shown 
to negate the possibility of detached spectators of reality since its a priori principle is one of 
creative engagement; interrelationship with both the world and others is fundamental. With this 
principle of seamless unity life is understood as a dynamically creative act arising from an 
overlapping interweaving reciprocity "between mind, and matter, psyche and soma" (UU, 386). 
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My inclusion of biographical evidence serves to illuminate the reciprocal 
interconnections between Shelley's personal life and his literary compositions. However 
biographical information needs a sensitive handling to avoid "the censorious moralizing to 
which his private life has been subjected by ultra-Tories and radical feminists alike" (MYR, p. 
351). Shelley's creative technique was inspired by portraying actualities from his own life. 
Moreover, his ideas about the nature of existence arose from and were modified according to 
his own experiences."3 Shelley's expression of personal feeling, rather than abstract 
conceptualizing, gave his theories an authenticity and a cogent viability. The creative dialogue 
between artistic and personal consciousness validates Shelley's metaphysical belief that 
thoughts empowered by intense emotions crystallize into tangible reality the very experiences 
that have been previously envisioned. For David Bohm, it is not meaningful to see a separation 
between consciousness and the world; he posits the necessity for "a view in which the thought 
itself is part of the reality" (UM, 92).4 Furthermore Bohm envisaged that fundamental changes 
occur within our state of being and subsequent experience of reality when we "really see 
something deeply with great energy" (UM. 94). Tt is precisely this combination of innovative 
thought-forms and passion that propels Shelley's poetry and creates a new vision of the world. 
In his "Speculations on Metaphysics", Shelley had pointed out the erroneous mistake of 
neglecting our inner nature: 
We do not attend suffieiently-to-what passes within ourselves. We combine words, 
combined a thousand times before . . . Our whole style of expression and 
sentiment is infected with the tritest plagiarisms. Our words are dead, our thoughts 
are cold and borrowed. (Julian VI1 , 62) 
What characterizes the lyrics to Jane is a moment—by—moment emotional topography of 
Shelley's inner state of being. Here my reading is diametrically opposed to Medwin who 
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sought to disestablish any notion of reciprocity between lyric utterance and lived experiences. 
Medwin terms love poetry "(like the Epipsvchidion) mere idealisms,—as 'exercises on 
amatory matters.'"3 Not surprisingly, perhaps since Medwin is Shelley's cousin, he attempts 
to defuse the emotional intrigue by painting a pristine portrait of Jane, and attributing an 
emotional detachment to Shelley: 
But a purer being than Mrs. Williams cannot exist. Not a breath of scandal could 
possibly attach to her fame. The verses addressed to her always passed through 
the hands of Williams himself, and who had too much confidence in the virtue of 
one devotedly his, to harbour for a moment any jealousy of an attachment the 
most innocent and disinterested. Effusions such as these must not be interpreted 
literally.6 
In a similar vein to Medwin's "Platonic aspirations",7 Stephen Behrendt sees Shelley's 
liaison with Jane as "an idealized, platonic sort of reciprocal relationship, and perhaps little 
more than a dalliance on Shelley's part."* I investigate how Shelley's thoughts and emotions 
transgress the boundaries of friendship into love. In view of Shelley's creative metaphysics, 
far from being purely "platonic", my interpretation focuses on the underlying dynamics of 
consciousness and exposes the depth of the psychological undercurrents that inevitably existed. 
The bonds of relationship are primarily established metaphysically. As soon as Shelley 
entertains amatory feelings for Jane they are released into the field of consciousness at the 
level of quantum potentiality. Recurrent lyrical disclosure energizes his romantic vision of Jane 
to a point where personal life and poetic expression cohere into a concatenation of tangible 
circumstances. Initially Shelley's comments about Jane were recorded in an almost 
observational tone: he remarks that Jane is as an "extremely pretty & gentle woman— 
apparently not very clever. I like her very much" (LS I I , 256-7). Nearly a year latter, after 
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some misgivings,9 Jane becomes the centre of Shelley's focus: "Mrs. W., more amiable and 
beautiful than ever, and a sort of spirit of embodied peace in our circle of tempests. So much 
for first impressions!" (LS TT, 376). Generically, Shelley's lyrics to Jane appear 
"confessionally modern" with ''the implication that Shelley has transferred his Utopian hopes 
onto a particular, named person" (MYR, p. xxii). But this focus on an individual also makes 
the poems vehicles of his philosophical creed. I f Shelley's theoretical speculations on the power 
of love to enact a transformation in society are to work at the level of mass consciousness, 
then they must also operate with interpersonal relationships. Interposed towards the end of 
Shelley's composition of The Triumph of Life in his notebook are the words "Alas I kiss you 
[? ] " (BSM I , f. 52v, 19). At this crucial moment in the manuscript the name is maddeningly 
illegible and two probable nominees arise: either Shelley wrote Jane referring to Jane Williams, 
or Julie alluding to Rousseau's heroine from La Nouvelle Heloise. Both possibilities are of 
significance to his theories on love and merit detailed comment. 
Textual support for the choice of Jane is suggested by Michael O'Neill who makes a 
tentative comparison with a word that is scrawled in smaller print in the corner of a letter to 
Edward Williams (MYR, pp. 414-6). From the position of "Alas I kiss you [? ] " in the 
Bodleian Shelley Manuscript the moment seems to be of dire consequence; the preceding line 
from The Triumph of Life reads, "And sank fell, as I have fa II en by the / way side" (BSM I , f. 
52v, 17-18). In Rousseau's La Nouvelle Heloise. Saint-Preux experiences ungovernable 
feelings after kissing Julie: "My-senses are <lisordered; all my faculties are disturbed by that 
fatal kiss."10 After subsequently kissing Julie's cousin, Saint-Preux analyzes his responses 
with the remark that "sensations are nothing but what the heart makes them."11 And Saint-
Preux's heart was given to Julie long before he touched her. Whether Shelley embraced Jane 
Williams is of consequence to his ideas on love which state that "The sexual impulse, . . . 
serves, from its obvious and external nature, as a kind of type or expression of the rest, as a 
common basis, an acknowledged and visible link" (PS. 408). httimate physical contact is the 
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moment when idealized love is rendered into actual experience with release of repressed 
emotions. In "We Meet Not As We Parted" Shelley depicts a clandestine liaison: "We feel 
more than all may see" (PW. 2).1 2 The illicit "moment" of passion, recollected four times in 
the short lyric, precipitates "a life of pain" (PW, 12): "Sweet lips, could my heart have hidden 
/ That its life was crushed by you," (PW. 16-17). The emotions aroused in this lyric, where 
"One moment has bound the free" (PW. 5), are opposed to Shelley's theoretical idea of love 
which is an elevating and freeing experience. But such suffering captivity appears willingly 
chosen in the playful coda: "Methinks too little cost / For a moment so found, so lost!" (PW. 
24-25). 
With regard to the creative process, William Reach appropriately remarks that "Shelley 
uses Rousseau to make himself and his readers think about the mutual entanglements of 
writing and living. He might also have used Byron. But he did not dare." (SS. 234). In The 
Triumph of Life the figure of Rousseau hauntingly conveys a post-mortal awareness that 
literary creation has physical reverberations. 
I sung wrote 
Have suffered what thoy point, or viler pain! - -
So have my words been seeds of misery 
And so were But I 
Thus—have my words been seeds of misery (BSM I , f. 33r, 19-23) 
Reiman and Powers gloss these lines with the following interpretation: "Rousseau acted out his 
passions before writing them, so that his writings lack tranquillity, and therefore they enflame 
others as ill considered actions do" (PP. 463, n. 6). Certainly Rousseau's "writings lack 
tranquillity" and would have a stirring effect on his reader's consciousness. But my concern is 
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with a prior consideration; to discover why scenes from Rousseau's novels literally shaped his 
subsequent experiences. Before I discuss Shelley's lyrics to Jane Williams in detail, it is 
illuminating to reflect on Rousseau's artistic technique, especially since he is central to The 
Triumph of Life, which Shelley was writing concurrently with these lyrics. 
Shelley's admiration for Rousseau is expressed in A Defence of Poetry when he describes 
Rousseau as being "essentially a poet" (PP. 502 n. 8). Rousseau is also confirmed as one of the 
immortal writers who "have celebrated the dominion of love, planting as it were trophies in the 
human mind of that sublimest victory over sensuality and force" (PP. 497). More specifically 
in 1816 Shelley had praised 4<the divine beauty of Rousseau's imagination, as it exhibits itself 
in Julie" (LS I , 480). But in The Triumph of Life Shelley's Rousseau is "one of that deluded 
crew" (184) whose proclivity to despondency is apparent in the summation: ' " I feared, loved, 
hated, suffered, did, and died" (200). Emotion is pivotal in this disclosure, and the way in 
which passions are channelled through the human spirit either results in dispiriting scenes of 
destruction, or scenes of redemptive love and harmony.13 
Rousseau's historical contextualization in an epoch of turmoil is of relevance and, 
according to Edward Duffy, a primary consideration: "the 'Rousseau' in Shelley's poem is 
unintelligible i f divorced from his implication in the blood, mire and controversy of recent 
European experience."14 But it is my contention that the forlorn figure of Rousseau also 
illustrates Shelley's deepest intuitions about the reciprocal nature of art and life. In this way, 
the shade of Rousseau voices an acutely perceptive statement about the nature of creativity 
that is philosophically more Shelleyan than Rousseauian: ' " I / Am one of those who have 
created, even / ' I f it be but a world of agony.'— " (293-5). With the emphatic " I / Am" there is 
a sense of challenging defiance: ultimate value is invested in the ability to create; "even / I f 
mediates a partial exoneration for the tragic consequences. In The Triumph of Life Shelley's 
Rousseau is delineated as a complex persona, and as Michael O'Neill rightly discerns, with 
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the explanation of his fell there is not "a cut-and-dried moral perspective" but a "blurring of 
moral responses" (HMI. 184-5). 
Perhaps the greatest affinity between Rousseau and Shelley is their extreme sensitivity to, 
and artistic expression of, fervent feelings. Rousseau, like Shelley, claimed he was naturally 
endowed with an acute sensibility: " I felt before I thought: which is the common lot of man, 
though more pronounced in my case than in another's" (C, 19). But for Shelley feeling has a 
primacy that is more than a reaction against the Enlightenment emphasis on reason, or an 
authentic articulation of one's inner state of being. Feeling has a central role in Shelley's 
philosophical creed: intense passion kindles imaginative conceptions and facilitates their 
enactment. I examine Shelley's conviction that passionate visions precipitate experiences by 
comparing the intriguing similarities between Rousseau's fictional creation of Julie and his 
subsequent love for Sophie d'Houdetot. 
An experience of existence which gives primacy to feelings was poeticized by Shelley in 
Hellas: "Nought is but that which feels itself to be" (785). Contrary to popular epistemological 
misconceptions, it must be understood that Shelley did not advocate a position of subjectivism. 
Conceptually he advances a view of being that unites the human spirit with matter in a creative 
reciprocity between the self and a definite universe, albeit a transient world. Some quantum 
theorists validate Shelley's poetic insights: Danah Zohar's physics of consciousness explains 
the way in which a distinct form is elicited from the underlying potentiality of conceivable 
forms: 
At the moment of observation, some dialogue between the quantum wave function 
and the observer (be this man or machine) evokes, and thus gives concrete form 
to, one of the many possible realities inherent within that wave function. But there 
is already the potential for some very definite sort of reality there . . . (OS. 32) 
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Notably Zohar cautions that: "Nothing in quantum theory itself suggests that observation or 
the observer 'creates' reality (the properties of subatomic particles)" (OS. 31-2). But perhaps, 
as Shelley thought, emotion is decisive in eliciting an underlying potentiality from the realm of 
the imaginary and materializing it into the physical world. Certainly the interconnections 
between Rousseau's life and writing point to a supposition that human consciousness and 
emotions maybe the potent energies essential to the manifestation of "one of the many possible 
realities." From The Confessions it is evident that Rousseau's life followed parallel patterns to 
those of his literary creations.15 The following discussion offers a theoretical explanation as to 
why these correspondences occur. 
In The Confessions the interiority gained through Rousseau's meticulous examination 
of his thoughts and emotions conveys a vivid portrayal of his inner life. But his reliability as 
a narrator is contentious on several issues. Rousseau readily admits that his details may be 
inaccurate: " I may omit or transpose facts, or make mistakes in dates" (C, 262). Nevertheless 
for the period covering his love for Sophie d'Houdetot, Rousseau states that he has "sure 
information in a collection of transcripts from original letters in the care of M. du Peyrou" (C, 
262). Rousseau's factual imprecisions, although significant, are subordinate to an account 
which he terms "the history of my soul" and is authenticated by emotional exposition: " I cannot 
go wrong about what I have felt, or about what my feelings have led me to do; and these are the 
chief subjects of my story" (C, 262), Of greater consequence is that Rousseau earlier writes 
that his version of reality is only clarified through reflection and therefore modified by 
hindsight: " I do not know how to see what is before my eyes; I can only see clearly in 
retrospect, it is only in my memories that my mind can work" (C, 114). Moreover his 
perceptions were distorted by an excessive fear of "worldly terrors" and can appropriately be 
attributed to the cognitive state now designated "persecution-mania."16 In relation to 
Rousseau's autobiographical quest, to convey access to an unmediated self, David 
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Marshall's understanding of "Sympathy encapsulates the multiple perspectives to be 
carefully negotiated in interpretation: 
The Confessions teaches us to read the self as a layering of double illusions which 
combine and overlap in continual self-eclipse—and which must be reproduced in 
the reactions and representations of other minds.17 
Even with these complexities, tracing the correlations between Rousseau's devouring emotions 
and their sequential events gives a cogent insight into how art and life become mutually 
inspiriting. 
Rousseau's self-questioning reveals a conscious quest for love born of overwhelming 
desire: "How could it be that with such inflammable feelings, with a heart entirely moulded 
for love, I had not at least once burned with love for a definite object?" (C, 396). At the peak 
of fervid feeling, Rousseau transmutes unquenchable personal desire into imaginative vision: 
The impossibility of attaining the real persons precipitated me into the land of 
chimeras; and seeing nothing that existed worthy of my exalted feelings, I fostered 
them in an ideal world which my creative imagination soon peopled with beings 
after my own heart . . . In my continual ecstasies I intoxicated myself with 
draughts of the most exquisite sentiments that have ever entered the heart of a 
man. (C, 398) 
What emerges from Rousseau's penetrating analysis is that his world of inner vision is given 
greater clarity and brilliance than external reality. Once the imaginary world saturates 
Rousseau's consciousness, he describes an overwhelming sense of psychic enthrallment in 
terms of being "seduced" by his visions and experiencing a complete loss of autonomy: " I was 
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no longer master of myself even for a moment, the delirium never left me" (C, 404). This 
intense energy needs an outlet and, almost against Rousseau's reason, is channelled into 
literary composition: "Being completely captivated, I was forced to submit" (C, 405) to the 
creative impulse. From a psycho-analytical perspective, Jung explains that the literary work 
emanates from the subconscious and becomes a controlling power, even determining the artist's 
existence: 
Whenever the creative force predominates, life is ruled and shaped by the 
unconscious rather than by the conscious will, and the ego is swept along on an 
underground current, becoming nothing more than a helpless observer of events. 
The progress of the work becomes the poet's fate and determines his psychology. 
It is not Goethe that creates Faust, but Faust that creates Goethe. (SMA. 103). 
Similarly "the progress" of La Nouvelle Heloise can be seen to "create" Rousseau, but it is a 
creation that was initially instigated through his own choice, albeit more of an unwitting 
rather than conscious intent. Rousseau imagines an ideal society, the creation of which 
dominates his apprehensions: "Altogether ignoring the human race, I created for myself 
societies of perfect creatures celestial in their virtue and in their beauty . . . I spent countless 
hours and days at it, losing all memory of anything else" (C, 398). Rousseau's experience of 
"fantastic amours" with their "fatal consequences" are prefigured by the creation of a 
character, Saint-Preux, consciously drawn with his inherent pre-dispositions: " I identified 
myself as far as I could with the lover and friend. But I made him young and pleasant, whilst 
endowing him also with the virtues and faults that T felt in myself (C, 400-1). To confuse 
further the boundaries of art and life Rousseau chooses his favourite locus, Vevey at Lake 
Geneva, as a setting to foster '*the illusion of real existence" (C, 401). Rousseau so 
interrelated facts from his own life with imaginative visions that they coalesced in his thought 
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processes. Through obsessive re-enactment vision is given a stability analogous to real life: 
"This fiction, by constant repetition, finally assumed greater consistency and took a fixed and 
definite shape in my brain" (C, 401).18 In Shelleyan terms Rousseau has "a mind so powerfully 
bright as to cast a shade of falsehood on the records that are called reality" (LS I , 485). 
Rousseau's creative fantasies merge the internal realm of consciousness with the external 
world to achieve a sense of total integration. A vivid account of this process appears in 
Rousseau's Reveries of the Solitary Walker, when 
Emerging from a long and happy reverie, seeing myself surrounded by greenery, 
flowers and birds, and letting my eyes wander over the picturesque far-off shores 
which enclosed a vast stretch of clear and crystalline water, I fused my imaginings 
with these charming sights, and finding myself in the end gradually brought back 
to myself and my surroundings, I could not draw a line between fiction and reality. 
(RSW, 90-1) 
The Rousseauean heritage of an interaction with nature in the emergence of self-definition and 
self-expression is a pervasive influence in Romantic poetry. The creative act is one of 
extemalization arising from the depths of the writer's being. In this way "Rousseau immensely 
enlarged the scope of the inner voice. We now can know from within us, from the impulses of 
our own being, what nature marks as significant. "'-Moreover an inclusive apprehension of an 
interaction with the natural world is the apotheosis of the Romantic vision; in Childe Harold's 
Pilgrimage Byron questions, "Are not the mountains, waves, and skies, a part / Of me and of 
my soul, as I of them?" (BP I I , III . 707-8). Physically, this seems literally true in view of 
Danah Zohar and Ian Marshall's quantum suppositions that 
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The dynamics of both our bodies and our minds emerge from the 
same laws and forces that move the sun and the moon or that bind 
atoms together. 
There is just one reality, and we are all part of it. Physics tells us 
about the processes of creativity and transformation in the natural 
world. The physics of consciousness tells us about those same 
processes within ourselves and our society. I f we understand the 
actual physical basis of transformation, perhaps we can align 
ourselves with it. (QSO. xi.) 
Artistically Rousseau sets up a triangular situation, but with two women rather than two men: 
" I gave one of them a lover to whom the other was a tender friend and even something more" 
(C, 400). The menage a trois is an implicit feature in Rousseau's emotional psychology20 and 
his attraction to Sophie d'Houdetot is increased by her prior romantic involvement: "Her 
intimacy with M. de Saint-Lambert . . . made her still more interesting to me" (C, 402). 
Similarly Rousseau also narrates that Sophie d'Houdetot could conceive of an "intimate and 
delightful trio" (C, 411) if Rousseau could regain greater self-possession in her presence. 
Passionate imaginings precede and most possibly conspire to determine Rousseau's 
romantic encounter with Sophie d'Houdetot at the Hermitage.21 Indeed a materialization of 
Rousseau's creative fantasies occurs at the climatic point of vision: "At the height of my 
reveries I received a visit from Mme d'Houdetot, the first she had made me in all her life . . . " 
(C, 402). Later Rousseau outlines another synchronism between literary creation and a 
sequential occurrence in his life. In an "ecstatic state" fueled by an "amorous delirium" and 
"erotic transports" whilst writing La Nouvelle Heloise fiction collapses into actual experience. 
Rousseau explains that "At precisely this same time I received a second unexpected visit from 
Mme d'Houdetot" (C, 408). With his mental and emotional being seized by passion, 
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Rousseau falls hopelessly in love with Sophie d'Houdetot leaving him with "a terrible and 
indelible memory" (C, 408). Art and life then become chaotically confused in Rousseau's 
consciousness: "when trying to think of Julie T was surprised to find that I could only think of 
Mme d'Houdetot" (C, 410). 
Philosophically Rousseau's outlook appears to be passively fatalistic; he does not 
acknowledge an active role in the unfolding of his destiny. In his search for love Rousseau 
deems 'Wat fate owed me something she had never given me" (C, 397). So often Rousseau 
sees himself as a victim, his future determined by exterior circumstances: "my unlucky star 
prevailed" (C, 400). But Rousseau's complicity in his despair is outlined in an admission from 
his Reveries of the Solitary Walker; he augments fear through frenzied analysis, "My fevered 
imagination builds them [fears] up, works on them, magnifies them and inspects them from 
every angle" (RSW. 29). These destructive imaginings are projected into impending events 
and render Rousseau's worse apprehensions self-fulfilling prophecies. A poet's understanding 
of creativity is often penetrating and, in relation to Rousseau, Byron's appraisal in Childe 
Harold's Pilgrimage Canto TTI is germane: "His life was one long war with self-sought foes" 
(BP I I , IE. 752). Byron shows how Rousseau's inspiration emanates from frenzied despair: 
Here the self-torturing sophist, wild Rousseau, 
The apostle of affliction, he who threw 
Enchantment over passion, and from woe 
Wrung overwhelming eloquence, first drew 
The breath which made him wretched; yet he knew 
How to make madness beautiful, and cast 
O'er erring deeds and thoughts, a heavenly hue 
Of words, like sunbeams (BP I I , III. 725-32) 
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Even though Rousseau could cast "a heavenly hue / Of words", the foundation of his creativity 
emanates "from woe" and inevitably attracts despair. Rousseau's engrossed self-
obsessiveness allows no perspective for detached comment. Goethe's hero Werther, similarly 
ensnared in despair, conveys a psychological truth when he remarks "that the pains people 
endure would be less if only . . . they did not put so much imaginative energy into recalling the 
memory of past misfortune. . . " n Even when Werther's mind becomes unbalanced by self-
inflicted despair, he still recognizes that his fate is one of self-determination: " I feel all too 
clearly that . . . the source of my wretchedness lies within myself, as the source of all my joy 
once did."23 
In his amorous liaison Rousseau rhetorically protests a helpless innocence; he assigns 
culpability for his anguish equally to Saint-Lambert and Sophie d'Houdetot: 
Was it I who had sought out his mistress? Was it not he who had sent her to me? 
Was it not she who had come to seek me? Could I avoid receiving her? What 
could I do? They alone had done the mischief, and it was T who had suffered by it. 
(C, 429) 
This accusatory tone and self-exoneration read as psychologically naive, especially since 
Rousseau earlier confesses how he imaginatively conjures a scene of romantic seduction: 
as I walked T dreamt of her I was about to see, of the affectionate welcome she 
would give me, and of the kiss, that fatal kiss, even before I received it [emphasis 
added]. It so fired my blood that my head was dizzy, my eyes were dazzled and 
blind, and my trembling knees could no longer support me. I had to stop and sit 
down; my whole bodily mechanism was in utter disorder; I was on the point of 
fainting. (C, 414)24 
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Given the friendship between Rousseau and Sophie d'Houdetot, intimate embrace would have 
been within the realm of potentiality. And perhaps Rousseau's unwavering focus gives his 
emotive vision a heightened intensity that crystallizes her kiss into tangible reality. Certainly 
from his account vision and thought precipitate actual experience. An explanation of 
Rousseau's "utter disorder" can be found in David Bohm's panpsychist paradigm of existence 
where consciousness and matter interpenetrate: "The mental and the physical are one. A 
change in the mental is a change in the physical, and a change in the physical is a change in the 
mental" (UM. 95). Consequently, as Rousseau's experience affirms, this unified field 
manifests in bodily chemical reactions as the "intellect, emotion and the whole state of the 
body are in a similar flux of fundamental participation" (UU, 386). With vague thoughts and 
little emotion only, subtle, almost imperceptible, changes occur. But Rousseau's potent visions 
provide a dynamic example; his emotional intensity yields an excessive physical stimulation 
that is overtly demonstrable to "the point of fainting." Not only does the nature of Rousseau's 
being change, but the whole field of consciousness is impregnated with his emotive thoughts. A 
way in which thoughts and emotions are all pervading is extolled by Saint-Preux in La 
Nouvelle Heloise: "My charming Julie! I see you, I feel you everywhere, 1 breathe you in with 
the air that you have breathed; you penetrate my entire being."25 
There are similarities between Shelley's relationship with Jane and Edward and 
Rousseau's with Sophie d'Houdetot and M. de Saint-Lambert. Rousseau's emotional 
involvement could also apply to Shelley's situation with-Jane-and-Edward-Williams: "We were 
both intoxicated with love—hers for her lover, and mine for her" (C, 413). In The Confessions 
Rousseau recognizes an ethics that advocates self-restraint in love and values, amonst other 
considerations, "morality and marital fidelity, which are at the root of all social order" (C, 
405). Conversely Shelley's conception of love is founded on a freedom to unite. Commitment 
to a single partner with the exclusion of future liaisons is delineated as life-denying in 
Epipsvchidion (1821): 
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I never was attached to that great sect, 
Whose doctrine is, that each one should select 
Out of the crowd a mistress or a friend, 
And all the rest, though fair and wise, commend 
To cold oblivion (149-53) 
Under the impulse of intense emotion Rousseau's need to communicate with Sophie 
d'Houdetot is compelling: " I was calmer for having spoken. A love known to the person who 
inspires it becomes more bearable" (C, 411). Similarly, in La Nouvelle Heloise. the stimulus to 
write emanates from unquellable feelings which, as Saint-Preux illustrates, become mitigated 
through articulation: "What good fortune to have found ink and paper! I am expressing my 
feelings in order to temper their excess; I moderate my ecstasy by describing it ." 2 6 A similar 
mediation of desire is a major reason for Shelley giving his lyrics to Jane Williams. Both 
William Keach and Susan Wolfson examine Shelley's conscious motivations behind the lyrics. 
Their appraisals are valuable and taken as a point of reference, but my concern is also with 
the sub-conscious workings that fuel Shelley's creativity, and generate interrelations between 
art and life. Chapter One, "A Poetics of Being", explored how poetry elicited an emotional 
engagement which re-defined the sense of being. Accordingly, if, as Shelley thought, poetry 
"compels us to feel that which we perceive, and to imagine that which we know" (PP. 505), 
then he was fully aware that his lyrics would have a profound effect upon Janerone that-was 
enhanced with each subsequent reading. With the lyrics to Jane Shelley's reliance on 
experiential knowledge tests his concepts to their ultimate extreme, and his theoretical 
conception of love falters with actual experience. Shelley's encounter with Jane confounds his 
elevated vision of love. Significantly Jane has a "lack of literary refinement" (LS I I , 435) and 
is, in Shelley's estimation, "not very clever" (LS I I , 257). Here Shelley's maturing ideas on 
love depart from his earlier insistence on a complete empathetic fulfillment, "a communion . . . 
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of our whole nature, intellectual, imaginative and sensitive" (PS, 408). Indeed the lyrics show 
how states of feeling become pre-eminent in Shelley's vision. 
Like Rousseau Shelley was accomplished at imaginatively conjuring and then physically 
meeting his metaphysical conceptions. His encounter with Jane Williams has a notable literary 
antecedent which Shelley himself recognized: Jane is "a most delightful person—whom we all 
agree is the exact antitype of the lady I described in the Sensitive plant—though this must have 
been a pure anticipated cognition as it was written a year before I knew her" (LS I I , 438). 
Ostensibly "pure anticipated cognition" seems to imply a prescient view of futurity. But this 
correlation between artistic representation and subsequent physical occurrence has a deeper 
signification. With Shelley's creative technique, poetic expression and personal ideals are 
so interrelated that he linguistically inscribes his deepest desires into an evolving archetypal 
image of woman. Originally the Countess of Mountcashel "was the source of the inspiration of 
his Sensitive Plant."27 In the poem the Lady's compassionate nature is powerfully projected 
to the flowers: " I doubt not they felt the spirit that came / From her glowing fingers through all 
their frame" (II. 31-2). It is no mere coincidence that Shelley himself should subsequently 
encounter a woman who possessed these very qualities. Jane's beneficent healing ability is 
captured in "The Magnetic Lady to Her Patient": "And from my fingers flow / The powers of 
life, and like a sign, / Seal thee from thine hour of woe" (MYR. p . 399, 9-1l).2 8 
n 
Shelley's emotional state in 1822 appears at a level of heightened sensitivity, and this affective 
state of being emanates from his previous artistic imaginings. The unequivocal choice 
between "Death and Love" had dominated Aiastor. prefaced Laon and Cythna. was a major 
theme in Julian and Maddalo. and is implicitly woven into other poems. In the Preface to 
Shelley's elegiac tribute to Keats, Adonais. death and love coalesce in his poetic vision. Shelley 
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reflects on the alluring beauty of the Protestant cemetery in Rome where his son William is 
buried: "It might make one in love with death, to think that one should be buried in so sweet a 
place" (PP. 390). Death as a means of unification permeates Adonais: "Die, / I f thou wouldst 
be with that which thou dost seek!" (464-5). Shelley's reasoning is persuasively argued, but 
raises concern with its hurried rashness: "Tis Adonais calls! oh, hasten thither, / No more let 
Life divide what Death can join together" (476-7). 
Shelley's letter to Trelawny in June 1822, requesting some "Prussic Acid, or essential oil 
of bitter almonds" (LS I I , 433), reveals a suicidal leaning that is probably more gesture than 
firm resolve. I f resolute, it is doubtful that Shelley would engage an intermediary to procure 
the means for his demise. Poison is intended as an anodyne against anticipated emotional 
suffering: " I need not tell you I have no intention of suicide at present, but I confess it 
would be a comfort to me to hold in my possession that golden key to the chamber of perpetual 
rest" (LS II , 433). However a note of desperation is evident in Shelley's remark, " I would 
give any price for this medicine" (LS II , 433). "Medicine" is a curious choice since it is 
usually taken as a curative rather than to precipitate fatal consequences. In "The Serpent Is 
Shut Out from Paradise" Shelley is seeking peace and death might provide a welcome 
obliteration of consciousness: "Doubtless there is a place of peace / Where my weak heart and 
all its throbs will cease" (47-8). The interlinking of death and medicine appears in "Lines 
written in the Bay of Lerici": "As if to some Elysian star / They sailed for drink to medicine / 
Such sweet and bitter-pain as mine" (42-4). In relation to the unfolding of futurity, death is 
firmly established at the level of quantum possibility, and frequently given greater clarity by 
Shelley's concentrated attention. By confusing the boundaries of art and life, was Shelley 
unwittingly inscribing his own death into his poetic compositions? If, as Shelley's theories 
state, emotive thoughts materialize into manifest existence, perhaps, through passionate poetic 
expression, he literally held "that golden key to the chamber of perpetual rest" (LS I I , 433). 
Was Shelley unconsciously, or even studiedly, preparing the scenario of his own death? Given 
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Shelley's views on the interconnections between art and life, continually inscribing the death of 
the author into his texts seems a hazardous exercise, as in the Preface to Epipsvchidion. "The 
Writer of the following Lines died at Florence, as he was preparing for a voyage to one of the 
wildest of the Sporades" (PP, 373). The cancelled Preface II gives another fatalistic version: 
"(The following Poem was found in the PF. of a young Englishman, who died on his passage 
from Leghorn to the Levant]" (PW. p. 425). 
As Michael O'Neill points out "No one was more vividly and tragically aware than PBS 
himself of the 'rashness' of his emotional adventures" (MYR, p. 351). But Shelley's interest in 
Jane Williams is not a sudden impulsive venture; it is a gradual attraction pursued with a 
studied sophistication. To attain Jane's surrender, Shelley deploys his metaphysical theories 
with great dexterity: thought, imagination and passion are masterfully woven together in a 
complex emotional strategy. Far from being the "Serpent" excluded from "Paradise", Shelley is 
emotionally coiled around Jane seeking both to occupy the primary position in her 
consciousness and to elicit a sense of sympathy by disturbing her equanimity: "These verses 
were too sad / To send to you, but that I know, / Happy yourself, you feel another's woe" (54-
6). Shelley seeks to elicit feelings from Jane that will become entangled with his own emotions. 
Yet at times this ploy is almost sabotaged when Shelley's emotions are aroused to a conflicting 
chaos and focus on despair. 
Richard Holmes declares that "Almost telepathically, Claire chose this moment to burst in 
again on Shelley's life from Florence" (SP. 701). But sudden synchronistic connections are 
understandable when consciousness is understood as an open interactive field, and Claire's real 
name is actually Jane. Such telepathy was hardly surprising considering that Mary had been 
removed from any idea of happy fulfillment in Shelley's emotional life. "When Passion's 
Trance Is Overpast" conveys a mood of despondency which "strongly reflects Shelley's 
estrangement from Mary during their last years together" (PP, 442 n. 4). In this lyric, Shelley 
laments the absence of "tenderness and truth" (2) and finds this loss of intimacy unbearable: 
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"Could thou but be what thou hast been!" (10). Indeed in an endeavour to recapture Mary's 
affection Shelley is willing to bridge this chasm partly through his imagination fueled by 
emotion: 
It were enough to feel, to see 
Thy soft eyes gazing tenderly . . . 
And dream the rest—and bum and be 
The secret food of fires unseen. (6-9) 
But Shelley's poetic gaze did not linger on Mary; it was transferred to Jane. Poignantly in his 
last letter Shelley thinks of giving Jane delight: " I only write these lines for the pleasure of 
tracing what will meet your eyes" (LS II , 445). 
Shelley's disaffinity with Mary is more openly addressed in a letter to John Gisbome. " I 
only feel the want of those who can feel, and understand me . . . Mary does not. The necessity 
of concealing from her thoughts that would pain her, necessitates this, perhaps" (LS I I , 435). In 
"The Serpent Is Shut Out from Paradise", instead of dreaming and lyrically revitalizing his 
love for Mary, Shelley is focused on his abject circumstances: the current reality of his "cold 
home" (25) and "Of acting a forced part in life's dull scene" (28). The Jane lyrics are poems 
of intense feeling and from the drafts Shelley appears to be in a desperate triangular situation. 
As Geoffrey Matthews remarks, his love for Jane-Williams 'Vas the most profoundly 
disturbing personal experience of Shelley's whole maturity."29 
Stendhal's shrewd understanding of human sentiments is of relevance to Shelley's impasse 
with Jane: "It should be remembered that a person under the stress of strong emotions seldom 
has time to notice the emotions of whoever is causing them."30 Although Jane is the focal point, 
for the release of Shelley's emotions, there is also some unattainable ideal beyond humanity, 
which conveys a sense of spiritual homelessness in the physical world. In "The Zucca", 
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Shelley's aspirations soar towards an unknowable goal that is paradoxically sensed as elusively 
omnipresent: 
I loved—oh, no, I mean not one of ye, 
Or any earthly one, though ye are dear 
As human heart to human heart may be;— 
1 loved, T know not what — but this low sphere 
And all that it contains, contains not thee, 
Thou, whom, seen nowhere, 1 feel everywhere. (PW, 17-22) 
Given the intensely private nature of "Lines written in the Bay of Lerici" one can not avoid 
a disquieting sense of voyeurism when engaging with the poet's intimate reflections. But 
access to Shelley's thoughts can be justified for the unique insight into the way in which he 
deftly employs the metaphysical elements of thought, passion and imagination to possess Jane 
Williams aesthetically. In solitude Shelley lapses into a pensive mood: 
She left me, and I staid alone 
Thinking over every tone, 
Which though now silent to the ear 
The enchanted heart could hear. (15-18) 
As the external scene gives way to reflective contemplation, emotion pervades the poet's 
being and quickens vision: 
And feeling ever—0 too much— 
The soft vibrations of her touch 
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As i f her gentle hand even now 
Lightly trembled on my brow. (21-4) 
Sensation is cleverly manipulated to signify tangible presence. "Lightly trembled"31 does little 
to dissuade the reader that this is not current experience, but evoked from an interweaving of 
recollection and imaginative vision. Moreover "even now" conveys a dramatic immediacy that 
virtually renders the absent Jane present. This poetic evocation resembles a personal moment of 
heightened awareness in 1814: Shelley visualized his ideal beloved with such fervour that 
"ideas almost acquired the intensity of sensations."32 Lyrically Shelley's "enchanted heart" 
seeking "The soft vibrations of her touch" recalls his ideas in On Love: " i f we feel, we would 
that another's nerves should vibrate to our own" (PP, 473). Furthermore in defining one of the 
"sensations" of love Shelley details a state of mutual resonance, an interrelationship "with a 
frame whose nerves, like the chords of two exquisite lyres strung to the accompaniment of one 
delightful voice, vibrate with the vibrations of our own . . ." (PP. 474). In "Lines written in the 
Bay of Lerici" passionate feeling hovers waveringly between insubstantial chimera and 
tangible actuality until desire collapses this distinction when vision supersedes external 
reality: 
And thus although she absent were 
Memory gave me all of her 
That even fancy dares to claim.— . (25-27) 
These lines read as an act of imaginative coition, and the erotic implication of fulfilled 
desire, in "gave me all of her", is substantiated in the draft. Originally Shelley chose "Fancy" 
(BSM I , f. 35v, 5) intimating a figurative rather than a literal surrender. Subsequently he 
changed "Fancy" to "Memory" which suggests the reminiscence of an accomplished act. Here 
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the interplay between past and future blurs the distinction between actuality and creative 
fantasy melding the scene into a timeless moment. Given the intimacy that these lines establish, 
the depth of emotion is most likely love, especially since Shelley censured loveless coition. 
Desire must be consummated either physically or imaginatively because love "when 
individualised, becomes an imperious necessity, only to be satisfied by the complete or partial, 
actual or supposed, fulfilment of its claims" (PS. 408). The artistic control and aesthetic 
distance achieved in "That even fancy dares to claim" was wrought from constant 
refinement. Revealingly Shelley initially drafted a more active role for himself: ' I daro—te / 
That—fate / I daro [d] to (BSM I , f 35v, 6-8). From the draft one can discern how the 
lyrics literally manifest, render into tangible form, a complex nexus of thoughts and emotions. 
Technically, by the social mores of the Christian value system, the poem reads as a spiritual 
and imaginative adultery by Shelley. As Geoffrey Matthews suggests "Life was what he had 
sought with Jane Williams, not peace."33 The poet is only able to allow free reign to his 
sensual feelings when alone as "Her presence had made weak and tame / All passions" (28-9). 
Here there are faint echoes of Dante's angelic conception of Beatrice: "Thus by her merest 
glance 1 am unmanned."34 But for Dante, Beatrice is an intermediary in his aim to reach God: 
Shelley's goal is a deeper relationship with Jane. William Keach considers whether lines 28-9 
mean that Shelley "felt no passion" with Jane or "spent his passion in her presence" (SS. 230). 
The nature of these "passions" is elaborated in the draft: "Al l passion, and / Desire & 
feaf . . ." (BSM I , f. 35v, 19-20). Paradoxically Shelley undermines his own philosophical 
creed here: unremitting hope conceived through love is creative; fear breeds despair and has a 
destructive potential. Whatever emotion may be quelled in Jane's company is reinvigorated 
when the poet is alone: 
But soon, the guardian angel gone, 
The demon reassumed his throne 
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In my faint heart . . . I dare not speak 
My thoughts; but thus disturbed and weak. (33-6) 
In the draft, immediately preceding these lines Shelley wrote and then crossed through, 
"But now I desired, I dare not" (BSM I , f. 35v, 28). This undercurrent of illicit feelings is 
barely contained and surfaces in the final composition: " I dare not speak / My thoughts" (35-
6). Herein lies the poem's artistic and Shelley's personal dilemma: "The crisis on which 
'Lines' founders challenges, at a preemptive level, the possibility of communication, even with 
one's own thoughts."35 The reason for this "crisis" in Shelley's authorial role emanates from a 
deeper understanding of his metaphysical belief that literary expression can be tantamount 
to physical incarnation. Again and again, Shelley had poetically reiterated his faith in the 
power of language to create life's experiences. In Laon and Cythna. Shelley warned that 
"Much must remain unthought, and more untold, / In the dark Future's ever-flowing um" (CP, 
344-5). Furthermore Shelley invested power in articulation, when he affirmed that "great is the 
strength / Of words" (CP. 1569-70). A year before writing "Lines written in the Bay of Lend" 
Shelley was theoretically able to separate, at some level, the consequences of art and life when 
he communicated to the Gisbomes the depth of "painful emotions" which generated the 
poetry of Adonais and stated that: 
The poet & the man-are two different natures: though they exist together they 
may be unconscious of each other, & incapable of deciding upon each other's 
powers & effects by any reflex act.— . (LS I I , 310) 
It is precisely an awareness of the reciprocal "powers & effects" between "The poet & the 
man" that is called into question in "Lines written in the Bay of Lerici." The poem is fraught 
with anguish over revealing the extent of Shelley's emotional involvement with Jane and 
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"couples an agitated uncertainty about desire and personal relationships with an agitated 
uncertainty about writing, about verbal representation" (SS. 233). This agitation arises from 
Shelley's belief that the combination of thought, imagination and passion is procreative. 
Accordingly, to "claim" Jane Williams poetically is, as Shelley is consciously aware, a stage in 
his anticipated physical seduction. 
Once the imaginative vision of Shelley's union with Jane is complete, he depicts a scene of 
furtive ensnarement that is psychologically revealing: 
And the fisher with his lamp 
And spear, about the low rocks damp 
Crept, and struck the fish who came 
To worship the delusive flame. (51 -4) 
Keach's reading of these lines is perceptively acute; he does not see Shelley merely as the 
passive "helpless fish" but " perhaps as both fisher and fish - luring the reader, Jane and 
himself towards a grim ending" (SS. 232). Indeed it is reasonable to assume that had Shelley 
lived he would not have been content solely with an artistic possession of Jane. 
The sympathetic interpenetration of one consciousness with another, to effect a state of 
spiritual and physical healing, is explored in "The Magnetic Lady to Her Patient." For Shelley 
magnetism was attractive as its underlying philosophical assumption about the structure of the 
world is based on unity: "Mesmerism, as Morse explains, saw the world in terms of continuity 
and harmony, while Lavoisier . . . held to a conception of science which was based on analysis 
and division."3 6 Magnetism was a way of stirring and strengthening deep feelings of 
compassion into a more comprehensive engagement of being. The poem was given to Jane 
folded, sealed and addressed: 'To Jane. / Not to be opened unless you are / alone, or with 
Williams" (MYR, pp. 396-7). Communication of Shelley's desire for Jane Williams is 
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intricately presented because "PBS brings into play the workings of a sensitive, emotionally 
complex consciousness" (MYR, p. 352). And because the messages are interwoven with his 
creativity they emanate from what Bohm terms the "implicate order" of reality, that is the 
deepest level of being, beneath the threshold of conscious awareness.37 Consequently, it is 
easily conceivable that Shelley was not aware of the extent to which his emotions are exposed. 
The following letter, addressed to Edward Williams, which accompanies "The Serpent Is Shut 
Out from Paradise", is fascinating for a number of reasons: 
My dear Williams 
in 
Looking over the portfolio from which my friend used 
in 
to keep his verses, & ftem when \ ich those 1 sent you the other 
day were found,— I have lit upon these; which as they are too 
dismal for me to keep I send them you. who can afford 
I f any of the stanza's should please you, you may 
read them to Jane, but to no one else, — and yet on second 
thought I had rather you would not - [as] [it-] [is] fTess] [diplomatic] 
[ ? - ] [Your ] [sieeefe] [SheHey] Yours ever affectionately. P.B.S. (MYR, p. 415). 
This message is certainly not "diplomatic" and, as William Keach points out, the writing 
contains a series of devices: "The blatantly transparent disguise ('my friend'), divided 
emotions, insinuatingly underscored pronoun and still legible deletions . . . " (SS, 216). If, as 
Michael O'Neill tentatively suggests, the cancelled marks at the start of the last line are 
"Jane" (MYR. pp. 414-6), then she appears tellingly at the moment Shelley is deciding which 
endearment to close with and consequently the sentiments are dedicated to her not Williams. 
272 
Sheiley was right to strike out "sincere"; the note's subterfuge is a way of revealing his 
emotions for Jane and not a declaration of sincerity to Williams. In the first draft preface to 
Epipsvchidion. Shelley writes that "The following Poem was found amongst other papers in 
the Portfolio of a young Englishman" (PW. p. 424). Epipsvchidion is a romantic invitation to 
Emily, Shelley's "heart's sister" (415) and, as in Williams' note, he uses the idea of a 
"Portfolio" to convey a token of love, whilst partially concealing his motives. 
Through poetic discourse "The Magnetic Lady to Her Patient" induces a deepened, 
soothing state of consciousness to establish a state of receptivity: 
"Sleep, sleep on, forget thy pain — 
My hand is on thy brow 
My Spirit on thy brain 
My pity on thy heart, poor friend. (MYR, pp. 398-9, 5-8) 
Here there is a threefold integration of the physical, spiritual and emotional levels of being to 
elicit a compassion that becomes, by the end of the second stanza, heart-rending for Jane: "my 
heart bleeds / For thine" (MYR. pp. 398-9, 22-23). Disconcertingly Shelley's emotional 
integrity is regained by causing a divisive anguish in Jane's state of being. In "One Word Is 
Too Often Profaned", most possibly written for Jane, Shelley mtimates that sympathy from 
the beloved-is cherished most: "And pity from thee more dear / Than that from another" (7-8). 
In "The Serpent Is Shut Out from Paradise" pity is experienced as the deepest emotion: 
"hatred", "scorn" and "Indifference" (9, 10) are bearable, "But not to speak of love, Pity alone 
/ Can break a spirit already more than bent" (12-13). The capitalization in "Pity" and its 
juxtaposition with "alone" underlines the depth of feeling. Keach harshly declares that "self-
pity takes a defiant, bitter edge and confronts the limitations of pity" (SS, 217). But this 
censure underestimates a human vulnerability that is wrestling under artistic restraint. "The 
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Magnetic Lady to Her patient" ostensibly depicts Jane healing Shelley, but certain lines can 
also be read from Shelley's perspective. For instance "from my fingers flow / The powers of 
life" (MYR, pp. 398-9, 9-10) is Shelley literally penning verses to Jane and thereby 
establishing a deeper affinity so that his emotional life can become intermingled with hers: 
And from my fingers flow 
The powers of life, and like a sign 
Seal thee from thine hour of woe, 
And brood on thee, but may not blend 
With thine. (MYR, p. 398-9, 9-13) 
Linguistically these lines are artfully composed. Jane's refusal of physical intimacy is 
undermined: "may not" has not the definite refusal of can not and the enjambment in "blend / 
With thine" intimates union. Significantly "brood" not only connotes a sense of dwelling on, 
but transports resonances from Epipsychidion where Shelley's invitation to Emily is 
presented within the Ovidian myth of Ceyx and Alcyone: "The halcyons brood around the 
foamless isles" (412). In this context "brood" evokes maternal feelings, appealing to Jane's 
deepest instincts, as in Ovid's myth when "Alcyone broods on the sea, wings outstretched over 
her nest."38 Although "Jane herself is made to speak the first four stanzas" (SS, 219) my 
interpretation resists this complicity. Moreover reading the concluding line of each stanza in 
succession discloses how it is Jane that is literally spell-bound by Shelley: "With thine", "For 
thine", "Be thine", "Possest", "My chain" (MYR, pp. 398-400). Of Shelley's request, "tempt 
me not to break / My chain" (MYR, p . 401, 24-5), Judith Chernaik remarks that "chain" has 
a dual significance: '*the chain of life" and '*the chain of his marriage."39 But another meaning, 
the "chain" of enchantment, that Shelley has so deftly woven around Jane, arises when 
juxtaposed with Byron's Manfred (which I discuss a little later). Beneath the level of conscious 
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awareness, in a state of semi-trance, Shelley is asking Jane to comply with his seduction of 
her. Shelley's success in establishing emotional bonds between Jane and himself is apparent 
with her extreme agitation after thinking Shelley passes twice along the terrace when he 
was elsewhere. As Mary Shelley observes, this behaviour is uncharacteristic of Jane: "the 
strangest thing is that M " W. saw him. Now Jane though a woman of sensibility, has not much 
imagination & is not in the slightest degree nervous —neither in dreams or otherwise."40 This 
visionary experience denotes the depth of Shelley's psychic and emotional link to Jane. 
Furthermore through her sympathy for Shelley, Jane experiences a more comprehensive and 
deeper engagement of being. As Shelley states in A Defence of Poetry: 
The imagination is enlarged by a sympathy with pains and passions so mighty, 
that they distend in their conception the capacity of that by which they are 
conceived; the good affections are strengthened by pity, indignation, terror and 
sorrow . . . (PP, 490) 
Jane, as Shelley's current love, can anchor him to mortal existence, a link that is defined 
in Manfred as "the chain of human ties" (BP IV, I I . i i . 102). Shelley has woven such a 
hypnotic spell around Jane, that it would have been difficult for her to break. Nigel Leask 
states that "Mesmerism is a form of willed love or 'pity' in Rousseau's sense of a primary 
social sympathy, when natural or -free' love is impossible in the polluted garden of patriarchal 
society."41 But monogamous relationships in ''the polluted garden of patriarchal society" are 
not an obstacle for Shelley who wrote in Epipsvchidion that "Love is like an understanding, 
that grows bright, / Gazing on many truths" (162-3). In "The Magnetic Lady to Her Patient" 
Shelley's own rejuvenation is instigated primarily at a soul level: 
"Like a cloud big with a May shower 
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My soul weeps healing rain 
On thee, thou withered flower — 
It breathes mute music on thy sleep — 
Its odour calms thy brain — 
Its' light within thy gloomy breast 
Spreads, like a second youth again — 
By mine thy being is to its deep 
Possest.— . (MYR. p. 401, 8-16) 
In this penultimate yet climactic stanza, the "spell" touches the well-springs of Jane's being, 
where her "soul weeps healing rain." Here Shelley has seduced Jane to a point of total 
spiritual, imaginative and emotional consummation: "By mine thy being is to its deep / 
Possest." This level of communion suggests a complicity on Jane's part, but one that is not 
necessarily conscious. The desire to "Forget lost health, and the divine / Feelings which feH 
died in youths brief mom" (MYR, p. 401, 3-5), in the previous stanza, is now overturned: 
"divine / Feelings', connoting a sacred completeness, are restored with the "second youth 
again." When Jane's "soul weeps healing rain" it is the emotional release that facilitates 
rejuvenation. In a similar vein, Shelley appeals to Emily's tears in Epipsvchidion to enact a 
divine purification: 
I pray thee that thou blot from this sad song 
All of its much mortality and wrong, 
With those clear drops, which start like sacred dew 
From the twin lights thy sweet soul darkens through, 
Weeping, t i l l sorrow becomes ecstasy: 
Then smile on it, so that it may not die. (35-40) 
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In Epipsvchidion Shelley's envisaged love with Emily was presented as a mutual reciprocity, 
but in terms of possession: "Possessing and possest by all that is / Within that calm 
circumference of bliss" (549-50). 
Disquietingly, in the Jane poems, love is often portrayed as tortuously binding, as in 
"With a Guitar. To Jane": "Ariel to Miranda;— Take / This slave of music for the sake / Of 
him who is the slave of thee" (1 -3). In A Defence of Poetry the Troubadours' poetry is 
enchantingly mesmeric; their "verses are as spells, which unseal the inmost enchanted 
fountains of the delight which is in the grief of Love" (PP, 497). Spells, enchantment and a 
sense of captivity permeate these late lyrics and this level of seduction can be elucidated in 
relation to Byron's Manfred. 
In Byron's dramatic poem Manfred, the eponymous protagonist is "A Magian of great 
power, and fearful skill!" (BP IV, n. iv. 31). Such a powerful hero held an obvious attraction 
for Shelley whose fascination with the magus-like Ahasuerus had reached its zenith in Hellas. 
The allure of magic is a dominant theme in the poems to Jane Williams and this is mirrored by 
a complicity in the natural world. In 'To Jane—The Recollection" Shelley writes 
We paused amid the pines that stood 
The giants of the waste, 
Tortured by the storms to shapes as rude 
As serpents interlaced. (MYR. p. 387, 2-5) 
Trees exerted a quasi-mesmeric effect on Shelley and when forged into "serpents interlaced" 
import the symbolic power of Mercury's caduceus, the magician's wand. 
In Manfred the incantation evokes a spell-binding bondage over its protagonist who 
becomes ensnared in its "clankless chain" (BP IV, I . i , 259): 
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When the moon is on the wave, 
And the glow-worm in the grass, 
And the meteor on the grave, 
And the wisp on the morass; 
When the railing stars are shooting, 
And the answer'd owls are hooting, 
And the silent leaves are still 
In the shadow of the hill, 
Shall my soul be upon thine, 
With a power and with a sign. (BP IV, I . i . 192-201) 
Shelley's enthusiastically praises the liberated ideals in Byron's dramatic poem: " I have read 
'Manfred' with the greatest admiration. The same freedom from common rules that marked the 
3rd Canto [of Childe Harold! and 'Chillon' is visible here" (LS I , 547). However Shelley has 
reservations about the darkness of Manfred's vision which he found "dreadfully melancholy" 
and led him to question Byron about such despair: "Why do you indulge this despondency?" 
(LS I , 547). Charles Robinson investigates "evidence of the Alastorian quest in Manfred" (SB. 
53) and finds that its aspirations provide "an anti-Shelleyan tract" (SB. 59). As Robinson 
points out "what evidently violated Byron's sense of decorum was the Poet's passive and futile 
death and the narrator's failure to question the idealistic premise of the Poet's quest" (SB, 53-— 
4). But Shelley's Alastorian quest is a courageous venture into the nature of being and search 
for his soul's counterpart, themes which become dominant in his poetic vision. 
Like Shelley in the "Magnetic Lady" Manfred is seeking "Forgetfulness" (BP IV, I . i . 136). 
but a state which only comes through self-annihilation: "Oblivion, self-oblivion—" (BP IV, I . 
i . 144). Similarly Shelley would need a total loss of consciousness to forget Jane. Manfred's 
feminine ideal, "The lady Astarte" (BP IV, HI. i i i . 47) shares his pursuit of arcane wisdom 
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with "The quest of hidden knowledge, and a mind / To comprehend the universe" (BP IV, I I . 
ii.110-11). But her search is crucially tempered with the "gentler powers" of compassion: 
"Pity, and smiles, and tears—which I had not" (BP IV, I I . i i . 113). Although her "tenderness" 
has a benevolent influence which is mirrored in Manfred's desire for her, he lacks her vital 
quality of "Humility'' (BP IV, I I . i i , 114, 115). Manfred is a poem about the wielding and use 
of supernatural power, which is destructive unless lovingly tempered with wisdom and 
beneficence. Of his feminine counterpart Manfred states: " I loved her, and destroy'd her!" (BP 
IV, I I . i i . 117). Astarte's point of vulnerability is not physical, but through the emotional part 
of her being. Manfred destroys her: "Not with my hand, but heart —Which broke her heart — / 
It gazed on mine, and withered" (BP I I . i i . 118-19). As in Shelley's Laon and Cythna. the 
heart is the source of creation and point of destruction. 
From the facsimile of 'To Jane. The Invitation" Shelley's writing initially appears fairly 
faint, "Fine pen-cut; dark brown ink; light tint" (MYR. p. 371), and this delicacy mirrors the 
opening exaltation of Jane in radiant images of light: "Best & brightest, come away — / Fairer 
far than this fair day" (MYR. p. 373, 4-5). The words do not proceed along the page 
horizontally, but the lines slope downwards, the characters become larger and bolder as the 
poem progresses. With this descent in the style of writing there is a sense of the spiritual 
qualities receiving a more earthly portrayal. Jane is not rapturously apostrophized and remote 
like her predecessor Emilia, in Epipsychidion. who was, at times, inaccessibly conceived as 
"Thou Moon beyond the clouds!" (27) and "Thou Star above the Storm!" (28) Throughout 
"To Jane. The Invitation" the spiritual mterrningles with the physical: "The brightest hour of 
unborn spring" (MYR. p. 373, 11) effects a transfiguration through cosmic embrace: "Bending 
from Heaven in azure mirth / It kissed the forehead of the earth" (MYR. p. 373, 15-6). The 
concluding simile of the first stanza interconnects the natural world with the beloved, "Making 
the wintry world appear / Like one on whom thou smilest, dear" (MYR. p. 373, 23-4): 'Hhou" 
suggests a divine elevation, yet this remoteness is counterbalanced by "dear" which conveys 
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earthly sentiment. In Alastor the narrator voiced an interrelationship with the elements: "Earth, 
ocean, air, beloved brotherhood" (1). Jane is similarly delineated in cosmic kinship: "Radiant 
Sister of the day" (MYR. p. 377, 1). 
Intriguingly, in the Jane poems, desire is communicated at different levels of conscious 
awareness. Whereas in "The Magnetic Lady to Her Patient" a deepened state of relaxation was 
invoked to facilitate hypnotic suggestion, in 'To Jane. The Invitation" Shelley's enticement is 
explicit: 
Away away from men & towns 
To the wild wood & the downs, 
To the silent wilderness 
Where the soul need not repress 
It's music lest it should not find 
An echo in another's mind, 
While the touch of Nature's art 
Harmonizes heart to heart.—. (MYR. p. 375,1-8) 
Here Shelley envisages a natural setting for a spiritual and emotional engagement that 
"Harmonizes heart to heart." Noticeably, at the heightened moment of erotic implication, 
Shelley's writing falters over the word "yields", bringing it into greater prominence: " ' L a m -
gone into the fields / "To take what this sweet hour yei\ ields" (MYR. p. 375, 11-12). As this 
manuscript was given to Jane it could denote a private avowal of their intimacy. Equally, the 
stumble suggests a sense of frustration. Significantly an ink mark appears at the far left of the 
line " 'At length I find one moment's good", this moment occurring "After long pain —with all 
your love" (MYR, p. 375, 24-5). Again, perhaps this is a coded admission of their affection: 
the dash leaves space for a thought which automatically conjures Jane. But the concluding line 
280 
intimates that a declaration of Jane's feelings have been withheld: "This you never told me 
o f " (MYR, p. 375, 26). The poem moves quickly to an envisioned synthesis of the elements: 
is 
And the blue noon * over us, 
And the multitudinous 
Billows murmur at our feet 
Where the earth and ocean meet 
And all things seem only one 
In the universal Sun.—. (MYR, pp. 377-9, 23-8) 
With "the universal Sun" Shelley gestures towards a sense of unification. "Sun" presents a 
cosmic image of bestowing life, but in Shelleyan terms also designates the poetic imagination, 
which he earlier termed "the Sun of l ife." 4 2 
' To Jane—The Recollection" opens as a poem of irretrievable loss reminiscing on a time 
which Shelley deems has passed, "The loveliest & the last, is dead" (MYR, p. 385, 6). 
Accordingly the permeating radiance, "Which scattered from above the sun / A light of 
Paradise," has now been eclipsed, leaving "The epitaph of glory dead" (MYR, p. 385, 24-5, 
9). However a tone of optimism is conveyed as inspiration from cherished experience can be 
summoned into lyrical expression: "Rise Memory, & write it's praise!" (MYR, p. 385, 1), 
In the first stanza of the lyric Shelley immediately re-invokes a feeling of intimacy with 
"We" which also commences stanzas two, and four. In the poems to Jane love "veers between 
implying feelings for a particular person and a more general stance towards reality . . . " (MYR. 
351). Indeed Shelley deftly achieves an oscillating movement between focusing on his 
relationship with Jane and a boundless interpenetration with nature; this apprehension of 
cosmic fusion was sought with Emily in Epipsychidion: 
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Let us become the over-hanging day, 
The living soul of this Elysian isle, 
Conscious, inseparable, one. . . . (538-40) 
Alastor had opened with the narrator experiencing a personal reciprocity with the natural 
world: " I f our great Mother has inbued my soul / With aught of natural piety to feel / Your 
love, and recompense the boon with mine" (2-4). But this self-secluded interpenetration 
ultimately proved to be destructive. In 'To Jane—The Recollection" Shelley seeks, through 
Jane, an interconnection with universal love which he depicts as implicit in all creation: 
The breath of peace we drew 
With its soft motion made not less 
The calm that round us grew.— 
There seemed from the remotest seat 
Of the white mountain-waste, 
To the soft flower beneath our feet 
A magic circle traced, 
A spirit interfused around 
A thrilling silent life: / . 
To momentary peace it-bound 
Our mortal nature's strife;— 
(MYR, pp. 387-9, 20-26, 1-4) 
Encompassed by an "inviolable quietness" (MYR, p. 387, 19) Shelley experiences a deep 
attunement to Jane, a unison felt in "The breath of peace we drew." This accord is 
experienced as the very rhythm of life; an expansive interconnection to the universal harmony 
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which in a "momentary peace" temporarily dissolves division or "strife." Here Shelley's 
philosophical vision of unity in On Life appears seamlessly woven into his consciousness and 
implicit in his poetic expression; he dissolves the boundaries between internal and external 
reality until they merge into an iridescent glow. Surrender to this serenity engages the 
innermost state of being. 
And still I felt the ee centre of 
The magic circle there 
Was one fair form that filled with love 
life 
The breathless atmosphere. (MYR, p. 389, 5-9) 
Following Jane's earlier depiction as "a sort of spirit of embodied peace" (LS I I , 376) she now 
appears as curiously remote, disembodied and idealized as "one fair form." Significantly 
Shelley's recognition of Jane is not on an outward physical level, but through the pervasive 
feeling of love that permeates the scene. Jane's responsive sensitivity to Shelley is life-
enhancing. Although partly idealized, Jane's actual presence is signified in the opening of the 
fourth stanza: "We paused beside the pools that lie / Under the forest bough—" (MYR. p. 
389,11 -12). The poem progresses to a deeper visionary state of apprehension: 
And all was interfused beneath 
With an Elysian glow, 
An atmosphere without a breath, 
A softer day below -
Like one beloved, the scene had lent 
To the dark water's breast 
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Its every leaf & lineament 
With more than truth exprest. fMYR. p. 391, 6-13) 
Seemingly a pantheistic pervading spirit evokes a divine unity where "all was interfused." Yet a 
closer reading registers degrees of resistance: "Like one beloved" intimates, yet impairs, 
fusion. Moreover "lent" evokes the transient nature of such visionary experience. Nature is 
impregnated with inner subjective qualities rendering a panpsychist view as "imaged in the 
water's love" (MYR, p. 391, 4). This apprehension imbues existence with a sentient 
consciousness: "It's every leaf & lineament / With more than truth exprest." In Julian and 
Maddalo, Julian had rhetorically proposed that human consciousness itself possessed the 
ultimate ideals: "Where is the love, beauty and truth we seek / But in our mind?" (174-5). Now 
"love, beauty and truth" are immanent in all existence. Yet this immanence is ephemerally 
reliant on Jane's presence; her absence deprives the world of this vitality: "A frown is on the 
Heaven's brow" (MYR. p. 385, 11). Shelley ingeniously disrupts the Edenic scene of blissful 
serenity with atmospheric change: 
Until an envious wind crept by, 
Like an unwelcome thought 
Which from the mind's too faithful eye 
Blots one dear image out — . (MYR. p. 391, 14-17) 
The human referent of "an envious wind" has variously been identified as Mary Shelley, but 
there is a deeper level of meaning. As Susan Wolfson notes "it is the imagination itself. . . 
that blots out its dear image."43 In "Mutability" "One wandering thought pollutes the day" 
(10), and one would expect a permeating effect from "an envious wind" or "an unwelcome 
thought" rather than a blot. Pointedly "Blots" is given full weight metrically and denotes an 
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eclipse which erases visionary apprehension where "all things seem only one / In the 
universal Sun." 
The closing quatrain provokes critical analysis, especially since the "loaded blank begs 
for comment."14 
Though thou art ever fair and kind 
And forests ever green 
Less oft is peace in 's mind 
Than calm in water seen. (MYR. p. 391,18-21) 
In these lines Keach finds that the omission "might be expected to cause suffering, for Shelley 
to make Jane Williams fill in the missing name" (SS, 216). This undermines what is perhaps a 
playful stroke; a more perceptive reading of the tone is Michael O'Neill's suggestion of '*the 
deftest insinuations of disquiet, the most understated of emotional diminuendos" (MYR. p. xxi). 
Indeed words are chosen for their tranquil connotations and "Less oft" does little to dispel a 
concluding atmosphere of serenity. However the all-pervading unity becomes fragmented in 
these lines. Earlier nature was imbued with Jane's qualities, her fairness being implicated in 
'^ that fair forest green" (MYR, p. 391, 5). Now there is a distinct notion of separateness 
reintroduced by "thou" which re-establishes distance. 
In 'To Jane [The keen stars were twinkling]" Shelley successfully creates and sustains an 
atmosphere of mutual consonance. It is an "ariette", designed as a duet between Shelley's 
poetics and Jane's musicality, in which he accomplishes a victorious synthesis: "Where 
moonlight & music & feeling / Are won" (BSM I , f. 38v, 8-9). This draft version is written 
upside down at the bottom of a page that commences with the following lines from The 
Triumph of Life: 
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[? Thoro] the creators, near them—a—dr-
in 
Of the destroyers, ef one victory 
Both swell the pageant now 
[? Tho3o] hearts wore confounded. (BSM I , f. 38v, 6-10) 
Although Shelley was "trying to conserve his dwindling supply of writing paper" (BSM I , p. 
310), there is an interesting parallel in relation to his ideas on creativity. Essentially the 
"creators" and "destroyers" which "swell the pageant" of life are joined in "one victory" 
because their "hearts were confounded." Here "confounded" denotes a fusion where the 
emotions become inextricably linked. Likewise in "The keen stars", there is a union between 
Jane's singing and Shelley's depth of feeling which generates the lyric: 
Sing again, with your dear voice revealing 
Atone 
Of some world far from our's, 
Where music & moonlight & feeling 
Are one (MYR, p. 437, 23-7). 
Susan Wolfson reads Shelley's initial choice of "Are won" as suggesting a tenable goal: "as i f 
the destination intimated by Jane's singing could be gained by striving."45 But what might this 
destination be? The "world far from our's" is a world of unity that, although not yet physically 
achievable, is created imaginatively and spiritually. Perhaps, of all the lyrics given to Jane, 
"The keen stars" is the one in which lyrical expression evokes the greatest degree of 
emotional closeness. Shelley's confidential missive to Jane, written along the right-hand side of 
the lyric, is artfully constructed: 
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I sate down to write some words for an ariette which might be profane—. but it was 
in vain to struggle with the ruling spirit, who compelled me to speak of things sacred 
to yours & Wilhelmeister's indulgence— . I commit them to your secrecy & your mercy 
& will try & do better another time. (MYR. p. 437, 28-31) 
This inscription has been seen as "a cryptic and apologetic note" (SS, 228) written to establish 
a "guilty scenario of 'secrecy and mercy. '" 4 6 In his desire to "do better" there is an element of 
romantic posturing, but when read in conjunction with his final letter to Jane, one detects 
Shelley's sense of emotional impoverishment within this relationship: "the absence of one 
scarcely worth regretting" (LS I I , 445). This brief communication is a well-organized attempt 
to disestablish the intrinsic oneness at the heart of Jane and Edward's relationship by profanely 
addressing '^ things sacred" to their "indulgence." Having thus interceded, Shelley chooses 
"(x>mmit," a verb rarely found in his poetics,47 in an attempt to dispossess Edward by 
extracting a private understanding from Jane. To sanction his intrusion Shelley cites a 
compulsion driven by l<the ruling spirit", presumably creative inspiration. There is a volte-
face from "The Serpent Is Shut Out from Paradise" where the poetic impulse had initially led 
Shelley to withdraw in despair: " I too, must seldom seek again / Near happy friends a mitigated 
pain" (7-8). Tracing the mercurial nature of Shelley's connection to Jane takes the reader 
through a succession of intricate manoeuvres. "With a Guitar. To Jane" opened with Ariel in a 
servile, self-abasing, relationship to Miranda: "the slave of thee" (3). Shelley's persona of 
Ariel, unique to this poem, pursues a dedicated interest in tracking Miranda and Ferdinand's 
(Jane and Edward's) "course of love" (33). Having served as a "guardian spirit" (13) and 
posed with the forlorn demeanor of "deserted Ariel" (26), the creative "sprite" (37) forges 
metaphoric bonds, so that the lyric culminates by realigning Shelley's own position: "For our 
beloved Jane" (90) claims an equal share in her affections. 
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Jane's 'taste for music" is endlessly enticing to Shelley: " I listen the whole evening on our 
terrace to the simple melodies with excessive delight" (LS I I , 435). This feeling of "delight" is 
resplendency conveyed in "The keen stars": "No leaf will be shaken / While the dews of your 
melody scatter / Delight" (MYR. p. 437, 19-21). Simplicity imparts lyrical grace: "So your 
voice most tender / To the strings without soul had then given / It's own" (MYR, p. 437, 12-
14). The balanced poise achieved in this lyric is highlighted when compared with Shelley's 
earlier celebration of Claire Clairmont, who had inspired the "consuming extacies" (11) of 
"To Constantia." Here a tone of enthrallment prevails; Shelley is captivated "By the 
inchantment of thy strain" (28). Claire's performance is one of spellbinding intoxication. "The 
blood and life within thy snowy fingers / Teach witchcraft to the instrumental stings" (2-4). 
Passion veers uncontrollably towards a precipice: "Upon the verge of Nature's utmost sphere" 
(32). 'To Constantia" is energized by a heavy sensuality that leaves an indelible imprint on 
the poet's emotional life: "Even while I write my burning cheeks are wet— / Such things the 
heart can feel and learn, but not forget!" (43-44). Constantia stirs an unendurable eroticism, 
bordering on the demonic: "Cease, cease —for such wild lessons madmen learn" (34). 
Conversely the emotional intensity in "The keen stars" is masterfully tempered under 
imaginative control: "Though the sound overpowers / Sing again" (MYR p. 437, 22-3). 
Similarly, in "With a Guitar. To Jane" harmony is elicited through a disciplined finesse: "But, 
sweetly as its answers will / Flatter hands of perfect skill" (87-8). 
In Epipsvchidion. which is "consciously baptized with a Platonic name" (PS, 279), Shelley 
envisioned a relationship with Emily that would penetrate the depths of being, to reach "the 
wells / Which boil under our being's inmost cells, / The fountains of our deepest life" (568- 70). 
Shelley knew that his affection for Emilia Viviani was inevitably "ill-fated", nevertheless he 
displayed a keen attentiveness with regard to her future: " I am deeply interested in her destiny, 
& that interest can in no manner influence it" (LS I I , 256). But influencing Jane's "destiny" 
seems an achievable possibility, especially since she is not incarcerated in a convent like 
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Emilia, but living in close proximity. Certainly the lyrics seek to elicit from Jane a deeper 
engagement of being; they are "charges of affection, rivalry, and manipulation",48 designed to 
encompass the emotional spectrum: jealousy, heartfelt compassion, sorrow and joy. 
In these last lyrics, what role does Shelley assign to Jane? Evidently, from her primary 
position of addressee, Jane inspired some of Shelley's most finely wrought compositions. 
Although Jane serves as creative muse, she is much less a romantic projection than her 
precursor Emilia, who Shelley venerated as an anima archetype in Epipsvchidion: "Youth's 
vision thus made perfect" (42). With its classical origins Epipsychidion is conceived from "the 
words / Of antique verse and high romance" (209-10). Yet the poem also, in Shelley's words, 
reveals aspects of his inner nature, "what I am and have been," by depicting "an idealized 
history of my life and feelings" (LS I I , 434). In the lyrics to Jane there is little idealization, and 
an almost palpable sense of human involvement which denotes greater emotional maturity. 
Conventional romantic appellations such as '^ thy voice" (BSM I , f. 38v, 4), in the drafting of 
"The keen stars," are revised to "your dear voice" (MYR, p. 437, 23) in the final composition, 
thus showing a more intimate association. 
Exclusion from paradise is the presiding atmosphere of these late lyrics; a paradise lost 
with Mary and one not yet gained with Jane that induces deep emotions: "Griefs that should 
sleep, and hopes that cannot die" ("The Serpent Is Shut Out from Paradise", 20). Milton's epic 
appears woven into Shelley's consciousness; his letters readily draw on allusions from 
Paradise Lost, and one written to Claire Clairmont, 30 May 1822, situates Jane's discontent 
within a Miltonic framework (LS I I , 430 n. 2). Whilst writing The Triumph of Life Shelley's 
ideas about creativity questioned the authorial role. Milton's philosophical disquisitions in 
Paradise Lost are of relevance to Shelley's ideas of creativity: 
In discourse more sweet 
(For eloquence the soul, song charms the sense) 
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Others apart sat on a hill retired, 
In thoughts more elevate, and reasoned high 
Of providence, foreknowledge, will, and fete, 
Fixed fete, free will, foreknowledge absolute, 
And found no end, in wand'ring mazes lost.49 
The council of fallen Angels, expelled from paradise and bewildered by this philosophical maze 
must have engaged Shelley's deepest attention, especially in relation to the dichotomy between 
"Fixed fete" and "free will." Most significantly the disgraced Angels are unable to extricate a 
tenable theory concerning the nature of reality, and herein lies the decisive principle in their 
fell; a principle which Shelley searchingly pursued in his poetic vision. In Paradise Lost a 
philosophical position of uncompromising free-will is elicited in a complicated deliberation: 
So were created, nor can justly accuse 
Their Maker, or their making, or their fete, 
As if predestination overruled 
Their will, disposed by absolute decree 
Or high foreknowledge; they themselves decreed 
Their own revolt, not I: if I foreknew, 
Foreknowledge had no influence on their feult, 
Which had no less proved certain unforeknown. 
So without least impulse or shadow of fete, 
Or aught by me immutably foreseen, 
They trespass, authors to themselves in all 
Both what they judge and what they choose; for so 
I formed them free, and free they must remain, 
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Till they enthrall themselves . . . 
Milton poses a view of self-determination; the fallen Angels are unequivocally pronounced the 
"authors" of their own destinies. Throughout Paradise Lost "Author" encompasses both the 
benign and malevolent aspects of creation: Satan is admonished as the "Author of evil" 
perpetrating "These acts of hateful strife, hateful to all." 5 1 The question of authorial creativity 
was a major issue for Shelley, and, given Rousseau's warning in The Triumph of Life, that his 
"words were seeds of misery" (280), it seems almost inconceivable that Shelley should both 
write and envision Jane in a scene of desolation: " I fear you are solitary & melancholy at Villa 
Magni . . . I figure to myself the countenance which has been the source of such consolation to 
me, shadowed by a veil of sorrow" (LS I I , 445). Jane's postscript to this letter shows an 
intuition that her life might be imperilled in some way: "Why do you talk of never enjoying 
moments like the past, are you going to join your friend Plato or do you expect I shall do so 
soon?" (LS II , 445 n.3). Why did Shelley cast not only himself, but also Jane in a tragic role? 
Shelley's sense of alienation is often acutely portrayed during his last months; "Remembrance" 
depicts a desultory loneliness: "As the heart when joy is fled / I am left alone, - alone —" 
(MYR. p. 357, 9-10). This sense of estrangement is projected onto Jane. "For our beloved 
Jane, alone.—" ("With a Guitar. To Jane", 90) simultaneously evokes a sense of her 
uniqueness, but disconcertingly isolates Jane; an isolation that became a devastating reality 
following Shelley and Williams' drowning; 
An analysis of Shelley's "poetry of life" opened this thesis with an holistic paradigm of 
existence in which poetry was shown to have a fundamentally creative role in shaping 
conceptions concerning the structure of reality. This concluding chapter has looked more 
deeply into the nature of poetic creativity by examining its influences on the state of being in 
relation to Rousseau's writings and Shelley's poems to Jane Williams. Close textual readings 
of Shelley's lyrics, missives and letters have suggested a reciprocity between art and life, a 
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reciprocity that was foremost in Shelley's thoughts whilst writing The Triumph of Life. 
Moreover Shelley's lyrics themselves show an awareness of the complicated interrelations 
between writing and living. Implicated in these interconnections are philosophical questions 
concerning the fabric of existence. What influence did Shelley's artistic expression have on the 
life experiences of his immediate circle? Following Shelley's mature insights into the nature of 
creativity, expressed through his poetic vision in Hellas and The Triumph of Life, it is certainly 
plausible that artistic creation engenders "A being more intense" in which we actually gain 
"The life we image." 
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3 As Judith Chemaik has appropriately remarked: "The Romantic poets took private 
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its primacy as a test not only of knowledge but of wisdom and moral truth", The Lyrics of 
Shelley (Cleveland: P of Case Western Reserve U, 1972), 6; hereafter referred to as Chemaik. 
4 When conveying his holistic understanding of existence, Heidegger's innovative terminology 
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Lovers. Inhabitants of a Small Town at the Foot of the Alps, trans. Judith H. McDowell (1968; 
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State UP, 1987), 52; hereafter referred to as Rousseau, Nouvelle 
Heloise. 
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is a mystery" and their examination of textual evidence suggests that it was most probably 
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